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I. Introduction
With the withdrawal of Israeli settlers and soldiers from the Gaza
Strip, increasing attention inevitably has focused upon the fate of Israeli
settlements on the West Bank,1 the area of the Palestinian Mandate west of
the Jordan River that Jordan captured in 1948 and that Israel refers to as
Judea and Samaria. Excluding small outposts constructed without
permission of the Israeli military administration2 and certain disputed
neighborhoods within the borders of Jerusalem3, approximately 250,000
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See,e.g., Editorial, Not Good Enough, HAARETZ, Mar. 6, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/690437.html (urging removal of West Bank settlements); Aluf Benn
& Yossi Verter, Olmert to Offer Settlers: Expand Blocs, Cut Outposts, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/692632.html(last updated Mar. 10, 2006) (Acting Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert, if Kadima Party forms the next government, intends to remove settlements beyond a certain
line, but then to expand settlement blocs within that line); Mazal Mualem, Netanyahu: Poll is Referendum
on Olmert’s Pullout Plan, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/692852.html (last
updated Mar. 12, 2006); Nir Hasson & Lilach Weissman, Peretz: Labor won’t Waive on Negotiations for
Withdrawal, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/692847.html (last updated Mar.
11, 2006) (Labor will not witdraw from West Bank unilaterally, but will remove illegal outposts and
compensate settlers who leave West Bank voluntarily).
2
See, generally, Talya Sason, Summary of Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts, Mar. 20, 2005
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Summary+of+Opinion+Concer
ning+Unauthorized+Outposts+-+Talya+Sason+Adv.htm (hereinafter, the “Sason Report”).
3
A 2004 map prepared by the Washington Institute for Near Policy shows all areas of Greater Jerusalem
that fall outside the pre-1967 armistice lines, distinguishing between those areas largely inhabited by Jews,
those largely inhabited by Arabs, and those with mixed populations. See
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/mapImages/41de98e058452.jpg (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). One of the
neighborhoods that falls outside the pre-1967 lines is Gilo, which lies in the direction of Bethlehem and has
been the subject of many attacks. See CNN.com, Bomb kills 19 on Israeli bus,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/06/18/mideast.violence/index.html (last visited Dec. 22,
2005). The question of what areas of Jerusalem Israel should retain has now resurfaced, with talk of a
“unified Jerusalem” under Israeli sovereignty less current than it had been under the Sharon government.
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Israeli Jewish settlers live in approximately 150 settlements on the West
Bank.4 While the exact amount of territory the settlements occupy on the
West Bank is subject to debate, most authorities place that area as less than
two percent of the land mass of the West Bank.5 Both the agony of the Gaza
withdrawal6 and the impetus for establishing a Palestinian state according to
the “road map”7 – the plan adopted by the United States, the United Nations,
the European Union and Russia and accepted by the Palestinian Authority
See Nadav Shragai, No MoreTalk of Unified Jerusalem, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/690895.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2006).
4
See Nadav Shragai, Peace Now: No New West Bank Outposts, But More Settlers in 2005, HAARETZ
DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/679476.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2006) (estimate of
250,000 at end of 2005); Mitchell Bard, Facts About Settlements,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/settlements.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (estimate of
246,000 as of August, 2005); B’Tselem,
http://www.btselem.org/English/Settlements/Settlement_poplation.xls (visited Jan. 9, 2006) (estimate of
232,718 settlers at end of 2004). Note that Palestinians, who characterize many parts of present Jerusalem
(e.g., Gilo) as settlements, state much higher figures. See, e.g., EDWARD SAID, THE END OF THE PEACE
PROCESS, introduction at xiii (2000) (“there are about 350,000 Israeli Jewish settlers on Palestinian land”).
5
The percentage depends, to a large extent, upon whether the references are to the designated municipal
borders of a settlement or the built-up area and whether the reference includes road construction ancillary
to the settlement. See infra notes 254-58, 279, and accompanying text.
6
See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paying the Price for Peace, The Human Cost of Disengagement
Jul. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israels+Disengagement+Plan+Renewing+the+Peace+Process+Apr+2005.htm. For a pictorial presentation of the agony, see Anat
Balint, Haaretz photographer wins 1st prize in World Press Photo contest, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/681472.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2006) and
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/681483.html (last updated Feb.11, 2006). For the difficulty of the
Gaza evacuees reestablishing their lives following the evacuation, see, e.g., Raffi Berg, Israel’s ‘forgotten’
settlers, BBC News, Nov. 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/4442106.stm.;
Nadav Shragai, Abandoned Comrades, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/657298.html (last
updated on Dec. 13, 2005)(describing the unemployment, homelessness, illness and other social problems
of the evacuees). See also Dan Izenberg, Comptroller Slams Gaza Resettlement Failures, THE
JERUSALEM POST,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1139395557407&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Mar. 7, 2006).
7
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Performance Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two State Solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Apr. 30, 2003) (hereinafter, the “Road Map”), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/A+PerformanceBased+Roadmap+to+a+Permanent+Two-Sta.htm. The Road Map called for the creation of a Palestinian
state in certain stages, beginning in Phase 1 with “Ending terror and violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life
and Building Palestinian Institutions.” While Phase 1 was supposed to have been accomplished by May,
2003, it has yet to be accomplished. Since its inception, disagreements over the various steps – for example,
whether the Palestinian Authority must disband various militant groups before Israel has any obligation to
cease settlement construction -- have surfaced. Nonetheless, the specifics of the Road Map have seemed to
replace the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (Sep.13, 1993) (hereinafter, the “Oslo Agreement”),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm,
resulting from secret negotiations in Oslo between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as the
primary reference with respect to the mutual obligations of Israel and the Palestinians.
resulting from secret negotiations in Oslo between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as the
primary reference with respect to the mutual obligations of Israel and the Palestinians.
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and Israel, with reservations8 -- highlights the importance of confronting
directly the more contentious issue of whether these settlements preclude a
peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
To some – a group that includes not only Palestinians9 and the
governments of other Arab nations, but also most members of the European
Union10, much of the American press11, the United Nations General
Assembly12, and, occasionally, even the American government13 – the
question hardly merits serious review. Along with the security fence that
Israel is constructing to separate most of its cities from the major population
centers of the West bank, settlements constitute the major obstacle to a peace
settlement. Even commentators and scholars usually considered stalwarts in
their defense of Israel14 and certain American Jewish groups that would
define themselves as pro-Israeli15 decry the presence and expansion of
Jewish settlements on the West Bank. Indeed, the liberal left in Israeli
politics seems to blame the settlers, for every offense imaginable, including
8

See Israel’s Road Map Reservations, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=297230 (May 27, 2003).
9
See Associated Press, Palestinian FM: Settlements threaten chance for Palestinian state, HAARETZ
DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/651888.html (updated Nov. 30, 2005); Glenn Kessler,
Palestinians get Rare Bush Meeting,Policy Complaints are behind Meeting, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2005,
http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2005/10/12/palestinians_get_rare_bush_meeting?mode=PF
(last viewed Feb. 25, 2006).
10
See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Europeans Rebuke Israeli Jerusalem Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at
A18.
11
See, e.g., Editorial, Gaza First, But Not Last, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2004, at A24 (late ed.); Editorial,
One Step Back in the Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005 at A22; Editorial, Bush, Abbas Intentions,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2005, at A16.
12
See,e.g., A/RES/60/105,18 January
2006,http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/d28e6c316706c0438525
7106006ce8ca!OpenDocument (last viewed Feb. 15, 2006). Other resolutions to the same effect can be
accessed at,
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/vGA!OpenView&Start=1&Count=150&Expand=121#121 (last
viewed Feb. 15, 2006). See also Associated Press, UN slams Israeli settlements, E. Jerusalem separation
fence, HAARETZ DAILY, Dec. 2, 2005, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/651888.html; Richard
Schifter, The First Word: Is the UN Improving?, THE JERUSALEM POST,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1134309585843&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(updated Dec. 15, 2005).
13
See, e.g., US Department of State Daily Press Briefing #180,
Wednesday, Dec. 4, 1991, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1991/9112/180.html(last
visited December 22, 2005).
14
See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR PEACE 13 ( 2005).
15
An organization called the Israel Policy Forum fits into this category. See Israel Policy Forum, Building
a Bridge From Disengagement to Two States at 2-3 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.ipforum.org/display.cfm?id=6&Sub=16&dis=7; Letter from “Prominent American Jewish
Leaders” to Condoleezza Rice, Nov. 22, 2004, available at http://www.cephaslibrary.com/israel/israel_letter_by_prominent_american_jewish_leaders.html See also, Shlomo Shamir,
N.Y. Jewish Leaders Lobbied Rice on Gaza Border Deal, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/646999.html
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the reality to no peace exists between Israel and Palestinian Arabs.16 In
contrast, to some Israelis, settlements are not an obstacle to but a
prerequisite of peace, either because they represent the first line of defense
against an Arab attack from the East and/or Palestinian terrorism17 or
because empirically their establishment and growth provided the impetus for
serious peace overtures from Palestinian representatives.18
This article takes a different tack. Israeli settlements, first and
foremost, need not be an obstacle to peace for the reason that their location
may influence the eventual borders between Israel and a Palestinian state,
but need not determine such borders. Just as Palestinians can and do live
within the predominantly Jewish state of Israel, Israeli Jews can live within
a predominantly Palestinian nation. And if this analysis is true, then much
of the agony that accompanied the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and has
accompanied recent evacuations of some illegal outposts on the West Bank19
can be avoided, and negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority to achieve a final settlement made that much easier.
It is useful to begin this exploration with an analogy. Imagine
African-American families moving into part of a city exclusively inhabited
by whites, acts of terrorism being committed against them by certain persons
living within the white community and sellers of the property to AfricanAmericans – having been labeled traitors and “collaborators” – being
executed without trial for their act of betrayal against their own community.
16

For a reflection of this view, see Akiva Elder, Kadima supporters and the road map, HAARETZ,
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/650612.html (last updated, Nov. 28, 2005).
17
For a reflection of these views, see CNN.com, Extra! West bank,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/EDUCATION/08/14/extra.west.bank/index.html (last visited December 22,
2005).
18
See Hillel Halkin, Why the Settlements Should Stay, COMMENTARY, June 1, 2002, 21-27, at 23.
19
For descriptions of the difficulty of the recent evacuation of Amona on the West Bank, see Greg Myre,
Settlers Battle Israel’s Police in West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at A1; Jonathan Lis, Amos Harel,
Gideon Alon, Lilach Weissman & Nadav Shragai, B’Tselem to Mazuz: Investigate police violence during
Amona Evacuation, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/677685.html (last
updated Feb. 2, 2006) (over 200 protesters and police injured in evacuation of Amona); Bradley Burston,
Brushfire civil war: Israel, the New Enemy of the True Jew, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=677531&contrassID=2 (last updated Feb. 2,
2006) (“Increasingly, the language of hardline settlers has taken on a note of estrangement, even divorce
from institutions of the state, the police, the Supreme Court, the army, the prime minster….By no means
are they representative of settlers as a whole…Theirs is brushfire civil war. But brushfires can take
directions and forms which no one can control.”); Nadav Schragai, Why the SettlerLeaders Stayed Silent,
HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/677705.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2006) (referring to the
evacuation of Amona, “The ‘consciousness searing’ that settler leaders spoke of so frequently in the
months before the disengagement [from Gaza] occurred yesterday, five months after the disengagement.”);
Jonathan Lis & Gideon Alon, Olmert Promises that Government will Maintain Dialogue with Settlers,
HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/678953.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2006)
(reporting on a Jerusalem rally, “The speeches expressed the growing feeling within the religiously
observant camp that the justice system discriminates against the right and the settlers.”).
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Imagine, further that the “enlightened” liberal community would blame the
African-Americans for their own plight and repeat as a mantra the notion
that if only the African-Americans would leave that community, all would
be peaceful in race relations. While tragically such opinion was once widely
held, it is totally unimaginable that it reflects liberal and enlightened
thinking today.
But, the reader might protest, if the African-American hypothetical is
meant to suggest that the nearly universal condemnation of Israeli
settlements is intellectually inconsistent, the analysis is false.20 It has been
argued, for example, that whereas African-Americans, or Jews for that
matter, have domestic rights to settle anywhere in the United States, Jews
are not a people having any collective rights to settle in Palestine.21 This
article seeks to parse out the assumptions that underlie a liberal inclination to
place Israeli settlements in a different category than that of a minority
wanting to live among members of another group. I suggest that, subject to
certain conditions, the right of Jews to live in historic Palestine is a
powerful imperative that cannot be dismissed away because some, or even
substantially all, Palestinian Arabs do not want Jewish communities in their
midst, any more than the right of African Americans to establish
communities in territories inhabited by “whites” should be dismissed in a
context of white opposition.
20

One such party who rejects such is W. Thomas Mallison, whose views seem quite infected by a
pronounced anti-Israel animus towards Israel as a Jewish state. See W. Thomas Mallison, Remarks at
American Society of International Law Proceedings, April 25-27, 1985, Craig Jackson, Reporter, Israeli
West Bank Settlements, the Reagan Administration’s Policy toward the Middle East and International Law,
79 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 217, 226 (1987); Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas Mallison, Settlements and
the Law, A Juridical Analysis of the Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories at 7 (The American
Foundational Trust 1982), available at
http://www.geocities.com/alabasters_archive/settlements_and_the_law.html (last viewed Feb. 25, 2006).
21
Id. In fact, Mallison disputes the whole concept of a Jewish people. See W.T. Mallison, The ZionistIsrael Juridical Claims to Constitute “The Jewish People” Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in
It: Appraisal in Public International Law, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 987-93 (1964). That position
contrasts with his readiness to accept Palestinian peoplehood (see W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V.
Mallison, An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the
Palestine Question at 39-41 (Study prepared and published at the request of the Committee on the Exercise
of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, United Nations 1979)), a recent Twentieth Century
identity as compared with the several millennia concept of a Jewish people. See infra note 307, and
accompanying text.
David Kretzmer make a more legitimate objection to this analogy based upon the power
relationship between the parties. But, of course, the question of power depends upon the scope of the
parties and relations considered. In the case of African-Americans, does one consider simply them and
their white neighbors or the power of the federal government? In the case of Israelis and Arabs, does one
consider not only the Palestinians but also 22 Arab nations hostile to Israel’s existence, or even more, a
larger number of other nations that seem automatically to vote for any resolution the would deny Jews a
sovereign state equal to those insisted upon by other peoples? See, e.g., U.N. G.A. Res. 3376 available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/30/ares30.htm (Nov. 10, 1975), equating Zionism and racism.

5

At the core of the position taken in this article is a fundamental
distinction almost universally overlooked in discussions about Jewish
settlements22: settlements and sovereignty need not be coterminous – that is,
it is entirely possible, at least theoretically, to have both Arab “sovereignty”
over lands and Jewish communities within that sovereignty. Part II of this
article explores this distinction between sovereignty and settlements in the
context of an increasing and necessary realization of the incompatibly of
Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Israel’s identity as a Jewish
democratic state.23 Part III outlines those arguments, particularly those
based upon liberal values, that support the continuation of Jewish
settlements on the West Bank even when a state of Palestine is established.
Part IV lays out the conditions which must be satisfied for this resolution to
occur. In effect, these conditions also respond to those arguments that have
been raised against the settlements, including their legal status, and to doubts
that might be raised against the viability of settlements remaining in a future
state of Palestine.
II. Sovereignty and Settlements
It is almost universally assumed that Jewish settlements equate to
Israeli sovereignty. The nexus between settlements and sovereignty is
critically important from both Palestinian and Israeli perspectives. From a
Palestinian perspective, because the settlements are scattered over much of
the West Bank (even if their actual borders constitute less than 1/50 of its
territory), the continuation of Jewish settlements under Israeli sovereignty
realistically means Israeli sovereignty over all or substantially all of the
West Bank. Even if Israeli sovereignty did not encompass all of the West
Bank, it would either, if the settlements were connected to each other or to
Israel, preclude a contiguous Palestinian state having sensible borders, or, if
the settlements were not connected, nonetheless represent a serious
infringement on Palestinian sovereignty. In either case, according to
Palestinian sentiment, the settlements would leave little room for other than
a Bantustan-type Palestinian state or other self-governing entity. These
22

Seemingly, the sole published party taking exception to this view is the Israeli novelist, Hillel Halkin.
See Halkin, supra note 18, at 21-7; Hillel Halkin, Beyond the Geneva Accord, COMMENTARY, Jan., 2004;
Hillel Halkin, Whose Land? Why the Settlements Should Stay, Making the West Bank Judenrein is no way
to Bring Peace, WSJ.COM, http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id+110001769 (May 29,
2002).
23
Although Israel does not have a constitution, it has adopted certain “Basic Laws”, one of which, the
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, states: “The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity
and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic
state.” See http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
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issues of contiguity and sovereignty are discussed later in this article.24
From an Israeli perspective, if settlements remain and they necessarily
implicate Israeli sovereignty, it will become impossible to separate the
border of Israel from that of a state of Palestine. The two entities will have
become combined. Realistically, then, Israeli sovereignty over settlements
eventually means de jure or de facto Israeli sovereignty over all or much of
the West Bank. The inseparability of Israel from a Palestinian state will
spell the demise of a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that is, a
predominantly Jewish state and a predominantly Arab state living side by
side of each other in the territory west of the Jordan River. And none of the
various possibilities that flow from this fact favors the continued existence
of Israel as a Jewish democratic state adhering to the rule of law. With the
exception of fringe elements within the Israeli political spectrum25, even
former stalwarts of the settlement movement and the concept of a Greater
Israel encompassing all land west of the Jordan have now seemingly
recognized this reality.26 Thus, Ehud Olmert, the acting Prime Minister of
Israel and head of the newly-created Kadima party, has reiterated in various
fora that Israel “must create a clear border that reflects the demographic
reality that has been created on the ground as soon as possible.”27 In the
words of Michael Oren, “[a] solid majority of Israelis accept that they cannot
24

For a discussion of the issue of contiguity, see infra notes 117-126, and accompanying text; for a
discussion of the issue of sovereignty see infra note 455, and accompanying text.
25
See Nadav Shragai, Right-Wing Group Readies to Build 15 New Illegal Outposts, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/659860.html (updated Dec. 19, 2005) (referring to a group
named, “Loyalists of the Land of Israel”, that intends to build additional illegal outposts on the West Bank).
26
Belated recognition of this fact led even Ariel Sharon, the prime minister of Israel presently in a coma
and one of the champions of the settlement movement during the 1970’s through the 1990’s, to leave the
Likud party, which he had helped to found, and to establish a new party, Kadimah, in November of 2005.
Kadimah’s platform includes territorial compromise in order to insure “a Jewish and democratic state.” See
Mazal Mualem, Kadima Platform Calls for Jewish Majority, Territorial Concessions, HAARETZ, Nov. 29,
2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/651003.html. See also Steven Erlanger, How Reality Cut
Likud’s Vision Down to Size, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at 43. See Aluf Benn, Olmert: Top Priority is to
Determine Israel’s Borders, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/673922.html
(updated Jan. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Israel’s Borders].
27
Aluf Benn, Managing the conflict, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/677165.html (last
updated Feb. 1, 2006). Aluf Benn, Olmert: Top Priority is to Determine Israel’s Borders, HAARETZ
DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/673922.html (updated Jan. 24, 2006); Aluf Benn,
Olmert: Israel Will SeparateFrom Most Palestinians, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/680081.html (last updated Feb. 8, 2006) (reporting on Olmert’s first
interview with the media since assuming his post as Acting Prime Minister, in which Olmert said that Israel
“will separate from most of the Palestinian population that lives in the West Bank, and that will obligate us
to separate as well from territories where the State of Israel currently is…”); David Ratner, Olmert: We
WillFreeze Spending on West Bank Construction, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/691248.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2006); Aluf Benn & David
Ratner, Olmert: If Kadima Wins, We Will Not Invest in Territories, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/691448.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2006).
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continue to occupy the West Bank and Gaza without endangering the moral
and demographic foundations upon which the Jewish state is built.”28 To
understand this reality and hence knowledgably to discuss the various
options concerning Israeli settlements, consider the various possibilities of
Israeli sovereignty, either de jure or de facto, over the West Bank.
One possibility is that over time – due to vastly differential birth
29
rates – the Palestinian population will overwhelm and surpass the number
28

Michael B. Oren, Hamas Has Won. What’s Next?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28-9, 2006, at A8.
The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (“ICBS”) reports an Arab Moslem birth rate in Israel of between
twice to one and one-half that of Jews during the ten-year period from 1996 through 2005. See
http://www.cbs.gov.il/yarhon/c1_e.xls (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). The Arab population of Israel grew from
1,069,4000 at the end of 1997 to 1,372,800 at the end of 2005, an increase of 28.37 percent, while in the
same time period the Jewish population of Israel grew from 4,701,600 to 5,302,600, or an increase of 12.78
percent. id. The latter statistics may show some slight distortion given two factors that might affect the
total populations: increase in the Jewish population of Israel resulting from immigration from other
countries (a factor that would increase the Jewish population), and lack of consistency in the territory of
Israel covered by the statistic (a factor that would increase the total Arab population). For example, Dr.
Aziz Haider, a Hebrew University sociologist, claims that the ICBS statistics are distorted by including the
Druze on the Golan Heights and the Arabs of East Jerusalem, both of whom are not Israeli citizens. See
Lily Galili, We are More Normal than You Think, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/685199.html (last updated Feb. 21, 2006). Haider also believes that
the aggregate birth rate reported by the ICBS is misleading, in that the Bedouin in the South have much
higher birth rates than Palestinian citizens of Israel who live in the North.
In any event, it is believed that the birth rate of Palestinians on the West Bank exceeds the current
birth rate (3 percent) of Israeli Arab Muslims, but accurate figures with respect to the Arab population on
the West Bank and birth rates are more difficult to establish and presently subject to enormous dispute
among demographers. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (“PCBS”) conducted a West Bank and
Gaza census in 1997, deriving the figure of 2,895,683 Palestinian Arabs in the West and Gaza. Making
certain assumptions, including a birth rate of 4-5 percent, the PCBS projected a Palestinian population
(excluding the Arabs in Israel) of 3.83 million by mid-2004. See Bennett Zimmerman & Roberta Seid,
Arab Population in the West Bank & Gaza, The Million and a Half Person Gap, Study presented at the
American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C. (Jan. 10, 2005) (hereinafter, the “Zimmerman group”),
available at http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.990/event_detail.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). The
Palestinian projections would have meant that as of the end of mid-2004, there would 2,895,683
Palestinians on the West Bank if one included the Palestinians living in Jerusalem, and 2,685,474
Palestinians if one excluded Palestinians living in Jerusalem from the calculation. B’tselem, in a 2002
document that amounts to a “brief” against the settlements, estimated the West Bank Palestinian population
at 2 million. See Yehezkel Lein, Land Grab Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank at 95 (B’Tselem
2002), available at http://www.btselem.org/Download/200205_Land_Grab_Eng.doc (last visited Jan. 11,
2006). In contrast, adjusting for lower actual birth rates, lower fertility rates, net emigration from the West
Bank rather than immigration, alternative counts for a resident population base and internal migration of
Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel proper (within the “green lines”), the Zimmerman group
concluded that, as of mid-2004, the resident-only population of West Bank Arabs (excluding Jerusalem)
was 1,349,525. Taking into account the number of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the same group recently
concluded that there is at least a 1.4 million person gap between the PCBS projection and the true
Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. The Zimmerman group also concluded that the gap
between the Jewish population and the Arab population west of the Jordan was narrowing more slowly than
most had initially projected. The Zimmerman study has attracted some support. See, e.g., Nadav Shragai,
Deal with the Demography, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/690923.html (last updated
Mar. 7, 2006). But other demographers dispute this claim. For example, Sergio Della Pergola of Hebrew
University states that the Zimmerman “claim is based on several additional assumptions, such as a drastic
decline in the fertility rate of the Palestinians, which has no basis in reality, and the anticipation of a large
29
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of Jews west of the Jordan, its Arab residents will have (as they should) all
rights of citizenship, including the right to vote, and Israel will remain
democratic but cease to exist as a Jewish state.30 Whether the name
remains,“Israel”, or, more likely, is changed to “Palestine” or some other
term more palatable to its majority is largely academic. What will certainly
change is the Law of Return31, and Israel’s core identity as a haven for Jews
in a still very much anti-Semitic world32 will cease. In fact, just as Israel’s
Jewish majority has from its inception caused the state to adopt and
implement an “affirmative action” policy for Jews throughout the world, its
dominant Arab population might well adopt and implement its own
affirmative action policy favoring the return of all those Arabs claiming
some connection to “Palestine” and outright banning the further immigration
of Jews, no matter how distressed the latter are in other parts of the world.
The second possibility is for Israel to “transfer” all Arabs from the
land west of the Jordan to other places. There is historic precedent for such
a move – to take but one example, millions of Germans were “repatriated” to
Germany from Eastern Europe after the defeat of Germany and in the
immediate aftermath of World War II.33 Numerous other population
transfers have occurred in the Twentieth Century.34 No matter how many
supposed “precedents” exist, however, for Israel actively to consider or
implement population transfer as a means to retain a Jewish majority if
Israel’s sovereignty extended over the entire West Bank would be morally
repugnant. It would also clearly violate the first paragraph of Article 49 of
positive balance of Jewish immigration, which is not in sight in the present circumstances.” See Sergio
Della Pergola, A Question of Numbers, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/674640.html (last
updated, Jan. 25, 2006). He notes that while original estimates called for a parity between the Jewish and
Arab populations by 1910, “the trend of narrowing the Jewish majority [of the population west of the
Jordan] until it is lost by 2020 is common to all the scenarios” and the Gaza withdrawal has delayed that
reality by perhaps another 20 years. Id.
30
See Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 453, 470 (2003)
(“The Israeli government is not and cannot become sovereign over the entire Palestinian population of the
West Bank and Gaza without forfeiting the expresssion of its own self-determination.”).
31
The Law of Return gives every Jew the right to automatically acquire Israeli citizenship. See Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Law of Return 5710-1950
, Dec. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law of Return 5710-1950.
32
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT ON ANTI-SEMITISM: EUROPE AND EURASIA, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Jan/05-93928.html?chanlid=eur (last visited December 23, 2005);
Associated Press, Britain’s Chief Rabbi: ‘Tsunami of Anti-Semitism’ Sweeping the World, HAARETZ
DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/664887.html (updated Jan. 1, 2006); Mortimer B.
Zuckerman, A Shameful Contagion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 7, 2002, at 34 .
33
See Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT’L L. J. 207,
228 (1975).
34
Many of these exchanges are summarized in Eyal Benvinisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property
Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (1995) (hereinafter, “Benvinisti
& Zamir”) at 322-24.
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the 4th Geneva Convention.35 Although fringe elements of Israel’s political
spectrum might seem comfortable with the possibility of transfer, it seems
totally incongruous that Israel, of all countries and as a matter of government
policy, would in the still personally felt aftermath of the Holocaust engage in
one of the practices practiced upon Jews during World War II. Minimally,
such an act would serve to transform a heatedly debated historical topic36 –
whether, on the one hand and as Israel contends, most Arabs who became
refugees in 1948 left of their own volition, with or without the
encouragement of their own leadership and/or of the invading forces of the
five Arab nations that attacked Israel or, on the other hand and as
Palestinians have contended, as a result of force exercised upon them by
Jews -- into firmly accepted doctrine that there was a broad Zionist plan,
which indeed was even implemented, to rid the territory west of the Jordan
35

See infra note 157. While this provision applies only in the case of belligerent occupation, it would be a
ruse for Israel to end its occupation by annexing the West Bank and then forcibly to transfer its Palestinian
residents.
36
The views both ways are summarized in BENNY MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER, ISRAEL AND THE
PALESTINIANS 1-48 (1994)[herinafter MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER]. Morris identifies himself, as well as a
few other Israeli historians, as a “new historian”, who in an earlier text, took issue with the traditional
Israeli view that the refugees left as a result of calls from other Arab leaders to depart for the sake of
providing an unobstructed path in their desire to wipe out the nascent Jewish state. In this work, as well as
his earlier writing (THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949 (1987)), Morris
concludes that “what occurred in 1948 lies somewhere in between the Jewish ‘robber state’ and the ‘Arab
order’ explanations.” MORRIS, 1948 AND AFTER. at 17. The work of Morris and other “New Historians”
has itself been criticized. EPHRAIM KARSH, Rewriting Israel’s History, pp.169-85 in RETHINKING THE
MIDDLE EAST (2003). Morris’ own views seem to have evolved. Replying to a distortion of his view by
Henry Siegman in The N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Morris commented:
In his article, Siegman repeatedly "cited" things I had said—with a consistency of distortion that is
truly mind-boggling. Just to give one key example: I most emphatically never stated anywhere that
"the dismantling of Palestinian society...and the expulsion of 700,000 Palestinians [were] a
deliberate and planned operation intended to 'cleanse'...those parts of Palestine assigned to the
Jews." Quite the opposite. Had Siegman bothered to read my books, he would have discovered
that mainstream (Haganah–JewishAgency) Zionist policy, until the end of March 1948—meaning
during the first four months of the war—was to protect the Arab minority in the Jewish areas and
to try to maintain peaceful coexistence. Intentions changed only in April, when the Yishuv was
with its back to the wall, losing the battle for the roads and facing potentially politicidal and
genocidal pan-Arab invasion. And even then, no systematic policy of expulsion was ever adopted
or implemented (hence Israel's one-million-strong Arab minority today). The Arabs have only
themselves to blame for the (unexpected) results of the war that they launched with the aim of
"ethnically cleansing" Palestine of the Jews. (Contemporary Arab apologists, always full of
righteous indignation, conveniently forget this.)
Benny Morris, ‘Israel: The Threat from Within’: An Exchange, 51 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, No. 6, April
8, 2004. And even more recently, reviewing the work of ABU SITTA, ATLAS OF PALESTINE 1948 (2005),
Morris writes: “From reading this Atlas, the reader will not know that it was the Palestinian Arab onslaught
on the Jewish community in Palestine in November to December 1947 that provoked Jewish counterviolence, which then triggered the Arab exodus; and that it was the follow-up invasion of the country by the
armies of the surrounding Arab states in May to June 1948 that turned what might have been an ephemeral
phenomenon into a still larger tragedy, consolidating and finalizing, as it were, the refugee status of the
fleeing communities.” Benny Morris, Details and Lies, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Oct. 31, 2005,
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20051031&s=morris103105.
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of its Arab inhabitants. While there undoubtedly were instances of force
used against Palestinian civilians in the context of the 1948 war, none of
them seem to have had the imprimatur of the Jewish Agency or, after the
establishment of Israel, its government.37 It would be academic and wholly
irrelevant that the present one-sided narrative as to the birth of the
Palestinian refugee problem38 pertains to an event half a century ago rather
than the present. Equally as important, Israel as a Jewish state would
become a pariah not only among other nations of the World – at times, a not
wholly outrageous overstatement of Israel’s position as a result of Arab
antagonism and increasing world-wide anti-Semitism, often expressed in the
guise of anti-Zionism39 – but also among the overwhelming majority of
diaspora Jewry40.
Nor do Arab and Muslim threats to “throw the Jews into the sea”,
“wipe Israel off the map,41 or, according to one of the many references to
Israel and Jews in Hamas’ charter, “implement Allah’s promise … [to] fight
the Jews (and kill them)”42 negate or even reduce the moral repugnancy of
forced population transfer. While moral systems are frequently based upon
the restraint “of self-interest in favor of promoting a reciprocal recognition

37

EFRAIM KARSH, Were the Palestinians Expelled? and The Palestinians and the Right to Return, in
RETHINKING THE MIDDLE EAST 127-54, 155-68 (2003).
38
See supra note 37, at 127-54.
39
For descriptions of this phenomenon, see ALAN DERSHOWITZ, Are Critics of Israel Anti-Semitic?, in THE
CASE FOR ISRAEL at 208-16(2003) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL]; Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Graffiti on
History’s Walls, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 3, 2003, at 44-51.
40
With respect to American Jews, some indication of this may be surmised by political affiliation. A 2005
Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion sponsored by the American Jewish Committee listed 54
percent of American Jews as Democrats, and the vast majority of the remainder, 29 percent as
independents. Thirty four percent identified themselves as liberal, 29 percent as moderate and only 27
percent as conservative. Nearly one in four American Jews, 23 percent, identified themselves as “distant”
from Israel, and over 60 percent of respondents said Israel should be willing to dismantle all or some of the
settlements as part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians. See Annual Survey of American
Jewish Opinion, http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=846741&ct=1740283
(Dec. 20, 2005). Given the political affiliation of most American Jews and their preference for the
dismantling of settlements, the percentage of American Jews feeling “distant” from Israel if Israel adopted
a forcible transfer policy to retain the West Bank would rise appreciably from the present percentage and
seemingly equal at least the percentage, 60 percent, that favors dismantling settlements. Another indication
of some dissociation among American Jews from Israel is the sharp decline (30 percent) in their
registration for the upcoming World Zionist Congress. See Daphna Berman, Drop in U.S. Voter Sign-up for
World Zionist Congress, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/681258.html (last updated Feb.
19, 2006).
41
Steven Erlanger, Israel Wants West to Deal More Urgently with Iran, NY TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A8
(Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, has recently called for Israel to be “wiped off the map”).
42
The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance movement (Hamas), Art. Seven,
http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/charter.html (last viewed Feb. 1, 2006). See also Itamar
Marcus, Special Report #27 (December 1, 1999) The Palestinian Authority’s Beliefs = Hamas’ Charter,
http://www.pmw.org.il/specrep-27.html (last viewed Feb. 1, 2006).
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of rights and interests,”43 negative acts cannot be justified on the basis of
“reciprocal intentions”, short of steps necessary to save lives and perhaps
property. Neither could one rationalize forced population transfer by noting
that continual pressure and persecution forced over 800,000 Jewish refugees
to flee Arab countries in the period right before and after the creation of the
State of Israel, of which number Israel absorbed more than 580,000
persons.44 Again, one would be attempting to use reciprocity – in this case,
an asserted population exchange -- as the basis for a negative act not
necessary to save lives. Moreover, Israel’s use of Jewish refugees from
Arab lands to justify a population transfer of Arabs would be “double
dipping”: regardless of why and under what circumstances many Arabs fled
the nascent state of Israel in 1948, Israel and its supporters have already
made the argument that their numbers were less than the Jewish refugees
from Arab countries forced to abandon their properties and flee to Israel
shortly thereafter.45
A third possibility is equally unpalatable. To include all or
substantially all of the West Bank within its sovereignty, Israel could simply
deny citizenship and therefore a right to vote to many or all of its Arab
residents. Outright denial of citizenship and franchise rights would place
Israel in the same camp as South Africa prior to the early 1990’s, converting
an outrageous analogy46 underlying the present divestment efforts on college
campuses and among certain Protestant church groups47 into an apt
43

David M. Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228, n. 107, and accompanying text
at 252-3 (1982).
44
MARTIN GILBERT, THE ROUTLEDGE ATLAS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 48 (Routledge, 8th ed. ,
2002) (1974).
45
See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, Did Israel Create the Arab Refugee Problem?, in DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL,
supra note 39, at 88-9.
46
The term apartheid is broadly and frequently applied to any measures that Israel takes, including those
that are security-related. See, e.g., Greg Myre, Israel Considers Banning Palestinians on West Bank’s
Main Roads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A10 (Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, described a
possible Israeli road plan in response to attacks on Jewish civilians on West Bank roads as “the official
introduction of an apartheid system.”); Chris McGreal, Worlds Apart, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 6, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1703245,00.html (“There are few places in the world where
governments construct a web of nationality and residency laws designed for use by one section of the
population against another. Apartheid South Africa was one. So is Israel.”) For criticisms of this view, see
Dennis Ross, Pretoria Calling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A27 (“Yasir Arafat loved to equate the
Palestinian struggle for statehood with the struggle of South Africans against apartheid, but his was always
a false analogy.”); HonestReporting Communique, ‘Road Apartheid’ Debunked, Oct. 21, 2005;
HONESTREPORTING, Guaradian Promotes Apartheid Slur, Feb. 12, 2006,
http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/45884734/critiques/Guardian_Promotes_Apartheid_Slur.asp.
47
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR PEACE 154-55 (2005). See also Rosner’s Blog, Divestment against
Israel is back in town, HAARETZ, Feb. 7, 2006,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/rosnerBlog.jhtml?itemNo=680115&contrassID=25&subContrassID=
0&sbSubContrassID=1&listSrc=Y&art=1.
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similarity.48 Again, it would matter not the least that other countries have
long employed a modified apartheid, e.g., Japan’s treatment of its resident
Korean population49 or even Lebanon’s denial of citizenship and franchise to
its “Palestinian” population.50
But could the problem be finessed if, at a point where a majority of
Israel’s population consisted of Jews, it were to enshrine in its political
system – for example, by adopting a Constitution -- law that made
unchangeable some modicum of political control by Jews, regardless of
subsequent population changes? To ensure its status as a safe haven for
Jews, Israel would have to enshrine the Law of Return as fundamental,
unchangeable law and divide political power so that, irrespective of whether
Jews constituted the majority or minority within the land, they would have a
sufficient number of parliamentary seats to either retain or significantly
share power. Dictatorships, with or without the semblance of a Parliament –
do just that. For example, Alawis, a small dissident sect originally derived
from Shiite Islam, controls Syria by retaining substantially all key military
and political positions, despite the fact that Sunni Muslims constitute the
overwhelming majority of Syria’s population.51 Prior to the recent Iraq War,
Sunni Arabs, and, in fact, a smaller clan among them, Tikritis, to which
Saddam Hussein belongs, ruled Iraq to the disadvantage of Shi’ia and Kurds
who constituted over three-fourths of that country’s population.52 Even
Lebanon, which at times purports to be an Arab democracy, has weighted its
political structure so that a Maronite Christian is always its President and,
48

See DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE 797 (2004) (“Ehud Olmert … declared in December 2003 that
Israel could not remain in the territories lest it lose its moral grounding and find its Jewish supporters
internationally unable to defend an apartheid reality.”)
49
Hideki Tarumoto, Multiculturalism in Japan: Citizenship Policy for Immigrants, 5 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL ON MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES (IJMS), 88 – 103 (2003),
ISSN 1564-4901, http://www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol5/issue1/art6 (“the myth of homogeneity has long
been challenged by the presence of ethnic and national minorities, including ethnic Koreans and
Chinese.Ironically, the idea has denied basic human rights to the “Oldcomers” who were
Japanese subjects before 1947 and are now permanent non-national residents in
Japan, where they were born and educated…”).
50
See United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, LEBANON: Palestinian Refugees
Complain they are Second Class Citizens, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=49326 (last visited
December 23, 2005).
51
See A. Shadid, Death of Syrian Minister Leaves A Sect Adrift in Time of Strife, WASH. POST, Oct. 31,
2005 at A1; Mordechai Nisan, Alawi Tribal Politics and Syria’s Future, THE JERUSALEM POST,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1134309631221&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(updated Dec. 22, 2005) (describing the degree of control, the various personalities, and the ministries
controlled).
52
See Confrontation in the Gulf, For the Iraqi Ruler, Variation on a Name, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1990, at
16, available at
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F30610FB3B580C768EDDA10894D8494D81 (last
viewed Feb. 12, 2006).
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despite their dwindling numbers, Maronites retain significant political and
economic powers in a country a majority of whose citizens belong to other
groups (Sunni Muslims, Shiites, or Druze).53 Indeed, much of the “world”
seems to understand Lebanon’s refusal to deny not only voting rights, but
any significant economic opportunities to the Arabs that fled Israel on the
ground that the granting of such rights would upset Lebanon’s delicate
“ethnic balance.”54
The quality of Israel’s “democracy”, however, is apt not to be judged
by Lebanese standards. While differential voting is not uncommon in
private organizations – for example, class voting in American corporate law
-- and, as noted, characterizes the political structures of certain other nations,
the principle of “one person-one vote” has now become so enshrined in the
scheme of Western democracies, no matter how imperfectly implemented,
that it is unlikely that Israel could sustain such a transparently antidemocratic ruse for long. The criticism and resultant ostracism that Israel
would face would probably not differ materially from Israel’s having
adopted a political structure that explicitly denied Arabs the right to vote.
If, then, Israel cannot both retain the West Bank and retain its status as
both a democratic and predominantly Jewish state that does not discriminate
against its minority citizens, Israel cannot retain sovereignty over the West
Bank forever. If so, does it not follow automatically that most settlements –
especially those not contiguous to the “Green Line” – the armistice line prior
to 1967 – must be removed in order to permit sovereignty over the vast
majority of Palestinian Arabs resident west of the Jordan by an Arab
juridical entity?
Contrary to the assumption made by most commentators, academics
and policy makers55 alike, removal of Jewish settlers from the West Bank
53

See Library of Congress Country Studies, Lebanon, Government and Politics,
http://www.presidency.gov.lb/presidency/history/after/after.htm (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006); U.S.
Department of State, Country Note: Lebanon, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm (Aug. 2005)
(last viewed Feb. 12, 2006) (President a maronite; prior to 1990, Christians and Muslims shared
parliamentary seats in a ratio of 6:5; under the Ta’if Accords, that ratio was changed to 50:50). As of 1987,
it was estimated that only 16 % of Lebanon’s population was Maronite (see
http://www.photius.com/countries/lebanon/society/lebanon_society_maronites.html (last viewed Feb. 12,
2006)), a figure that might well be lower today.
54
See Orly Halpern, Damascus torpedoed Jordan's peace offer, THE JERUSALEM POST, March 24, 2005, at
1.
55
For example, Amir Peretz, the Labor party chairman, has stated that, if Labor forms the next Israeli
government, it would evacuate West Bank settlements that did not fall into Israel’s eventual borders. See
Lilach Weisman, Nir Hasson & Mazal Mualem, Peretz: Settlers who Leave West Bank will be Fairly
Compensated, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/673863.html (updated Jan. 24, 2006).
Ehud Olmert seemingly intends to follow a similar path if Kadima forms the next Israeli government. See
Aluf Benn & Lilach Weissman, Olmert: We Must Separate from the Palestinians, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/679959.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2006).
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(hereinafter, sometimes “removal” or the “removal option”) and the
destruction of their settlements is not the only option. Theoretically three
others exist: Israeli settlements remain, but Israeli sovereignty pertains only
to them and not to other West Bank territory (“partial sovereignty” or the
“partial sovereignty option”); a sufficient land swap occurs such that almost
all settlements become part of Israel and Arab communities in Israel become
part of Palestine (the “land swap option”); and Israeli settlements remain but
become part of a sovereign Palestine (“continuance” or the “continuance
option”).56
The partial sovereignty option is for settlements, wherever they are,
simply to remain under Israeli sovereignty.57 All remaining land on the
West Bank would be transferred to Arab sovereignty. Indeed, Palestinian
negotiators themselves have tried to characterize the plan pressed by
President Clinton and accepted by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the
2000 Camp David Summit as substantially equivalent to the partial
sovereignty option.58 This outcome would leave islands of Israeli
sovereignty within a much larger geographical area of “Palestine.”
Precedents for partial sovereignty do exist, including the limited sovereignty
exercised by certain Native Americans in the United States over their
reservations59, the sovereignty of the Vatican within the larger nation of
Italy60, the sovereignty of Monaco within the larger nation of France61, and,
historically, the sovereignty status of a nation’s embassy to and in another
56

A recent proposal, which was earlier said to become part of Labor’s plank for the next election, would
combine the continuance option with a lease arrangement, whereby, although Palestinian sovereignty is
agreed upon, the settlement areas, or at least the large blocs of settlements, are then leased back to Israel
under a Hong Kong arrangement for a period of 99 years. See Mazal Mualem & Nir Hassan, Labor to call
for leasing settlements from PA, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/663117.html (updated
Dec. 28, 2005). It does not appear, however, that this idea became part of Labor’s platform. See supra
note 55.
57
For a criticism of this possibility, see Akiva Eldar, Kadima Supporters and the Road Map, Nov. 28,
2005, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/650612.html.
58
See DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE, THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE 668,
691 (2004). This is shown graphically by maps prepared by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
one depicting the actual proposal tendered to the Palestinians by President Clinton and the other map
depicting the Palestinian’s view of the proposal. See
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/mapImages/41db110b8ca1f.jpg (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). See also
Benny Morris, Camp David and After: An Exchange, 1. An Interview with Ehud Barak, THE N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS 42-6 at 44, June 13, 2002, where Barak refutes the contention that his proposal amounted to a
Bantustan, and ascribes Arafat’s characterization of his proposal as such to Arafat’s fear of Palestinian
reaction to Arafat’s rejection of Barak’s proposal had it been explained truthfully to Palestinians.
59
See The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2005).
60
See CIA, The World Factbook: Holy See (Vatican City), available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/vt.html .
61
See Id., The World Factbook: Monaco, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mn.html.
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country.62 But to the Palestinians – no matter how small such islands would
be (at present, the built-up area of such settlements constitutes less than two
percent of West Bank land) – the partial sovereignty option would be seen as
an infringement on its own sovereignty. Issues of security and police forces
aside, matters of trade, taxation and the like would be outside of any
Palestinian say.
A second theoretical option, which has resurfaced recently63, is the
land swap option, which would incorporate into Israel almost all of the
settlements in exchange for land presently part of Israel. True, substantially
all peace proposals, including that of President Clinton at the Camp David
summit in the summer of 2000 and the subsequent meeting at Taba in
December of that year64, incorporate some concept of a land swap, with the
largest settlements contiguous to the 1967 borders incorporated into Israel
and some Israeli land, usually that in the Negev contiguous to Gaza,
incorporated into Palestine. But Uzi Arad, the former head of Israel’s
intelligence agency, has larger ambitions. In order “to increase ethnic
homogeneity and to preserve each side’s basic territorial reach,”65 land swap
proposals of which he writes approvingly would transfer to Palestine not
only vacant land, but areas of Israel with large Palestinian and bedhouin
populations.66 He cites a study projecting the Jewish population of Israel to
decline to 74 percent in 2050 without a land swap and to remain at 81
62

See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Art. 22, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227.
63
See Uzi Arad, Trading Land for Peace. Swap Meet, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 18 & Dec. 5, 2005, at
16-18 (Arad, former Director of Intelligence in the Mossad, is the founding head of the Institute for Policy
and Strategy at the Lauder School of Government, of the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya); Yoav Stern,
Geographers propose transfer of Israeli Arab Towns to PA, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/673813.html (last updated Jan. 23, 2006).
64
See Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper (January 2001),
http://www.mideastweb.org/moratinos.htm (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006) (“Both sides accepted the principle
of land swap but the proportionality of the swap remained under discussion”).
65
Arad, supra note 63, at 16.
66
Arad also writes approvingly of a trilateral land swap involving Israel, Palestine and Egypt, again
designed for the same demographic and geographic purposes. Arad, supra note 63, at 18. The leader of
Yisrael Beiteinu, considered a “far-right” party has also reiterated a similar proposal, that is, incorporating
Jewish settlements strongholds into Israel in exchange for “areas within the 1967 border populated mostly
by Israeli Arabs to be handed over to the PA…” Lilach Weismann & Lily Galili, Lieberman says he’s
ready to evacuate his own settlement, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/676593.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2006). Even former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger seems to advocate a land swap that would involve “territories in
present-day Israel with significant Arab populations[, asserting that] [t]he rejection of such an approach, or
alternative available concepts, which would contribute greatly to stability and to demographic balance,
reflects a determination to keep incendiary issues permanently open.” Henry A. Kissinger, What’s Needed
From Hamas, WASH. POST., Feb. 27, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/26/AR2006022601263.htmlt .
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percent by performing a land swap.67 And, to the degree that Israeli
Palestinians do not favor a land swap that would result in their communities
becoming part of a sovereign Palestine rather than the state of Israel, Arad’s
suggestion can be interpreted as favoring land swap regardless of their
consent. Moreover, if a land swap on its own did not solve the demographic
problem he cites, he would seemingly favor a transfer of Palestinians who
are Israeli citizens to Palestinian sovereign territory. However, whether one
speaks in terms of a land exchange, a component of which is that Arab
villages now part of Israel become part of Palestine, or “population
transfers”, even Arad acknowledges that most Israeli Arab citizens –
irrespective of their increasing nationalist identity as Palestinians68 -- wish to
remain citizens of Israel. The rebuke to this proposal has been fast in
coming. Arik Carmon, the head of the Israel Democracy Institute that has
spearheaded an effort to establish a written constitution, termed “Arad’s
arguments … racist in nature, damaging to human rights – and of course to
the foundations of democracy -- … [and] in contradiction to international
norms and … unrealizable.”69 As Carmon opined, “[t]he termination of an
individual’s citizenship, according to international law, cannot occur unless
he relinquishes it by agreement.”70 A similar suggestion by a group of
academic geographers was rejected by Ahmed Tibi, a member of the
Knesset from Hadash-Ta’al, as “making its Arab population feel like a
rejected enemy…”71
Unlike the partial sovereignty and land swap options, the latter with or
without an additional population transfer of Arabs, only two options – the
removal option and the continuance option – do not infringe on Palestinian
sovereignty or result in the forced removal of Arabs from the state of Israel
in order to retain its Jewish majority and character. Of the two, the removal
option is almost universally assumed to be necessary and inevitable, while
the continuance option remains overlooked by substantially all
commentators.
In sum, Israeli sovereignty over all of the West Bank is incompatible
with both Israel’s continued status as a democratic Jewish state and the
creation of a viable sovereign Palestinian state. That conclusion does not
67
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2006).
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necessarily mean that removal of Jewish settlements is the only option.
Concentrations of Jewish and Arab populations should definitely influence
the de jure border between Israel and a Palestinian state, but they need not
dictate sovereignty. If so, the continued presence of Jewish settlements, per
se, is not an obstacle to the creation of a Palestinian state. Part III explores
why their continued presence in a state of Palestine is, at least in theory, a
more desirable option than their removal from the territory included in a
Palestinian state, while Part IV posits and analyzes the necessary conditions
to which this resolution is subject.
III. Reasons in Support of Continuance rather than Removal
The preceding section analyzed the incompatibility between Israeli de
jure or de facto sovereignty over the West Bank and its continued status as a
democratic Jewish state. Jewish settlements close to Israel’s 1948 armistice
lines can be incorporated into Israel consistent with that status, with or
without some land swap of unpopulated or sparsely populated Israeli
territory in the Negev contiguous to Gaza. But two options remain with
respect to other settlements: removal, that is, the destruction of the
settlements and the return of their residents to Israel, or continuance, that is,
their continued presence in a state of Palestine. This section analyzes why
the latter option is preferable.
A. Reversing an exclusionary policy: Jews, too, have the right to live in the
historic Land of Israel
In drawing borders between Israel and a state of Palestine, the location
of Jewish and Palestinian communities is not irrelevant: while the location
of these communities need not determine the borders between the states,
they should surely influence those borders. The great bulk of Jews living
West of the Jordan should be within the borders of Israel, just as the great
bulk of Arabs should be within an Arab juridical entity. From Israel’s
perspective, that proposition follows from Israel’s basic identity: it cannot
serve as a “homeland” for Jews – especially Jews oppressed in other
countries – unless it is predominantly Jewish. The same holds true for a
future Arab juridical entity – it too must be predominantly Arab. Otherwise,
the very desire for political rights that drives the Palestinian political
struggle would be thwarted.
But complete separation is impossible. Israel will always include
minorities and, as should be the case, strive for inclusion of those minorities
18

on a non-discriminatory basis. This proposition follows from Israel’s
identity not only as Jewish state, but a democratic one. Approximately 20
percent of Israel’s present population is Arab.72 Arab political parties do
exist73, Arabs belong to larger Israeli parties, especially Labor74, and Arabs
serve in the Israel parliament, the Knesset,75 some of whom voice views
quite antagonistic to the very existence of Israel.76 Arabs have served on the
Israeli Supreme Court77 and in the ministerial ranks of the government78.
Unlike Israeli Jews, who with several exceptions face compulsory army
service, Arabs can choose to serve in the Israeli military; with rare
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exceptions, Palestinian Arabs do not so choose, but larger numbers of
Bedouin79 do.
No one should be deceived on the basis of the above sketch that
Israel’s record of inclusion of its Arab minority has been stellar; quite the
contrary.80 But, relevant to the present discussion, no less than Palestinian
Arabs living in Israel, Israeli Jews, subject to certain conditions explored in
Part IV of this article, should have a similar right to live within a Palestinian
state.81 The continuance option in contrast to removal would allow Jews to
live within their historic Jewish homeland, Eretz Yisrael, the land of Israel,
although they would not be living within the state of Israel (Medinat
Yisrael). Indeed, the single most important reason that supports the
continuance over the removal option is that the former upholds the liberal
principle that Jews, qua Jews, are not forbidden to live in a particular place,
whereas the removal option undermines if not denies that right. Jordanian
law forbade land ownership of land by Jews.82 Similarly, under the
Palestinian Authority, a sale of land by an Arab to a Jew is considered a
capital offense, and sellers of land to Jews have been executed.83 Are these
truly policies that deserve reinforcement in a peace agreement between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority that creates a Palestinian state?
79
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To Jews, the principle that Jewish communities are not excluded from
maintaining communities on the West Bank is particularly important for
reasons of identity and history. Jewish identity began in the territory that the
Roman Emperor Hadrian, following the Jewish revolt against the Romans in
the second century, renamed Syria Palaestina in order to expunge its Jewish
identity.84 Their formation as a people occurred between the millennium or
so B.C.E. and the first several centuries A.D., during which they inhabited
the land, returned from a forced exile to it, built two temples there, and then
transformed their religious practices from one based upon priestly sacrifices
to one based upon prayer.85 Excluding perhaps Jerusalem, specific areas of
the West Bank which almost certainly would become part of a state of
Palestine – for example, Hebron -- are more central to Jewish identity than
areas west of the Jordan that would remain part of Israel86 when borders are
drawn. Jews had continually inhabited Hebron for millennia and
continuously inhabited it for at least 500 years prior to a 1929 massacre at
the hands of Muslim Arabs encouraged by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the British
appointed grand mufti of Palestine, who later, living in Berlin as an adviser
to Adolf Hitler, encouraged the latter to extend the Final Solution to the
Jews living in the Middle East.87 The general area in which Israel sits, most
frequently labeled either the “Middle East” or “Near East”, is one where
Jews were either entirely excluded – e.g., The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
both historically88 and even at present89 – or subject to recurrent secondclass status (dhimmitude)90, persecutions and expulsions. In the words of
84
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one scholar, while “persecution of Jews in the Islamic world never reached
the scale of Christian Europe…[,] that did not spare the ‘Jews of Islam’ …
from centuries of legally institutionalized inferiority, humiliating social
restrictions and the sporadic rapacity of local officials and the Muslim
population at large.”91 And, at least prior to the influx of Russian Jews in
the later 1980’s and 1990’s, a majority of Israel’s Jewish citizenry were
exiles from Arab lands, or the children or grandchildren of such exiles.92
Equally important to Israel’s identity and statehood was its emergence
in the aftermath of the Holocaust,93 with the horrendous death of a majority
of the relatives of most Ashkenazi Jews who settled in Israel. And an
essential Nazi idea, precedent to the Holocaust itself, was the alleged
“despoliation” of the Aryan race by the presence of Jews in Germany and
Austria. Nonetheless, Israel established relations with the Federal Republic
of Germany. But suppose that Germany had insisted as a price for such
recognition that no Jew could henceforth live or own property within
Germany. Is it conceivable that Israel would ever have signed such a peace
treaty? For Israel to accept the fact that Jews, as Jews, cannot continue to
live in a predominantly Arab governed polity severs a nerve cord connected
to an important historical underpinning of the state of Israel.94
The removal and destruction of settlements from Gaza, in the context
of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, produced much soul-searching
and agony, but did not present the same emotional, historical and geographic
challenges that removal from the West Bank would present.95 Nonetheless,
religions enjoyed only partial civil rights…” It should be noted that the term dhimmi initially implied a
protected status, but as time went on it connoted an unequal and inferior status which subjected Jews to
harsh treatment.
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the Gaza removal, like an earlier decision by Prime Minister Menachem
Begin to abandon Yamit in the context of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace
treaty,96 does offer precedent for the removal option. At the same time,
another aspect of the Gaza withdrawal may actually offer a more apt analogy
to the emotional agony of adopting and implementing the removal option in
the context of West Bank settlements. In response to public outcry and its
own soul-searching, the Israeli cabinet, reversing an earlier decision, decided
not to destroy any of the synagogues in Gaza.97
In sum, the continuance option maintains the principle that a minority,
in this case, Jews, can maintain communities among a larger and different
ethnic group, in the same way that Arab communities in Israel uphold the
same principle. The removal option contradicts this principle, in much the
same way that the principle would be violated if little-supported proposals to
transfer Palestinian Arabs out of Israel to the state of Palestine were ever
pursued. There are limits to the exercise of this principle – these are
explored in Part IV – but the principle itself is a weighty one.
B. Jewish settlements as a metaphor of acceptance
The settlements should stay for another powerful reason. The ArabIsraeli dispute has been characterized by two competing narratives.98 Each
narrative incorporates both an “affirmative” case, relating the Jewish or Arab
nexus to the land, as the case may be, and a “negative” brief, that has as its
considered to be the hemorrhaging of resources that providing security for the settlers there drained in
terms of both money and blood. Moreover, Gaza was not the crucial security corridor that the West Bank
is, nor were its sand dunes once home to the tribes of Israel, as were the hills and gullies of Judea and
Samaria.”). The recent evacuation of an illegal settlement on the West Bank, Amona, gives some
indication of the emotional and political complications of evacuating West Bank settlements in general.
See Amos Harel, Arnon Regular, Nadav Shragai, & Johnathan Lis, Security Forces Demolish Amona
Homes Amid Violent Clashes, HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/676627.html (last updated,
Feb. 1, 2006) (over 200 wounded settlers and police officers, along with several members of the Knesset
from parties supportive of the settlers). In the words of Hillel Halkin, “There is indeed something
unacceptable about telling Jews that although they may live anywhere they wish, in New York and London,
in Moscow and Buenos Aires, there is one part of the world they may not live in – namely, Judea and
Samaria, those regions of the land of Israel most intimately connected with the Bible, with the second
Temple period, and with Jewish historical memory, and most longed-for by the Jewish people over the
ages.” Halkin, supra note 18, at 24.
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purpose and/or effect to deny the nexus asserted by the other. Unfortunately,
the affirmative and negative parts of these stories are often so intertwined
that separating these elements becomes difficult.99
Many of the affirmative elements of the Jewish narrative have been
presented above.100 Its core is the several millennia nexus between the
Jewish people and the land, Eretz Y’srael.101 Historically, Israel’s
affirmative case was supplemented by its negative brief: Palestine was
99
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Palestine, 32 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 36-40, Nos. 21 & 22, Jan. 16, 1986, and Walter Reich, former
director of the US Holocaust Museum, 1995-98, and Professor of International Affairs, Ethics and Human
Behavior at George Washington University. See Walter Reich, Reich’s Letter to Samuel Rosner , available
at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/rosnerGuest.jhtml?itemNo=670656 (last viewed Jan. 16, 2006).
Porath, writing a critical review of Joan Peters’ From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the ArabJewish Conflict over Palestine, writes somewhat critically of some elements of the Jewish narrative, at least
in its unquestioned form:
“Jews, and Zionists especially, developed their own myths about Palestine. First they interpreted
ancient Jewish history according to the ideology of modern nationalism, equating the old Israelite
and Judean kingdoms with modern nation-states. The Maccabean revolt and the period of
Hasmonean rule were seen as typical manifestations of the struggle for modern national liberation.
During the years when most Jews lived in exile, it was argued, they always kept a separate
national identity: they never converted of their free will to another religion, and they preserved the
memory of their ancestral land, to which they always hoped to return. Indeed, against all odds,
some never left. Special emphasis was put on this last group. Every bit of evidence that could be
found, however trivial it may have been, was used to prove the continuity of the Jewish presence
in Eretz Israel and to show that it was central to the life of Jews in exile … The Zionists argued
that Jewish identity and the yearning to return to Palestine were strengthened by the persecutions
of the Jews in all parts of the world, including the Islamic and Arab countries. The return itself
was mainly perceived as a matter of Jewish resolve to establish a homeland, which required
struggle against Palestine's foreign rulers—the Ottoman Empire first, and then the British
Mandate.” Porath, supra, at 36.
Reich describes the Jewish narrative thus:
“It was a story that saw that the Jewish claim to the land as ancient and unbroken. Central to this
story was the understanding that the Jews had lived in that land for over a thousand years; that it
was the core of their cultural, moral and religious achievements; that while there they had
developed the teachings that had spawned the three great religions of the West; that it was the
place of their Temples and the site of their worship and their Zion; that ultimately most of the
Jews were exiled from that land; that many nevertheless remained in it; that the exiles continued to
pray, three times a day, for a return to it; that while they were in exile in Europe they were
constantly abused and repeatedly and genocidally massacred; that as a result, in the nineteenth
century, Herzl and other political Zionists created a movement, Zionism, to bring Jews back to
their homeland, their Zion, where they could a normal nation, determine their own destiny and
protect themselves; and that the creation of Israel was a just achievement based on the origin of
the Jews in that land and a necessary achievement based on the centuries of massacres and
genocide the Jews had endured in exile, of which the Holocaust was the most recent and most
stunning example.”
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barely inhabited when modern Jewish immigration began; many Arabs came
to Palestine attracted by the economic development produced by modern
Zionism prior to the establishment of the State of Israel; Palestinians never
considered themselves to be a separate people in a separate polity apart from
other Arabs; and, in general, Arab states and the Palestinians have pursued
repeated warfare and terrorism against Israel and the Jews.102 Combining its
affirmative and negative elements, the Israeli narrative has historically
portrayed the conflict as the unwillingness – carried to the extreme of Arab
encouragement of the Holocaust, of successive wars against Israel, and of
repeated acts of terrorism during the years of Israel’s existence – to permit
the existence of a sovereign Jewish nation in the Middle East despite the
demonstrated connection between the Jewish people and the land.
As might be expected, the Palestinian narrative substantially differs.
Its affirmative case stresses the fact that at the end of the nineteenth century
Palestine was inhabited, that Arabs formed the majority of the population,
and that Arabs lived in villages – i.e., they were more than Bedhouin
roaming across the deserts. More recently, Palestinians have sought to
buttress their claim to the land with the assertion that Palestinian are
descended from the Canaanites and therefore have always inhabited the land,
preceding even the ancient Hebrews. It is the Palestinian negative brief,
however, that has seemed to merit the most repetition. Walter Reich, former
director of the United States Holocaust Museum and now Professor of
International Affairs, Ethics and Human Behavior at George Washington
University, describes its elements as follows:
According to the Palestinian narrative, Jews have no right to the
land, and even had nothing, or little, to do with it in the past. The Jews
of today are seen as unrelated to the Hebrews who lived there two
thousand years ago; according to some versions of this narrative,
European Jews were simply the offspring of converts in Europe, and
were not descended from the Hebrews who used to live in what is
now Israel and the West Bank. So important is it for the Palestinian
"narrative" to deny the Jewish connection with the land - and therefore
102
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the justice of the Zionist return - that even the existence of the
Temples is denied. …
By creating Israel, Europeans were colonizing Palestine,
coming there without any basis for their arrival, much as the French
had colonized Algeria and the Boers and British had colonized South
Africa.103
According to this view, then, Israel’s creation – a European colonial
enterprise to deny Palestinians, the indigenous population, their right to the
land and sovereignty104-- was “utterly unjust.”105
To what degree have Jews and Arabs remained steadfast in believing
in and/or adhering to these narratives? Most Israelis still believe in the
positive core of their narrative – that Zionism and the resultant State of Israel
represented the act of self-determination by a people with an extraordinarily
103
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of the terrible treatment that Western Jews had suffered. On the contrary, the Muslims in general and the
Arabs in particular treated their religious and ethnic minorities with full equality and enabled both
Christians and Jews to take part in public life, to rise to high positions of state, and, in recent times, to
become full members of the modern and secular Arab nation living in its various states. The Jews living in
the Arab and Muslim countries, moreover, did not take part in the Zionist movement. They even actively
opposed it and did not want to emigrate to Israel. That most of them eventually did so the Arabs attribute to
the machinations of Israel working with corrupt Arab rulers who were "stooges of imperialism."¶After the
1948 war Arab propaganda added an important new claim: since the Jews wanted Palestine empty of
Arabs, they used the opportunity of the war to systematically expel the indigenous Arab population
wherever they could do so. Some Arab writers, and others favorable to their cause, have gone so far as to
claim that the war itself was set off in December 1947 by the Jews in order to create the right circumstances
for the mass expulsion of Palestinian Arabs from their homeland. ¶Until the mid-1960s the Arab claims
were usually presented as part of the ideology of Arab nationalism. Palestine was (and ideologically
speaking still is) considered part of the greater Arab homeland and the Palestinians part of the greater Arab
nation. The aim of the Arab struggle was to preserve the Arab character of Palestine from the JewishZionist threat. The Palestinian case was at best secondary when it was made at all. Only since the middle of
the 1960s and particularly after 1967 has the distinctively Palestinian component become relatively
stronger among the factors that shape the identity of the Palestinian Arabs.” Porath, supra note 101 at 36.
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strong physical, emotional and religious nexus to the land106 – but have
abandoned key elements of their negative brief.107 In doing so, most Israelis
understand that the Jewish/Arab struggle is, in the words of Chaim
Weizmann, the first president of Israel, “not the clash of right and wrong,
but the clash of two rights.”108 It is unclear, however, whether Arabs, in
general, and Palestinians, in particular, have similarly abandoned those
narrative elements that would deny any legitimacy to Jewish historical
claims.109 Writing approximately 15 years ago, Michael Curtis noted, “it
needs to be reiterated that the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains what
it has been for some seventy years, the implacable opposition by Arab states,
except Egypt since 1979, to the Jewish presence in the Mandate area of
Palestine and, since 1948, to the existence of the state of Israel.”110 While in
the subsequent fifteen years Jordan has made peace with Israel and the
Palestine National Council met to revise the Palestinian Liberation
Organization charter111 – sometimes referred to as the Palestine National
Charter – the only publicly available version still calls for the destruction of
Israel112 as does the even harsher representation of Israel and Jews in
Hamas’ charter.113 And, as recently as the Camp David summit between
then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, President Yasir Arafat of the
Palestinian Authority, and President Clinton, Arafat reportedly insisted on
“repeat[ing] old mythologies and invent[ing] new ones, like, for example,
that the Temple was not in Jerusalem …”114
To the Israelis, the question is an existential one: can Jews, as Jews,
live with a degree of power and not in dhimmi status within the Middle East?
That is, is there some acceptance of the Jewish narrative of a permanent and
106
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continual connection between the Jewish people and this land? Whether
Jews are permitted to live within a state of Palestine, in effect, then, is a
metaphor as to whether Israel, as a Jewish nation, can live in a sea of 22 or,
once Palestine is established, 23 different Arab nations within the area.115
And if the answer is negative – that is, any Arab state that is established
must exist without Jewish settlements – then that answer portends that any
Palestinian state that will be established will not have as its true goal the
two-state solution. To Israel, the question of establishing a legal entity of
Palestine depends upon whether that is the end of the conflict – an
acknowledgement that Jews too have rights to the land (as Israel, in
recognizing such a Palestinian state, would reciprocally be acknowledging)
– or simply a strategic move to be supplanted one day by one predominantly
Arab state.116
115
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C. Contiguity and Borders
If the Palestinian Authority succeeds in establishing order and a
functioning self-governing entity in Gaza117 and if Hamas’ recent victory in
Palestinian parliamentary elections does not derail peace efforts, it is
inevitable that a Palestinian state, the geographic bulk and center of which
will consist of much of the West Bank, will be established. In addition to
the question of how Gaza and the West Bank will be connected, a key focus
now has become whether the West Bank part of that state will be a
contiguous unit, with sensible borders, or a group of loosely tied districts.
Given the very small area west of the Jordan, only 10,871 square miles,118
drawing borders with the clarity that often characterized colonial borders is
impossible, and contiguity for both a predominantly Jewish and a
predominantly Arab Palestinian state is not easy to achieve. The Peel
Commission Partition Plan of July 1937 would have allowed for a

2006) (“Hamas' calls for the "Hudna" with Israel is merely an ancient maneuver commonly used by radical
Islamic organizations to reestablish and strengthen their power without being exposed to danger from their
adversaries. The "Hudna" is intended to serve the step by step program that Hamas advocates for the
liberation of all of Palestine, from the sea to the river.” Id. at 4).
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contiguous Arab state, but not a contiguous Jewish state119; a 1938 Jewish
proposal for partition foresaw both a Jewish and an Arab state in several
sections120; a British proposal for partition of the same year envisioned a
Jewish state in two sections and an Arab state that included Jaffa but was
physically cut off from it121; and pursuant to the 1947 United Nations
Partition Plan, accepted by the Jews but rejected by the Arabs, both Israel
and the Palestinian state would have had three different segments. And,
perhaps most significant to the present discussion, even a cursory look at a
map of Israel slightly north of Tel Aviv, its largest city, reveals a pre-1967
“waist-line” of only approximately 15 kilometers, in an area with a
population even more dense that that of the Gaza Strip.122 It has been
suggested that if the largest of the settlements, Maale Admumim, remained
under Israeli sovereignty and were connected to Jerusalem by construction
in the several kilometer stretch between the two, a Palestinian state would
lack contiguity, but, in fact, the Palestinian state would still have the same
width at that point, 15 kilometers as has Israel at its narrowest point. In
other words, continuance of Israeli settlements on the West Bank even if
they remained under Israeli sovereignty would probably not result in a
Palestinian state any less convoluted than the State of Israel.
Nonetheless, contiguity has seemingly been elevated from wise
policy, to the extent it can reasonably be achieved, to principle, and a
frequent allegation leveled against Jewish settlements is that they prevent a
contiguous Palestinian state with sensible borders.123 And the facile
conclusion is that if the presence of settlements with Israeli Jews prevents a
119
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contiguous state with sensible borders, then the simple solution is to remove
rather than tolerate them.124 Both principle and policy, however, militate in
favor of continuance over removal.
The principled reason has already been explored: removal only
achieves contiguity at the expense of the principle that Jewish communities,
just because they are Jewish communities, should not automatically be
excluded from the Land of Israel, whereas the continuance option, by
separating the concept of Jewish settlements from Jewish sovereignty,
allows for both contiguity and that principle.
The policy reason takes account of political reality. With its implicit
equation of Jewish settlements and Israeli sovereignty, the removal option
puts tremendous stress on the question of the exact location of the border
between Israel and a state of Palestine. This phenomenon is reflected, for
example, in pressure to expand Jerusalem eastward so that Jews inhabit a
geographic continuum between Jerusalem and settlements east of it.125 In
contrast, if Jews could be assured that, as Jews, they would be allowed to
live safely and freely within Eretz Yisrael, albeit outside of Israel’s
sovereignty, less opposition can be expected to the question of exactly where
the border will lie.126 And the weight the question holds – does the final
resolution involve the forced removal of between 50,000 to 100,000 people,
including Jews who perceive of their communities in religious terms, or does
it only involve acknowledging Palestinian sovereignty without interfering
with the lives of the people in these communities? – bears on not only the
probable success of negotiations, but the time it will take to arrive at a
124
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resolution. In short, it is actually the continuance option that offers the
greater prospect of a Palestinian state, Gaza aside, that minimally has
borders that make as much sense as the Green Line that characterized
Israel’s pre-1967 borders.
D. Cost considerations
Continuance of Jewish settlements is also the least expensive way of
creating a Palestinian state. Although creation of a Palestinian state by
2005, there is still great impetus for that reality to be created sooner rather
than later. Three sets of cost considerations need to be considered: the costs
associated with establishing a viable Palestinian state; the costs associated
with resolving the Palestinian and Jewish refugee problems; and, if removal
rather than continuance is the option effected, the cost to Israel of removing
and resettling all settlers not within the final borders of Israel once a peace
agreement is concluded.
The first broad category of costs includes those associated with
insuring the viability of the new Palestinian state. To bolster the Palestinian
economy and to provide other practical perquisites for statehood will require
billions of dollars.127 Even in anticipation of Israel’s withdrawal of
settlements from Gaza, the World Bank estimated that an additional $1.8
billion of donor aid would be necessary.128 The costs for insuring the
economic viability of a Palestinian state following an Israeli withdrawal
from the West Bank would be exponentially higher. While much of its
economic success would be dependent upon the ability of a much higher
number of Palestinians to find labor in Israel again, as in the period prior to
the 2000 intifada, increasing Palestinian economic independence is highly
desirable.129 The most recent World Bank Report on the Palestinian
economy credited its real 8-9 percent growth of gross domestic product in
2005, on the financial side, to large increases in both credit to the private
sector – 30 percent – and donor disbursements – 20 percent to $1.1 billon.130
Its conclusion is that “[t]he only satisfactory way forward is to combine
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good policies by both sides with more money”,131 and called on “[d]onors …
to increase their assistance levels” further.132
The creation of a de jure Palestinian state, with recognition by Israel,
the United States and others, will almost certainly require a permanent
resolution of both the Palestinian and Jewish refugee problems. Otherwise,
felt grievances that have made peace between Israel and Palestinians in the
Middle East so illusive will continue to hamper true reconciliation. Those
Palestinian refugees, or their descendants, who fled Israel or the territory that
became Israel in the 1947-48 period, will have to abandon their claimed
right of return to places within the borders of Israel. It matters little whether
international law supports such a right of return133 or the exact circumstances
of their exodus. Some refugees – probably small in number compared with
those claiming refugee status -- might in fact be allowed to reunite with
family in Israel itself, but, for most, resolution of their status will entail
permanent residence and citizenship in other parts of the Arab world and/or
within the new state of Palestine, with some compensation for claimed
losses of property within the state of Israel. Resettlement and payments for
claimed property losses will itself cost tens of billions of dollars.134 Jews
forced to flee from Arab countries, contemporaneously with or soon after the
establishment of the state of Israel, are similarly seeking compensation for
the loss of value of their homes and businesses.135 In the words of Julius
Stone, “any rule of international law requiring rights of return or
compensation would have to apply equally to Jewish refugees from Arab
countries…”136
If the removal rather than continuance option were chosen, it is
necessary to consider as well the cost of evacuating and resettling any
Jewish settlers whose settlements are not included within the borders of
Israel as negotiated between it and the Palestinian Authority. The aggregate
131
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cost of removing 7,000 settlers from Gaza and initiating their resettlement
has already exceeded $1 billion.137 As of four years ago, one party estimated
that the total cost of evacuating all the settlements at over $20 billion,138 an
amount that would have to be adjusted upwards to take account of inflation
in the price of housing within the pre-1967 borders of Israel. Moreover, the
definition of “cost” becomes relevant. Most usage of the term in the Gaza
context referred to the cost of compensating Gaza residents for the loss of
their homes. Necessarily, any compensation suffers from being both highly
subjective and highly objective, at one and the same time. The scheme is
highly subjective in the sense that politics and availability of funds
determine the outcome as much as any rigorous effort to determine all the
financial costs of resettlement.139 As of three months after the
disengagement from Gaza, three-quarters of the evacuees were unemployed
and a substantial number still living in tents.140 The scheme is highly
objective in the sense that rather than an individualized and highly
particularized calculation, settlers are treated in broad categories. While the
exact number of settlers that would have to be compensated from a West
Bank withdrawal varies depending upon which settlements would remain in
an Israel with modified borders, the number is usually presented as upwards
of 70,000 people. Moreover, since greater opposition to the removal of
West Bank settlements can be expected, even the cost of implementing such
a decision would probably well exceed the enforcement expenses in
evacuating the Gaza settlements.141 Inevitably, Israel would turn to the
international community and especially the United States to aid with such a
137
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resettlement at the same time that enormous financial demands would be
made upon that same external community to fund the costs of a new
Palestinian state as well as to resolve the Palestinian and Jewish refugee
problems.
In sum, requiring as a condition for the creation of a Palestinian state
that no Jewish communities continue to exist within its borders would mean
substantially aggravating the calculus of the total costs of that creation.
Correlatively, the fastest and least expensive means of achieving a
Palestinian state is to allow Jews to remain within its borders.
IV. Conditions precedent for Israeli Jewish settlements in a state of Palestine
All other things being equal, continuance is preferable to removal
based upon both considerations of principle, contiguity, cost and final
resolution of the conflict. But are other things equal? It has been argued
that Jewish settlements stand on “Arab” land, violate international and other
law, and prevent the establishment of a viable, sovereign Palestinian state,
and that neither Jews nor Arabs would find it practical to have Jewish
settlements continue to exist in that state. These arguments, in effect, posit
conditions that must be satisfied for Jewish settlements to remain in
Palestine: that settlements are not shown to have been established on
“Arab” land; that their establishment is not demonstrated to have been
“illegal” under international and other law; that their presence does not
prevent the creation of a viable sovereign Palestinian state; and that
continuance rather than removal is a pragmatic solution.
These have been identified as necessary conditions not only because
they respond to arguments and concerns that have been voiced against, or
about, Jewish settlements on the West Bank, but also for independent good
cause. The condition that Jewish settlements not lie on land that legally
belongs to another is based upon the principle that even military victory does
not justify theft of property.142 Abstractly, at least, the international law
condition – that the creation or continued presence of the settlements not be
conclusively demonstrated to have violated that body of law -- is premised
both upon respect for that body of law, and the instrumental consideration
that if actions contrary to law are validated, one simply invites additional
breaches. Exploring the legality of Jewish settlements is quite difficult,
142

Admittedly, this principle is often violated more in the breach than the observance, as is evidenced by
the difficulty of original owners of artwork or land prior to the Holocaust in retrieving or laying successful
claim to their property, even in European nations that pledge adherence to this principle.
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which is why this condition has been stated in the negative.143 Because the
question of land ownership and use implicates questions of international law,
the issue of land ownership is considered below as part of the overall
discussion of international law.
The condition that Israeli Jewish settlements not prevent the creation
of a viable Palestinian state is necessitated by the desirability of the twostate solution. As explored previously, any solution other than two states
would eventually mean the cessation of the state of Israel or, as previously
discussed, apartheid-like or forced transfer options that would negate Israel’s
status as a democracy. The pragmatic condition responds to an argument
that has been made even by parties that do not necessarily accept the notion
that Jewish settlements are illegal or would interfere with the creation of a
viable Palestinian state. If the continuance option is not pragmatic, most
particularly if Jews would not want to live in such a state for fear of their
safety or based upon other grounds, then the continuance option advanced in
this Article is at best academic. Both the state viability condition – which
deals primarily with Palestinian interests – and the pragmatic condition –
which addresses primarily Israeli interests – force us to confront the issue of
what it would mean for Israeli Jews to live under Palestinian Arab
sovereignty.
A. That Israeli settlements are not demonstrated to be illegal: the
occupation, land, and transfer issues
Well over one hundred scholarly works weigh in on the question of
whether Israeli settlements are “illegal.”144 When this body of work gets
condensed in the popular press, the dominant notion seems to be the
settlements are illegal, and the more popular commentators and politicians
hostile to Israel repeat this, the more it is believed.145 The task here is not to
repeat or refute every scholarly argument, but it is interesting to reflect both
143

The condition, as stated, is that Israeli settlements have not been conclusively demonstrated to be illegal
under international law rather than that Israeli settlements be demonstrated to be consistent with
international law. This condition is intentionally stated in the negative because of the political nature of the
legal arguments. Given their inconclusive character, other arguments – both pro and con the settlements –
would seem to be of greater relevance. See infra notes 443 to 493, and accompanying text.
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See sources cited in Peter Malanczuk, Israel: Status, Territory and Occuped Territories, 1468-1508 at
1497-1501, in Rudolf Bernhardt, editor, 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERANTIONAL LAW, (1995).
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As Martha Minow has noted in reference to the persistence of belief in the Czarist forgery, Protocols of
the Elders of Zion, “mere resonance and reverberation lends credibility.” Martha Minow, The Persistance
of Falsehood and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 47-55, at 47 in DEBORAH R. KAUFMAN, et.al,eds.,
FROM THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION TO HOLOCAUST DENIAL TRIALS, CHALLENGING THE MEDIA,
THE LAW AND THE ACADEMY (2006) (forthcoming).
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on the extent to which these arguments have changed over time (somewhat)
and the weaknesses inherent in the arguments of both supporters and
opponents of the settlements.
The arguments on both sides are well rehearsed and extraordinarily
heated.146 Unfortunately, as Michael Curtis has observed, “[n]o doubt,
customary and conventional international law have often been used to
buttress tendentious political positions, and it would be unrealistic to expect
otherwise.”147 Commenting on the views of two such scholars who have
sought to support Palestinian violence148, Curtis characterized their argument
as “infused with an animus that exceeds the usual boundaries of scholarly
discourse while paying scant attention to the realities of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.”149 Some commentators start from such a strong position that the
creation of the State of Israel is “unlawful” or “wrongful” that their
particular position with respect to Israeli settlements on the West Bank is
both predetermined and suspect.150
International law based arguments concerning Israeli settlements rest
primarily upon two sources of international law: the 1907 Hague
Regulations151 and the 1949 4th Geneva Convention.152 In particular,
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See, e.g., Craig Jackson, Israeli West Bank Settlements, the Reagan Administration’s Policy Toward the
17 (1987)(The different remarks made
Middle East and International Law, 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 2
in American Society of International Law Proceedings, April 25-27, 1985).
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Curtis, supra note 110.
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Richard A. Falk, Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the
West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129 (1991).
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Curtis, supra note 110.
150
See, e.g., W. THOMAS MALLISON, SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND WORLD ORDER (1986). After starting their study denigrating the concept of a “Jewish people”
and the Zionist movement (at 1-17), the Balfour Declaration calling for the creation of a Jewish state in the
Palestinian Mandate (at 18-78), the Jewish Agency which acquired by purchase most of the land on which
Jewish settlers within the “Green Line” (the armistice line established in 1948) (at 79-141), and the
resolution of the United Nations calling for the creation of two states in the part of the Palestine Mandate
west of the Jordan River (at 142-73), their “juridical analysis” of Israeli settlements is totally predictable
and pre-ordained (at 240-75). A similar analysis pervades their earlier work, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION (1979),
“prepared and published at the request of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People.” See also W.T. Mallison, Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims, supra note 21 .
151
See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Custom of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed at the Hague, 18 October 1907) (hereinafter,
“Hague Regulations”), reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
60-81 (2004) (herinafter SCHINDLER). While Israel is not a signatory, its Supreme Court has held the
regulations to be part of customary international law that is both applicable to Israel and enforceable in its
courts as a part of its municipal law.
152
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (signed at Geneva, 12
August 1949), ), FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 (hereinafter, Final
Record), Vol I. at 297-335 (William S. Hein & Co. Buffalo 2004), also reprinted in Schindler at 575-631.
Although Israel signed the Convention, subject to reservations not here relevant, the Israeli Supreme Court
has treated the Convention technically as not binding on Israeli courts in that, as conventional rather than
customary international law, it would take an act of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, to cause the
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Articles 43,153 46,154 52,155 and 55156 of the Hague Regulations and paragraph
6 of Article 49157 of the 4th Geneva Convention have been cited against
and/or in support of the settlement activity. Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations generally obligates an occupying power to “ensure, as far as
possible, the public order and [civil life], while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country”; Article 46 bars the confiscation
of private property; Article 52 bars requisitions from municipalities or
inhabitants “except for the needs of the army of occupation”; and Article 55
obligates the occupying power to “protect the capital of …[the real estate of
the hostile State], and administer it according to the rules of usufruct.” More
generally, these provisions, along with others such as Article 23(g)158, create

convention to be considered part of Israeli municipal law. Nonetheless, the Israeli Supreme Court has in
fact measured the actions of the Israeli military against the Convention. See infra, notes 415-26, and
accompanying text.
153
“The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter
shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” SCHINDLER, supra note
151, at 78. Benvinisti uses the term, “civil life”, deeming it a more accurate translation of the French than
the term, “safety”, which has been used in English sources. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF OCCUPATION 7 (1993).
154
Paragraph 2 of Article 46 provides: “Private property cannot be confiscated.” SCHINDLER, supra note
151, at 78.
155
Article 52 provides, in part: “Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation.” SCHINDLER, supra note 151,
at 79.
156
Article 55 provides, in part: “The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and
usufructuary of … real estate … belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It
must protect the capital of these properties, and administer it according to the rules of usufruct.”
157
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are
prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the
security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the
displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material
reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest
practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the
removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members
of the same family are not separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have
taken place.
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the
dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies. Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 307; SCHINDLER, supra note 151, at 594.
158
Article 23(g) provides that “it is especially forbidden … To destroy or seize the enemy’s property,
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.” Schindler at 73.
Unlike Articles 43, 46, 52 and 55, which are part of Section III of the Hague Regulations dealing with
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a standard of “military necessity” by which to judge the actions of an
occupying army. Although the Hague Regulations do protect the inhabitants
of an occupied territory, they were primarily designed to protect the interests
of a temporarily ousted sovereign159 in the context of a short-term
occupation:
…[T]he Regulations placed emphasis on a settlement whereby
reversion of control to the ousted power, in whole or in part, would
occur. The predominant theme … was the provisional character of
occupation, wherein the ousted power retains sovereignty, his
authority being merely in a state of abeyance. Interference in the
ousted power’s legislative and institutional system was thus
prohibited, for fear of being inimical to the settlement process. …To
preserve the rights and authority of the ousted sovereign, the Hague
Conventions proscribed any activity on the part of the occupant that
might tend to undercut it, with changes in existing laws and
institutions being the foremost concern.160
In contrast, the 4th Geneva Convention is unabashedly humanitarian law
that primarily seeks to protect persons caught up in warfare and its
aftermath. Article 49 thereof generally seeks to prohibit the forced
movement or use of people; the extraordinarily negative behavioral models
primarily underlying Article 49 were the deportations and slave labor
practices of the Nazis during World War II, which had a felt immediacy at
the 1949 Geneva Conference of delegates and the preparatory conferences
that preceded it.161 Paragraph 6 of Article 49 specifically prohibits an
occupied territory, Article 23(g) applies in the context of hostilities, i.e., the warfare prior to belligerent
occupancy.
159
For example, both themes were emphasized in an address made by Alexander Nelidow, the Russian
delegate to the Hague Conference and the President of the Conference: “This task …consists of two parts:
on the one hand, we must endeavour to discover a method of settling amicably differences which may arise
between States, and thus prevent ruptures and armed conflict. On the other hand, we must endeavour to
lighten the burdens of war – in case it breaks out – both as regards the combatants and those may be
99
indirectly affected by it.” JAMES BROWN SCOTT, ED., THE REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES ON 18
AND 1907, 197 (1917).
160
ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1978).
161
Max Petitperre, Head of the Swiss Federal Political Department, who presided over and convened the
first plenary session of the Conference considering the Convention, declared, in relation to the 4th
Convention: “Most important of all, the second world War showed that the Geneva conventions would be
incomplete if they did not also assure the protection of civilians. It has become an imperative necessity to
give such persons certain moral and material guarantees. In 1859 it was the groans of the wounded
abandoned on the battlefield of Solferino which upset Henry Dunant. Today another still more tragic
appeal is being made to us – that of the millions of civilians who perished in the horrors of the
concentration camps or died a miserable death, even though they had taken no part in military operations.
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occupying power from transferring or deporting its own civilians into
occupied territory.
The contentions about the illegality of the settlements usually take one
of three inter-related forms, or variants of such: first, the settlements are
illegal because Israel illegally occupies the West Bank; second, the
settlements are illegal because they are on “Arab” land and not justified by
military necessity under the Hague Regulations; and, third, the settlements,
as a transfer by Israel of its citizens into occupied territory, violate paragraph
6 of Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention. The corresponding
contentions, by supporters of the settlements, stress the disputed nature of
the West Bank, the “military necessity” of settlements to combat terrorism
and protect Israel from an eastern attack, the “public” or “state” lands on
which settlements have been situated since 1979, the voluntary rather than
forced nature of the settlement activity, and, in general, either the
inapplicability of international law to Israeli actions on the West Bank or the
conformity of Israeli actions with that law.
Before the particulars of these conflicting arguments are explored, it is
instructive to note the uniqueness of Israel’s position from both an
institutional and a temporal perspective. Although the Israeli government’s
stance has vacillated with respect to whether the West Bank is “occupied
territory” as that concept is understood in either the Hague Regulations or
the Geneva Convention,162 it did in fact establish a military administration
overseeing the West Bank in accordance with the Hague Regulations and
has also asserted that its conduct with respect to the West Bank and the
Palestinians therein conforms to the humanitarian standards of the 4th
¶It lies with us to give civilians the protection which has become a necessity. This is perhaps the most
important part of our mission….” Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 10. Even more generally,
German conduct during World War was the negative paradigm underlying the provisions of the 4th Geneva
Convention. Revising perhaps the most prestigious international law text used in the English language
after World War II – a revision that took account of the 4th Geneva Convention – Hersh Lauterpacht
commented, “In the part devoted to rules of warfare, the account and analysis of the new developments are
based, to a considerable extent, on the record of the violation of the law of war by Germany and her allies
and of the decisions of the various war crimes tribunals which were called upon to adjudicate upon them.”
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW A TREATISE, DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY, preface at v (Hersh
Lauterpacht, ed., David McKay Co. 1952). See also G.I.A.D. DRAPER, The Historical Background and
General Principles of the Geneva Conventios of 1949, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS
54, 58 (1998) (“This Civilians’ Convention was called into being by the civilized States of the community
of nations as a direct result of the experience of the Second world War. In that conflict, as we know, the
civilian population suffered in death, torture, and starvation to an extent that has never been witnessed in
the recorded history of humankind. In Auschwitz Concentration Camp alone 4 ½ million civilians died by
gassing, let alone the tens of thousand who perished there from shooting, flogging, torture, hanging,
starvation, typhus and tuberculosis.”); G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS (1958) (comments
at 26, 34-5, 47-8 all reflect the influence of what became known as the “Holocaust” on the drafting of the
4th Geneva Convention).
162
See the brief discussion of this in Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 305-06.
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Geneva Convention. In the words of Eyal Benvinisti, a critic of Israeli
settlements, “this is the only occupation since World War II in which a
military power has established a distinct military government over occupied
areas in accordance with the framework of the law of occupation[, whereas]
[a]ll other modern occupants who have assumed control over a foreign
territory have rejected this body of laws as inapplicable and irrelevant.”163
The singularity of Israel’s position temporally is that its control over the
West Bank has continued for close to 40 years. This radically differs from a
“classical” sequence of events related to occupation: belligerent occupation
is fairly quickly followed by a surrender (post-surrender occupation), which
then results in a peace agreement according to which either the defeated
sovereign regains control over the occupied territory status quo ante or the
occupying power retains some or all of the occupied territory, the border
having been redrawn between the victorious and defeated nations.164 Most
of the international law of occupation, particularly the Hague Regulations, is
premised upon this model of short term rather than long term occupations,165
making the issue of the applicability of the international law to Israel’s
occupation of, or control over, the West Bank somewhat especial.166 In
short, there is scant precedent in discussing the legal issues.
1. The “occupation” issue: the question of Israel’s legal status on the
West Bank
The claim has frequently been made that Israeli settlements on the
West Bank are illegal because Israel’s occupation of the West Bank is
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BENVINISTI, supra note 153, at 107. Geoffrey Best, another party somewhat critical of Israel’s policies,
echoes this thought: “Whatever reservations may be discerned behind the Israeli Government’s refusal to
recognize the de jure applicability of the fourth Geneva convention, it has at least acknowledge ‘the
relevance of international legal standards’ as for instance have not, in comparable circumstances, the USSR
in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, the Republic of South Africa in Namibia, and, one might
add, Indonesias in East Timor. Israel’s military authorities have allowed the ICRC considerable freedom of
access to the occupied territories and its Supreme Court has affirmed the applicability of the Hague
Regulations. It is relevant to remark also that the Israel Defence Forces’ commitment to the three other
Geneva Conventions has never been in doubt, and that Israel has permitted an almost unexampled latitude
of comment, from within its armed forces as well as from without, on the compatibility of their operations
with their legal and ethical obligations.” GEORGE BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 316 (1994).
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GERSON, supra note 160, at 2-21.
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Benvinisti explores the tension between a body of law primarily directed towards short term contexts
and the needs of the people of occupied territory in longer term occupations. See generally BENVINISTI
supra note 153, at 7-31. But even the 4th Geneva Convention has been described as premised on an
occupation of “limited and temporary” nature. See DRAPER, RED CROSS CONVENTIONS, supra note 161, at
39.
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BEST supra note 163, at 316.
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illegal.167 Such reasoning perhaps falsely equates the two: Israeli
settlements on the West Bank might be illegal even if Israel’s occupation
accords with international law; conversely, Jewish settlements on the West
Bank theoretically could be quite legal even if Israel’s occupation were
illegal. Nonetheless, enough of a connection between occupation and
settlements has been drawn to merit review of the differing views regarding
the legality of Israel’s control over the West Bank, including the legality of
its initial occupation, the legality of its continuing occupation, and the
implications of those questions on the legality and status of Israeli
settlements.
(a) “Disputed” or “Occupied” – the terminological debate
Initially, one might differentiate, however subtly, between a people
under occupation and a land under occupation. From one perspective, all
peoples not in control over the governing authority and rejecting the
legitimacy of that governing authority might be considered occupied. So,
for example, the Sunnis in present day Iraq might well consider themselves
occupied, in the sense that they both do not control the authority that
governs over them and many reject that government. The Palestinians
similarly and rightly feel they are under occupation by a power in whose
government, army and society they do not participate. To what extent can
we also say that the West Bank is occupied territory in a legal sense?
This question of whether Israel is “occupying” territory in a legal
sense has been debated as long as Israel has had control over the territory.
One problem that has been cited is that “occupation” of a territory implies
“the effective control of a power …over a territory to which that power has
no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory.”168
The question then arises: what is the “sovereignty” that Israel’s control over
the West Bank cannot negate? Jordan itself occupied the West Bank in
1948, contrary to the General Assembly resolution that called for the
creation of a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish state in the territory west of
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BENVINISTI, supra note 153, at 4. Indeed, “[t]he foundation upon which the entire law of occupation is
based is the principle of inalienability of sovereignty through the actual or threatened use of force.” Id.
While Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states that “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army”, Article 42 is the first article in Section III, entitled,
“Military Authority Over The Territory Of The Hostile State.” (emphasis added). Schindler, supra note 151
at 77.
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the Jordan River.169 Its annexation of the West Bank was never recognized
internationally, except by Pakistan and Great Britain.
In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Yehuda Blum, an international law
scholar later to become Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, argued
that since Transjordan had attacked and occupied the West Bank in an
aggressive rather than defensive war, it probably lacked even the status of a
“belligerent occupant”170, with the rights to control the West Bank according
to the standards of belligerent occupancy, including the power to regulate it
according to military necessity. At best, Jordan was a “belligerent
occupant”, but “her rights could not amount to those of a legitimate
sovereign … [a] conclusion which is of decisive legal significance as regards
the nature and scope of the present rights of Israel over these territories.”171
Because Jordan could not be considered the sovereign, according to Blum,
he described the West Bank as having a “missing reversioner.” Because
Jordan had no sovereign right over the West Bank, Israel cannot be said to
have occupied Jordanian land. Moreover, in Blum’s view, because the
“assumption of the concurrent existence, in respect of the same territory, of
both an ousted legitimate sovereign and a belligerent occupant lies at the
root of all those rules of international law[.] … [T]hose rules of belligerent
occupation directed to safeguarding that sovereign’s reversionary rights
ha[d] no application” to the West Bank.172 In any event, Jordan itself
renounced any claim to the West Bank on July 31, 1988.173
Picking up on Blum’s analysis – and well prior to Jordan’s
relinquishment of any claim to the West Bank -- Eugene Rostow, former
Dean of Yale Law School and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
in 1967 during the Six-day War, argued that the West Bank could be
considered an “unallocated territory.” 174 Having once been part of the no
longer existent Ottoman Empire and placed under the trusteeship of the
British, the West Bank, in Rostow’s view, was still under a trust mandate
sanctioned by the League of Nations and continued under Article 80 of the
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United Nations Charter. From this vantage point, Israel, rather than simply
being considered “a belligerent occupant”, had the status of a “claimant to
the territory.” His conclusion, relevant to the subject matter of this paper,
was that “Jews have a right to settle in it under the Mandate”, a right that he
declared to be “unchallengeable as a matter of law.”175
In accord with these views, the Israeli government historically was
careful to characterize the West Bank as “disputed territory.”176 Many
advocates of Israeli settlements still use that term,177 while certain other
Israeli Jews, many of whom perceive of the West Bank in religious terms,
use language indicating an even greater right to Jewish possession of the
land. In the eyes of the latter, all of the West Bank “belongs” to Israel,
thereby equating Eretz Yisrael with Medinat Yisrael, the land of Israel with
the government of Israel.178 With greater widespread recognition of the
threat that eventual sovereignty over the West Bank posed to Israel’s status
as a Jewish state, the “Greater Israel” movement lost much of its former
following, and today most Israelis accept the necessity of a two-state
solution. More recently, the Israeli government has itself used the term,
“occupation”, in a practical if not in a legal sense.
(b) Defensive Occupation
Even if, for purposes of international law, “occupied”, is equally as, if
not more, appropriate an appellation than is “disputed” to characterize the
West Bank under Israeli control, the analysis cannot stop there. To the
extent that the legality of Israeli settlement activity may depend upon the
175
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176
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legality of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, it bears repeating that
“occupation” in itself is not unlawful. Yoram Dinstein has articulated why:
Some Arabs claim that belligerent occupation, as such, is intrinsically
unlawful. But this is a spurious contention. In every war which is not
confined to a Sitzkrieg, armies are on the move. When the situation
stabilizes, the zones between the frontiers and the frontlines are
subjected to belligerent occupation. While belligerent occupation
does not transfer title (sovereignty), it does mean that the occupying
Power has a temporary right of possession (which can continue as
long as peace is not concluded).179
Moreover, international law has long recognized a distinction between a
lawful occupation – for example, those resulting from an act of self-defense
– and an unlawful occupation. From the latter, based upon the principle of
ex injuria just non oritur, no rights can arise.180 From the former,
annexation of territory not only can result, but has often resulted from war.
As Alan Gerson has noted, “[a]ny other rule would impose no sanction on
aggressive behavior and thus defeat the basic quest of international law, or
any law, in distinguishing lawful from unlawful behavior. A rule or policy
requiring lawful entrants to relinquish gains in bargaining power gained in
reacting against unlawful behavior would condone aggression and penalize
defensive action.”181
(c) The legality of Israel’s initial occupation of the West Bank
Turning to the issue of whether Israel’s initial occupation of the West
Bank was lawful, Israel acquired control over the West Bank during the
1967 War, about which volumes have been written.182 Most impartial
observers acknowledge that Israel fired the “first” shot against Egypt, but
also that Israel had little choice but to do so: Nasser had imposed a blockade
on all Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, ordered the UN troops and
observers between the Israeli and Egyptian borders to leave (a demand that
then UN Secretary General U Thant inexplicably complied with), and had
179
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planes fly over Israeli bases.183 In short, Israel fired the first shot (attacked
the Egyptian airfields) in a context where Egypt had signaled that it was
about ready to attack Israel. But more relevant to the present discussion is
that Israel, through intermediaries, twice asked Jordan not to attack Israel
and join in that war.184 Only after Jordan rejected these pleas and attacked
Israel did the latter capture the remainder of Jerusalem (including the Jewish
section of the Old City and the Western Wall, considered the holiest site in
Judaism) and the West Bank. The bottom line is that Israel occupied the
West Bank in a defensive war, and, as mentioned, there is no support for the
proposition that the occupation of territory in a defensive war violates
international law.185
(d) The legality of Israel’s continued occupation of the West
Bank
Nor does it appear that Israel’s continued control over the West Bank
after the cessation of hostilities in 1967 has been illegal. The generally
accepted, operative international legal document pertaining to this question
is Security Council Resolution 242, passed by the United Nations Security
Council in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 War,186 later supplemented
by Resolution 338 passed during the 1973 war.187 While various resolutions
were considered by the Security Council, only the compromise British draft
of Resolution 242 was voted upon, and it was adopted unanimously.188 Its
English version called for Israel, in return for “[t]ermination of all claims or
states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force”, to withdraw from “territories”
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captured in the 1967 War.189 Parties who participated in drafting Resolution
242 have testified to the significance and intentionality of the omission of
the article, “the”, prior to “territories”, from the English text, thereby
signifying Israel’s right to make some border adjustments in the context of a
peace settlement with the Arab nations.190 Israel, of course, has always
agreed with that interpretation, while Arab nations and Palestinians have
always disagreed. As Ruth Lapidoth reports, “Israel’s interpretation is based
[not only] on the plain meaning of the English text of the withdrawal clause
which was the draft presented by the British delegation[, but also] the fact
that proposals to add the words ‘all’ or ‘the’ before ‘territories’ were
rejected; and on the idea that in interpreting the withdrawal clause one has to
take into consideration the other provisions of the Resolution, including the
one on the establishment of ‘secure and recognized boundaries.’”191
Even were one not to accept the fact that Resolution 242 contemplated
border changes, Israel was not required to withdraw prior to termination of
all states of belligerency against it. Rather than pursuing peace, Arab
leaders convened a summit conference in Khartoum, in which they reacted
to their defeat in the 1967 War and the resultant UN Security Council
Resolution 242 by restating their position that there would be no
negotiations, recognition or peace with Israel.192 Moreover, after Jordan
relinquished its claim to sovereignty in the West Bank, no entity existed with
which even to negotiate an Israeli withdrawal until, in 1993, Israel and the
189
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Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Accords,193 pursuant to
which the Palestinian Authority was established.
Later interim accords between Israel and the Palestinian Authority led
to greater degrees of Palestinian self-government and control over the West
Bank194 – Israeli settlements and external border controls, excepted – until
the breakdown of the very extended negotiations in 2000 between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority, first at Camp David and then at Taba. That
breakdown was followed by the second Palestinian intifada and the renewal
of Israeli military control over West Bank population centers. Most wellplaced observers195 have placed the onus for that breakdown on the
Palestinian Authority and its then head, Yasir Arafat. While it may have
been possible for Israel unilaterally to have withdrawn from Gaza196 and a
substantial percentage of Israel’s population wants to repeat the exercise on
the West Bank,197 withdrawal from the West Bank without a peace treaty is
much more difficult. The West Bank lies contiguous for several hundred
miles to Israel’s heartland. For the same reason, Israel lacks the same option
allegedly available to other nations, for example, the United States in Iraq198,
of simply deciding to withdraw.
193
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(e) Relationship between lawful occupation and Jewish
settlements
If one is prepared to accept the fact that Israel’s occupation of the
West Bank is lawful but would not accept the Blum/Rostow position that
Israel’s rights to the West Bank exceed that of a occupying power, how do
the Israeli Jewish settlements on the West Bank fare under the Hague
Regulations? Response to the question is most difficult for two reasons
previously noted: Jordan’s own abrogation of any claim to sovereignty over
the West Bank; and the admittedly short term occupations envisioned by the
Hague Regulations.
Consistent with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,199 which calls on
the occupant “to respect[…], unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force
in the country”, Israel has for the most part continued to follow Jordanian
law on the West Bank, despite its position that Jordan was an illegal
occupant of the West Bank. Israel’s stance has been criticized as
contradictory,200but general continuance of Jordanian law by the military
administration can be justified on grounds of legal stability, long-term
reliance and other policy and equitable grounds reflected in international as
well as other law. Israel, however, has distinctly abrogated Jordanian law
that makes it a capital offense to sell land to Jews. It is inconceivable that
any country would subscribe to such a law against its own citizens,201 any
more than the new State of Israel in 1948 would “give effect to the White
Paper of 1939 regarding the prohibition of land sales to Jews, and the
prohibition of Jewish immigration into the country”202 or the American
occupation of Germany following World War II would continue to
implement the Aryan laws against the Jews.
Most Israeli settlements on the West Bank are not on land purchased
by Jews, however. While some early settlements, particularly several early
ones established in the Jordan Valley according to the Allon Plan under
Labor-led governments, were on land requisitioned from Arab owners, the
great bulk of Jewish settlements, and substantially all established legally
199
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under Israeli law after 1979, were established on “state” or “public” lands.
This development and the controversy over these lands is explored more
fully in Part III.A.2 of this article. For now, it is relevant to note that two of
the most cogent arguments made against the settlements on the basis of the
Hague Regulations are: 1) the incompatibility of civiliansettlements and a
justification based upon military necessity under Article 52 (the
requisitioning of private property), and 2) the incompatibility of seemingly
permanent civilian settlements with the obligation of an occupying power,
consistent with military necessity, to ensure the continued civil life of the
occupants of the territory under Article 43 – arguably to maintain the status
quo ante -- and to hold real estate belonging to the hostile state as a
usufructuary203 under Article 55 of the Hague Regulations.204
Few would dispute the initial strategic relevance of the earliest
settlements established according to the Allon Plan,205 primarily in the
Jordan Valley. Recent instances of terrorism in Jordan or emanating from
terrorist groups with headquarters in Syria have reinforced the view that an
Israeli presence on the West Bank is still necessitated to deter terrorism and
other threats from sources to the east of Israel,206 although debate continues
203
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about whether military bases or civilian settlements best serve that strategic
function. Elsewhere on the West Bank, perhaps the most contentious
settlements are those located across and to the west of the central mountain
ridge of the West Bank, fairly close to Palestinian populated areas. But
while it has been contended that these settlements have inhibited the
expansion of Palestinian communities and economic activity,207 it is also
true that these settlements may also inhibit Palestinian terrorism.208 The
proximity of some of the most contested areas to Ben Gurion Airport and
Israel’s major population centers is a subject of considerable concern.209
The showering of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip, most frequently in
the territory that had been occupied by Israeli settlements, strengthens the
argument that civilian settlements serve as a security buffer and undercuts
the theory that they play no strategic or military role.210 In a context of the
reality of terrorism, disrupting the “territorial contiguity of Palestinian
communities”211 does have both negative and positive effects. In the context
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of an absence of terrorism and the protection of all, neither effect would be
felt or relevant.
Recent history also undermines the argument that there is an inherent
contradiction between seemingly permanent civilian settlements and Israel’s
rights and obligations under Articles 43, 52 and 55 of the Hague
Regulations. The very fact that Israel has evacuated and removed or
destroyed civilian settlements -- first in Sinai after the Egyptian–Israeli
peace treaty, in Gaza, and in the West Bank at the same time as the Gaza
withdrawal and subsequently -- demonstrates that West Bank settlements
can be removed. The question, of course, remains whether they should be.
To explore this question more fully, it is necessary to inquire into the
question of whether these settlements have been established on “Arab” land.
2. The “Land” Issue: the charge that Israeli settlements have been
illegally placed on “Arab” land
This commonly made and accepted charge merits deconstruction, as it
conflates and therefore masks several different possible assertions: first,
that Jewish settlements have been established by expropriating or
requisitioning212-- the latter without military necessity -- privately owned
Arab land; or second, that settlements have been established on land
belonging to specific Arab villages or communities; or, third, that the land,
while not privately owned by individual Arabs or collectively owned by
certain Arab communities, belongs to a general Arab “polity” having rights
to the land. Each of these assertions bears exploration, both in terms of its
own validity as well as the different implications flowing from each. Each is
also, in large part, dependent upon the proper characterization of the land
upon which most settlements lie.
(a) Privately owned Arab land
Excluding Jewish development in East Jerusalem,213 a few early
Jewish settlements constructed on uncultivated land specifically
212
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requisitioned214 for military needs, and some West Bank outposts established
by Israeli Jews without permission of the military administration – regarded
by Israel as illegal215 -- substantially no present Jewish settlement on the
West Bank has been established on land that Israel considers to be privately
owned. With some exceptions,216 nor have settlements generally been
established even on land that was privately owned by Jews prior to 1948.
Despite Israel’s reversal of Jordanian law barring the sale or ownership of
land by Jews, Israel has “de facto recognized the actions carried out by
Jordan regarding the property of Israelis.”217 And Jordan, under its “trading
with an enemy” corpus of law, both statutory and administrative, regarded
Jewish-owned land as state land. The upshot is that, contrary to popular
opinion, substantially all Israeli settlements established after 1979 are either
in any final settlement. Hence, the subject matter of this article pertains to those areas that would most
probably become part of a Palestinian juridical entity.
214
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on land purchased by Jews from Arabs after 1967218 -- a small minority of
settlements -- or on property designated as “state land.” To understand this
development requires, in turn, a review of two seminal Israeli Supreme
Court cases decided in 1979 -- Ayub v. Minister of Defence, popularly
known as the Beth-El case,219 and Douykat v. Government of Israel,
popularly known as the Elon Moreh case220-- as well as an understanding of
the role of Israel’s Supreme Court in relation to the Israeli government and
military.221
The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice,222 has
considered claims of international law violations made against the Israeli
government or military to a degree unimaginable in the case of other
national courts with respect to actions of their governments or military in
armed conflict contexts. As Eyal Benvinisti has noted, “[a]lthough the
legality of occupation measures has been examined by many national courts
on various occasions, never have these measures been scrutinized by the
occupant’s own judicial system.”223 While “t]he Act of State doctrine (in the
British or American sense), the sovereign immunity doctrine …, and
questions of justiciability and standing have proved to be high hurdles for
claimants in other jurisdictions, …the [Israeli] Supreme Court has flatly and
consistently rejected these arguments.”224 In Beth-El, the Court dealt with
218
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(initially, perhaps on account of the government not contesting such) and its bypassing questions of
justiciability and standing that have characterized courts of other nations in similar contexts. Another
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the issue of whether military authorities could requisition private property225
for a civilian settlement upon proof of military necessity. Elon Moreh
explored more deeply the definition of military necessity and thereafter
effectively precluded further requisitioning of Palestinian privately-held land
for civilian settlements, no matter the claim of military necessity.
The Beth-El decision actually involved two different cases in which
Palestinian petitioners sought relief for lands which had been requisitioned
by the military for the use of civilian settlements. In one of these cases,
Beth-El, the owners neither resided on nor cultivated the land, while in the
other, Beka’ot, the petitioners had cultivated the land. In both cases, the
petitioners challenged the consistency of justifying the requisition of land on
grounds of military necessity and its use for civilian settlements. They also
challenged more generally the legality of such requisitioning under
international law.
Writing the court’s majority opinion, Judge Witkon rejected the
contention that use of land for civilian settlement is necessarily contradictory
to its taking based upon military necessity. He stressed the strategic location
of both settlements,226 the threat of terrorism, the reservist nature of the
Israeli Army and the reluctance of the court to substitute its judgment for
that of the military, even if the latter’s views corresponded to those of a
opponent of the settlers, Adam Roberts, expressed somewhat similar views, comparing Israel’s position
with that of other countries:
“Israel deserves credit for acknowledging openly, albeit inadequately, the relevance of
international legal standards. Its position contrasts with those of the many occupying powers in
the past 40 years that have avoided expressing any view on the applicability of internation legal
agreements: such powers have included the Soviet Union in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia
(1968) and Afghanistan (1979); and Sourth Africa in Namibia. Israel also deserves credit for
cooperating with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has played an important
role in the occupied territories by performing a wide range of tasks, ncluding, in particular,
monitoring conditions of detention.” Roberts, supra note 200, at 63.
A recent example of a case that the Israeli Supreme Court seems destined to rule upon involves the Israeli
military’s practice of targeting terrorists when physical arrest seems impossible in light of the refusal of the
Palestinian Authority to do so. See Ze’ev Segal, Targeting the High Court, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/656512.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2005).
On the other hand, like the United States Supreme Court, the Israeli Supreme Court will refuse to
decide a case brought in the absence of a concrete dispute which is predominantly political in nature. For
this reason, in Bargil v. Government of Israel, HCJ 4481/91 [1993], available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html , a three-judge panel of the Israeli Supreme Court,
sitting as the High Court of Justice, refused to hear a general political challenge to civilian settlements in
the West Bank and Gaza.
225
For the distinction between expropriation and requisitioning, see supra note 212.
226
The court, for example, relied upon the affidavit of Major-General Avraham Orly that the “Bet El camp
is situated in a place of great importance from a security point of view…evidenced by the fact that it was
previously a Jordanian camp. The settlement itself is on an elevation commanding the vitally important
junction of the longitudinal Jerusalem-Nablus route and the Transverse route from the Coastal Plain to
Jericho and the Jordan Valley.” SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 386.
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civilian government that favored Jewish settlement on the West Bank.
Turning to the claim of international law violations, Judge Witkon
affirmed the template that was, with some later modifications (particularly,
during the presidency of Aharon Barak), used by the Supreme Court in later
cases: that paragraph 6 of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention did not
reflect customary international law (although the court did not dispute that
certain other provisions of the Geneva Convention might have) and as “a
conventional provision … the petitioners … [could] not rely on it” before
the court; but that the Hague Regulations, having become customary
international law, could be used by the petitioners. Focusing upon Article
52 of the Hague Regulations, which specifically sustains requisition for “the
needs of the army of occupation,” Witkon then dealt with the divergent
interpretations of that standard, whether quite narrow, as alleged by the
petitioners, or more expansive, as alleged by the Israeli government. The
court accepted the government’s argument as to the appropriate
interpretation of Article 52 for much the same reason that it had decided that
military necessity would be accepted as the ground for the settlements, i.e.,
terrorist attacks and the like.227
It should be noted that one argument advanced by counsel for the
petitioners was one that has been used by subsequent critics of Israeli
settlements: “how a permanent settlement can be established on land
requisitioned only for temporary use.” To this Witkon responded, “This
occupation can itself come to an end some day as a result of international
negotiations leading to a new arrangement which will take effect under
international law and determine the fate of … settlements in the
Administered Territories.”228 This argument would have attained much
greater importance over the years were it not for the consequences of the
Elon Moreh case.
In that case, the military government had requisitioned 700 dunams of
land for a civilian settlement within the borders of a village, Rujeib, close to
Nablus and approximately two kilometers from the Jerusalem-Nablus Road.
227

Ironically, the aftermath of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza has strengthened the argument that
settlements serve as a security buffer. Recently, Palestinian rockets fired from the premises of former
Israeli settlements have reached the outskirts of Ashkelon, a major Israeli city. See Aaron Lerner, Israel
Radio: Palestinians Launching Rockets from Abandoned Communities on Northern Gaza Border, Dec. 16,
2005, http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=27832 (“Palestinians are now exploiting the abandon Israeli
communities on the norther border of the Gaza Strip as rocket launching sites that are considerably closer
to such strategic Israeli targets as a power plant and a large fuel storage area located south of Ashkelon”).
See also, supra note 210.
228
SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 392. Judge Ben-Porat, concurring, argued that “the word ‘permanent’
must be taken in a relative sense”, stressing the continuing state of emergency that Israel had found itself
for its first 30 years. SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 386.
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Although the land requisitioned for the settlement was uncultivated,
seventeen Arabs who had plots of land totaling 125 dunams within the area
of the requisitioned land successfully challenged the action before the Israeli
Supreme Court.229 Elon Moreh can be analyzed on several different levels,
including the facts of the case (especially those that differentiate the case
from the facts recognized by the Court in Beth-El), the tenor of the justices’
opinions, the actual reasoning employed, and, most importantly for present
purposes, the enormous effect of the opinion on the building of future
settlements. The case produced three different opinions, one by Justice
Landau, Deputy President of the Court (in which two other justices
concurred), and separate concurring opinions by Justices Witkin and Bekhor.
The opinions painted a rather negative picture of the settlers and their
actions. Landau’s opinion was highly critical of the speed with which the
requisition and initial construction occurred and the impropriety of the
military governor having given notice to the village mukhtar rather than the
actual landowners – steps that created “the impression … the occupation of
the land was organized as a military operation by employing an element of
surprise and in order to forestall the ‘danger’ of intervention by … [the]
Court on an application by the landowners before work began in the area.”230
Witkin stated that he “[did] not wish to refer to incidents … in which
members of Gush Emunim (among them the settlers before us) were shown
to be people who do not accept the authority of the Army and do not even
hesitate to give violent expression to their opposition”231, but, of course,
Witkon did precisely the opposite by mentioning such. In short, the die was
cast, although none of the opinions explicitly made their judgment in favor
of the Palestinian landowners dependent upon these negative depictions of
the settlers.
The government and military first tried to argue that the requisition
could be justified under a 1948 ordinance by the Provisional Council of
State, “regard[ing] the State of Israel as possessing sovereignty over all of
the land of Israel (Palestine).”232 The justices rejected that position: “In
dealing with the legal basis of Israeli rule in Judea and Samaria, our concern
is with legal norms which exist in fact and not only in theory, and the basic
229

Technically, the landowners petitioned the court for an order nisi against the Government of Israel, the
Minister of Defense, the Military Commander of the West Bank and the Military Subcommander of the
Nablus Subdistrict directing them to show cause why the requisition orders should not be declared void
and why the equipment and structures on the land should not be removed. An interim order was issued,
which, as a result of the court’s judgment, became absolute.
230
SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 407.
231
Id. at 435
232
Id. at 417.
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norm upon which the structure of Israeli rule in Judea and Samaria [the West
Bank] was erected is still today…the norm of military government and not
the application of Israeli law than entails Israeli sovereignty.”233 In other
words, Israel’s rights on the West Bank would be judged in terms of its
status as an occupier.
In accordance with the earlier Beth-El decision, all justices then
accepted the applicability of the Hague Regulations, as part of customary
international law, to the actions of the Israel’s Military Authority (regardless
of the legality of Jordan’s occupation of the West Bank). And the standard
for adjudging the Military Authority’s actions was that of military necessity
under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations. Distinguishing Elon Moreh
from Beth-El, the court concluded that the Elon Moreh requisition primarily
reflected a political response to the settlers’ desires rather than calculated
military necessity. Indeed, important facts pointed to both the lack of
military necessity and to the political nature of the decision that had been
taken.
While the Chief of General Staff took the position that the settlement
was militarily required, an affidavit filed by him and other evidence
indicated that the Minister of Defense had initially disagreed.234 And the
“military necessity” claimed was based upon a generalized notion of “the
importance of regional defence”235 in the context of war, rather than the
comparable justification – protection against terrorist activity -- offered in
the Beth-El case.236 Moreover, several high-ranking reserve officers had
opined in their affidavits filed with the court that Elon Moreh would be a
settlement without military value and, if anything, would consume military
resources in protecting the settlers and settlements in a time of war.237
The settlers did not help their own case. Unlike in Beth-El, they were
permitted to file affidavits of their own, and, in one such affidavit, a settler
“explained that the members … had settled at Elon Moreh because of the
Divine commandment to inherit the land given to our forefathers…”238 Both
the content of the various affidavits as well as the history of Elon Moreh
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Id.
The Minister of Defense had later gone along with the decision, based upon the fact that the Defense
Ministerial Committee, which the Prime Minister chaired, had come to a positive decision on the
settlement.
235
SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 408.
236
The comparable justification in Beth-El was that terrorist activity was impeded by careful location of
settlements.
237
SHAMGAR, supra note 219, at 409-10.
238
Id. at 414
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convinced the court that politics came first and the conclusion of military
necessity followed as, at best, a secondary motivation for the settlement.239
To Justice Landau, implicitly,240 and to Justice Witkin, explicitly,241 the
government bore the burden of proof on the issue of military necessity.
Without so declaring, this position seemed to have been a procedural shift
from its earlier decision in Beth-El. Justice Landau stressed “that the
military needs referred to in … Article [52 of the Hague Regulations] cannot
include, on any reasonable interpretation, national-security needs in the
broad sense”242, that is, the broad political perspective of the Government
and settlers. And, while military necessity could conceivably include the
regional defense justification used by the Chief of General Staff in his
affidavit to the court, the primacy of politics over military judgment in
making this decision undermined that justification. Hence, not only the
government’s broadly stated “national security” rationale, but also the
narrower “regional defence” grounds proferred by the Chief of General Staff
could not justify the requisition of private property in Elon Moreh. In
Justice Landau’s words,
In our legal system, the right of private property is an important legal
value protected by both civil and criminal law, and as regards the right
of an owner of land to legal protection of his property, it is immaterial
whether the land is cultivated or barren.
The principle of protecting private property applies also in the law of
war …
To Julius Stone, the decision was remarkable in that “[p]robing of this
severity by civilian judges of the motives of this level of military and
political decision-makers of their own government is … rather unique even
in democratic policies.”243 Its precedent in the general law of “belligerent
occupation” “now offers the novel rider that ‘military needs’, even if
attested in good faith by the highest military authorities, will not qualify as
239

Id. at 406-14.
Justice Landau, after stating the facts, then asked: “Have the respondents [i.e., the Israeli authorities]
shown sufficient legal warrant for seizing the petitioners’ lands?” Id at 420. (emphasis added).
241
“… We must ask ourselves who bears the burden of proof? Must the petitioners convince us that the
land was not requisitioned for the needs of the Army and security or should we perhaps require the
respondents, the security authorities, to convince us that the requisition was needed for this purpose? I
think that the burden rests upon the respondents.” Id. at 433.
242
Id. at 422.
243
Julius Stone, Aspects of the Beit-El and Eilon Moreh Cases, 15 ISR. L. REV. 476, 490 (1980). Stone
even questioned whether it made sense to allow the testimony of individuals to surmound the testimony of
military officers that military necessity existed. Id. at 492.
240
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such if it appears that historically the subjective motive of the officials
initiating the requisitioning procedure was not predominantly military.”244
Even more important than the court’s show of independence, its
rhetoric and the particular result regarding the initial location of the Elon
Moreh settlement, was the long term consequence of the decision.245
Thereafter, all Israeli settlements legally246 authorized by the Israeli Military
Administration have been constructed on lands that Israel characterizes as
state-owned or “public” land.247 This term would seem to include
uncultivated rural land not registered in the name of anyone248 and land
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Id. at 490.
Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34.
246
At times settlers have established settlements without authority of the Military Government, usually in
the form of mobile homes on empty hilltops. In response to such, the Prime Minister appointed a
commission, chaired by Talya Sason, to determine the extent of and make recommendations concerning
illegal outposts. As a consequence of the resultant Sason Report, supra note 2, such settlements were
supposed to be immediately dismantled. It appears, however, that the great bulk were still in existence as
of December, 2005. See Dan Izenberg & Tovah Lazaroff, No Action Taken on Illegal Outposts, Dec. 7,
2005, THE JERUSALEM POST,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132475697589&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
According to the Sason Report, four conditions must be satisfied to have settlement that is considered legal
under Israeli law:
“First, the decision to establish a settlement must be made by the authoritative political echelon.
….Second,… Israeli settlements shall be established only on State land.…Third[,]…a settlement shall be
established only according to a lawful designed building scheme. ….Fourth[,] the bounds of jurisdiction of
such a settlement was determined in an order by the Commander of the area....”
Because of these conditions for legality, the Sason Report defines an illegal settlement as one having one
of the following characteristics: a) there was no government decision to establish it; 2) the outpost was
established with no legal planning status; c) the outpost is not attached to an existing settlement; and/or 4) it
was established from the mid-nineties on.
247
The term, as used by Israel since the Elon Moreh decision in the late 1970’s, seems to include lands
owned by absentee owners and uncultivated rural land not registered to anyone. See Benvinisti & Zamir,
supra note 34, at 307-314 and 315 (f.n. 106). The absentee owner category would seem to include land on
the West Bank under registered ownership to Jews prior to 1948 that was held by Jordanian governmental
authorities prior to 1967, but, in any event, the land most in dispute involves uncultivated rural land that
was not under registered ownership to anyone. Even if this characterization is a continuation of the
Jordanian characterization and law on the subject, this is not to say that Palestinians accept the notion that
uncultivated land that is not registered qualifies as “state land.” See RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER’S LAW
26-33 (rev. ed. 1988). In addition, there have been recent reports of certain fraudulent land sales from
Arabs to Jews, who then turn the land over to the Civil Administration operating under the military
governor as “state lands”, with the lands then being leased back to the donors for development. See Akiva
Eldar, There’s a System for Turning Palestinian Property into Israel’s State Land, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/662729.html (updated Dec. 27, 2005).
248
KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 90. Although Ottoman law required registration for ownership, it is
claimed that most land on the West Bank was never so registered in order “to preserve the collective
ownership system (musha’a)[,] …to evade tax liability, and …to avoid being drafted into the Turkish
army.” During the British Mandate period and subsequent Jordanian rule, the pace of registration picked
up, “[b]y the time that Israel occupied the West Bank, regulation proceedings had beencompleted for
approximately one-third of the area.” Lein, supra note 29, at 54.
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owned by absentee owners, 249 both categories that existed under preexisting legal regimes, including Jordanian law. Inversely, the term would
seem to exclude land registered in the name of someone other than an
absentee owner (regardless of whether the land is presently being
cultivated), land as to which a title deed exists (even if not registered),250 and
land held by prescriptive use.251 The latter requires continuous use of the
land for a period of ten years.
As might be expected, Israel’s categorization and characterization of
certain lands as “state” or “public” have provoked considerable
controversy.252 Several of the most detailed critiques have been undertaken
by B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights group, which concedes that 90 percent
of the settlements have been established on what is nominally “state” land,253
but takes issue with that designation on both substantive and procedural
grounds.
B’Tselem’s principal substantive objections relate to the percentage
of West Bank land that has been designated as “state” land and to the
categories of land so categorized. According to B’Tselem, approximately
40 percent of West Bank land254 has been declared to be “state” or “public”
lands, a vast expansion of the 16 percent of West Bank land considered state
or public land while under Jordanian control. Other settlement opponents
have used percentages in the range of 60 percent,255 although even
B’Tselem’s figure may be on the high side when account is taken of its
inclusion of certain Jerusalem neighborhoods in its calculations. However,
249

The designation of land as “public” because owned by absentee owners was a continuation of the
Jordanian designation. Some of this land was owned by Jews or the Jewish Agency prior to 1948. See
Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 310-14.
250
Both of these types of land ownership would presumably come under the designation of mulk land.
Lein, supra note 29, at 51
251
KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 90. According to B’Tselem, “Miri lands are those situated close to places
of settlement and suitable for agricultural use. A person may secure ownership of such land by holding and
working the land for ten consecutive years. If a landowners of this type fails completely to farm the land
for three consecutive years for reasons other than those recognized by the law…, the land is then known as
makhlul. In such a circumstance, the sovereign may take possession of the land or transfer the rights
therein to another person. “Lein, supra note 29, at 52.
252
See,e.g., Raja Shehadeh, Jewish Settlements in the Occupied West Bank – How the Land was Acquired
for their Use and how they are Structured, 6-30 in Unispal, Division for Palestinian Rights,QUESTION OF
PALETINE: LEGAL ASPECTS (Document 4) (United Nations Mar. 31, 1992) at 7-11
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/ec6dd0bff00344e18525611e006d8
08d!OpenDocument (last viewed Feb. 12, 2006); Stacey Howlette, Palestinian Private Property Rights in
Israel and the Occupied Territories, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 117, 143-46 (2001); Lein, supra note 29
at 51-9; D. Kretzmer, supra note 204 at 90-4.
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Lein, supra note 29, at 51.
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Lein, supra note 29, at 8.
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See,e.g., Deorah Horan, The Promised Land Grab-Israel’s West Bank, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY,
May, 1993, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_n5_v25/ai_13786320.
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B’Tselem’s concedes that the vast majority of this land is in the Jordan
Valley, which, with the primary exception of Jericho, was barely populated
by Palestinian Arabs prior to 1967 (a fact that would explain why such land
was both unregistered and uncultivated).256 Moreover, regardless of the
gross percentage of land designated as state or public land, according to
B’Tselem’s own statistics, only approximately 5 percent of the West Bank
land is within settlement “municipal boundaries” and a much, much smaller
percentage of land, 1.7 percent of the West Bank, is developed settlement
land.257 In other words, B’Tselem’s emphasis on the large percentage of land
considered state or public on the West Bank relates more to the potential
takeover of West Bank land by Jewish settlements rather than to the present
reality of the actual land occupied. As B’Tselem itself concedes, there is a
huge divergence between built-up areas and municipal boundaries.258
Of greater substantive merit is B’Tselem’s claim that, while in
percentage terms the amount of public lands involved may not be large,
West Bank areas designated as public lands along the central mountain range
between the Jordan River and the Mediteranean Sea, and to the immediate
east or west of the range, where many settlements were established, lie close
to populated Palestinian centers and choke off their expansion and the use of
the land for agricultural purposes. But analysis of particular settlements,
including Ariel, one of the West Bank’s largest, seems to focus more upon
the stultifying effect of Ariel’s presence if expansion continues to its full
municipal boundaries than the comparatively small present built-up area.259
In other words, the notion of expansive municipal boundaries only has great
relevance if continued Israeli sovereignty rather than Palestinian sovereignty
is assumed.
B’Tselem also takes issue with the categories of land designated as
“state” or “public” lands, a designation that existed under both Jordanian law
and Ottoman law. To lands that were considered “state” lands by the
Jordanians, according to B’Tselem, the Israeli military administration added
land owned by the Jordanian government -- as property belonging to an
256

B’Tselem acknowledges that “there are no permanent Palestinian communities in the Judean Desert and
Dea Sea areas” (Lein, supra note 29, at 93), that “a significant proportion of land in this area was already
registered as state land under the jordanian administration, …[and that] most of the land reserves held by
Israel in the West Bank and registered in the name of the Custodian for Government and Abandoned
Property is situated in this strip…” Id. at 93-4.
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Lein, supra note 29, at 116.
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See, e.g., the discussion of several settlements south of the Trans-Samaria highway. One group of
settlements is described as having municipal boundaries of 14 times the built-up area and another group as
having municipal boundaries equal to 7 times the built-up area. Lein, supra note 29, at 101.
259
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construction. Lein, supra note 29, at 119.
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enemy state – and three categories of untitled land:260 “Miri land261 that was
not farmed for at least three consecutive years, and thus became makhul;
Miri land that had been farmed for less than ten years (the period of
limitation), so that the farmer had not yet secured ownership; [and] land
defined as mawat262 due to its distance from the nearest village.”263 Clearly
it would be unfair to declare Miri lands that have been continuously farmed,
but not yet for the full ten years, as state land. Yet it is unclear from
B’Tselem’s presentation how much of the “state” land consists of Miri lands
that fall into this subcategory and which, if any, Jewish settlements were
actually established on that land.264
B’Tselem’s procedural objections to the notion of state or public land
on which all settlements have been established since 1979 are deserving of
serious attention.265 B’Tselem claims that, because most land was not
registered under the Ottoman Empire for reasons such as tax avoidance, it
was held according to prescriptive use. Yet, according to B’Tselem, parties
who might have been affected by the designation of land as public land were
frequently not directly notified of such designation. While village mukhtars,
actually appointed by the military government, were notified, the mukhtars
in turn failed to notify the affected land “owners”, who first discovered the
designation when settlement building had begun.266 Theoretically, an
260

That is, land the ownership to which is claimed on the basis of prescriptive use.
Footnote added to text. “Miri lands are those situated close to places of settlement and suitable for
agricultural use. A person may secure ownership of such land by holding and working the land for ten
consecutive years. If a landowner of this type fails completely to farm the land for three consecutive years
for reasons other than those recognized by the law (e.g., the landowner is drafted into the army, or the land
lays fallow for agricultural reasons), the land is then known as makhlul. In such a circumstance, the
sovereign may take possession of the land or transfer the rights therein to another person. The rationale
behind this provision in the Land Law was to create an incentive ensuring that as much land as possible
was farmed, yielding agricultural produce which could then be taxed.” Lein, supra note 29, at 52.
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supra note 29, at 52.
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David Kretzmer, who is critical of Israeli governmental policy concerning settlements (as part of a
larger criticism of Israeli actions on the West Bank), likewise argues that since only about a third of the
land on the West Bank was registered prior to 1967, unregistered lands are not necessarily state lands.
However, he also cites the fact that a government attorney, in charge of checking whether land could be
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appeals process existed, but the land claimants often learned of the
designation of their property as state land too late to appeal the designation.
Moreover, regardless of when the affected Palestinians heard about the
designation, their only source of contesting the designation was a Board of
Appeals established by the military administration, which granted relief in
only a small percentage of cases. The burden of proof lay on the petitioners.
And that proof was difficult, given that that the Israeli authorities took
periodic aerial photographs as to whether the land was in fact being used for
farming.267 With respect to West Bank property that was registered but
owned by someone mistakenly classified as an absentee owner, B’Tselem
asserts a similar failure in the notice process. It cites one instance in which
the appeals committee refused to undo the transaction that allowed for a
settlement to be built on the ground that the faulty conclusion that the land
had been abandoned was made in “good faith.”268 In addition, B’Tselem
claims, the presence of the military court of appeals actually precluded, in
most instances, the Palestinians appealing to the Israeli Supreme Court
because, in theory, another procedural recourse existed.
These are, of course, allegations. B’Tselem seems to say that the
military administration, by using aerial photographs, had an unfair advantage
over those contesting land ownership, but it is unclear why use of
technology should prejudice the purported landowner. B’Tselem also
concedes that many prospective claimants had discontinued use of
unregistered land because of high wages in the Israeli labor market, which
made working in that market more favorable than continuing to farm.269
This argument, in any event, would seem to relate more to the political and
economic relationship between any prospective Palestinian state and Israel
than to the genuineness of an ownership claim based upon prescriptive use.
It is difficult to jump to the conclusion that a settlement falls on private land,
claimed on the basis of alleged use which was discontinued by choice on the
part of the purported owner.270
Nonetheless, B’Tselem’s core accusation that many land claimants
were denied notice and/or failed to contest the designation of land because
of the biased, or perceived to be biased, nature of the tribunal remains a
serious allegation. Even if recourse was never sought from the Board of
267
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Appeals, landowners should still have the opportunity to prove their claims.
If such a claim is established, two resolutions are possible, consistent with
the theme of this Article. Where substantial construction on land has not yet
occurred (that is, the land is in effect “reserved” for a particular settlement),
the condition that no private Arab land has been taken for the settlement will
not have been established, and the particular land should revert to its
Palestinian owner, with damages for the period in which the Palestinian
owner was unable to use the land. If there is substantial settlement
construction on that land with conflicting claims of settlers who relied upon
the characterization of the land as “state” land, rightful Palestinian claimants
should be granted restitutionary relief that would include a monetary amount
representing lease payments equal to what they would have received had the
land been requisitioned rather than mistakenly designated as “state” land,
with appropriate interest thereon from the date those lease payments would
have been made, as well as damages equal to the present value of the
property (rather than the value as of the date of the false designation).
Settlements falling into two other categories would, as well, not meet
the condition that a settlement must not have been established on Palestinian
owned land. Certain outposts, mostly hilltop caravans, have been set up
without the approval of the Israeli government; some of these were later
abandoned and then reoccupied. These settlements are considered illegal
under Israeli law. Several years ago, the Israeli government appointed Talya
Sason, an attorney, to investigate this phenomenon. Her investigation
revealed at least 105 of these illegal outposts. Of these, to the extent that
Sason was able to establish the legal status of the land on which the outposts
sit, 26 are located on state land, 7 are located on survey land, and 15 located
on Palestinian private property. Thirty-nine are located on “mixed” lands,
that is, land that is part state, part survey, and part owned by Palestinians.271
These outposts, almost all of which were established in the 1990’s, are
supposed to be dismantled, although only several have been thus far.272 A
majority of these outposts fail the condition that a settlement not be
271

Sason Report, supra note 2. “Survey land” seems to refer to land that has gone through a survey land
procedure for the settlement. In some cases, these procedures were accomplished without regard to
whether the settlements were otherwise legally established. Id., at 14.
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See, e.g., Nadav Shragai, Yuval Yoaz and Akiva Eldar, Four Officers, 11 Settlers Injured as Illegal W.
Bank Outpost Razed, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/669054.html (last
updated Jan. 11, 2006) (dismantling of Neveh Daniel North outpost, and impending difficulty of
dismantling Amona outpost); Aluf Benn, Amos Harel and Yuval Yoaz, Settler Leaders: Olmert’s Plan for
Outposts is ‘Declaration of War’, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/671976.html (last updated Jan. 18, 2006)(describing Acting
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s call for the defense establishment to formulate a plan to evacuate twenty
illegal outposts, and the negative reaction of settler leaders to that call).
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established on Palestinian private property and hence should not continue in
a future state of Palestine.273
Another group of settlements that may not satisfy this condition are
settlements that allegedly have been constructed on land acquired
fraudulently.274 One recent allegation by B’Tselem,275 for instance, relates to
new construction in the Modi’in Illit settlement on land within the territory
of the Palestinian village of Bil’in. Supposedly, a Palestinian father sold
land to his son who in turn sold the land to the Society of the Foundation.
The latter then transferred that land in trust to the Israeli administration,
which, after converting the land to state land, leased the land back to the
settlers’ building concern.276 Both the Palestinian father and son are dead,277
and the claim is that their signatures as well as those of others were forged in
this chain of events. If this is proved, any such settlement would not have
satisfied the condition of not having been built on Arab owned land. The
facts of the case remain murky, including whether the land at issue belonged
to the individual Palestinian-sellers or to the village within whose borders
the land was situated. A justice of the Israeli Supreme Court has issued a
temporary injunction in this case, and the Israeli State Prosecution is
considering a criminal prosecution.278
With these exceptions, however – no matter the procedural flaws that
require redress – the important point is that the vast majority of settlements
have not been legally established on land deeded or registered to resident
Palestinian Arabs or on land to which they can lay claim by cultivated use
over a period of time. Critics rightly note that Arab individually owned land
273

Amir Peretz, chair of the Labor Party, has announced that the condition for joining a coalition
government is the dismantling of all illegal settlements. See Lilach Weissman, Labor will Only Join Gov’t
that Pledges to Quit all 105 Illegal West Bank Outposts, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/691823.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2006).
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Id.
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The son was apparently shot in Ramallah in 2005. Since the Palestinian Authority considers it a capital
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has been used for public improvements such as roads.279 As long as Israel is
the ultimate power in the West Bank, especially over a 40-year period, it
cannot simply neglect infrastructure improvements that other governments
routinely effect, even if private property must be taken with compensation,
or requisitioned with periodic use payments, for such purpose. Every nation
in the world, including the United States280, takes land for such purposes.
Until a final peace settlement is achieved, road construction and other public
infrastructure improvements are theoretically both inevitable and warranted.
The heart of the criticism, however, is that most of the road work seems to
have primarily benefited the Israeli military and/or settlers rather than the
Arab residents and therefore cannot be justified on the need to ensure the
civil life and order of the local populace in accord with Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations.281 On the other hand, the extent of terrorist attacks on
279

See, e.g., HCJ 393/82 Askan v. Military Commander, [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 785, translated in Zamir &
Zysblat, supra note 223, at 396-409. The petitioners, who consitituted a cooperative society, had purchased
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government acts out of a reasonable belief that the taking will benefit the public.” Practicing Law Institute,
All Star Briefing, Erwin Chemerinsky: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Kelo is not so Radical as Many
have Made it Out to Be, Dec. 8, 2005, http://media.whatcounts.com/pli/allstar/ASB3.45.htm.
281
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notion of ‘public benefit’ [the theory under which such improvements have been sustained by the Supreme
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He particularly takes aim at the Israeli decision to disband district planning bodies that provided input into
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welfare of the population in the occupied territory rather than the political needs of the State of Israel where
the two conflict. In an occupation that has lasted this long, query, however, whether the local populace
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the Israeli military and Jewish residents while traveling would tend to
legitimate takings necessary for infrastructure work on a theory of “military
necessity.”282 Moreover, while there is dispute as to whether these roads
presently benefit the Israeli military and citizens more than West Bank
Palestinians, in any peace settlement the roads would serve all residents and
substantially contribute to the economic well-being of a new Palestinian
state.
(b) Land owned by Arab communities or villages
B’Tselem has also made a wider claim, to wit, that Israel has
expropriated land belonging to Arab villages, without compensation, in
order to construct Jewish settlements. For example, B’Tselem vigorously
argues that Ma’aleh Admumim, the largest Israeli settlement on the West
Bank and one several kilometers to the east of Jerusalem, is situated on
territory taken from Abu Dis, al-‘Izriyyeh, al-‘Issawiyyeh, a-Tur, and ‘Anata,
Palestinian Arab villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem.283 But its “brief” to
that effect then equivocates: “The farmland of these villages extended from
the border of Jerusalem on the west to a’-Khan al-Ahmad, at the approach to
the Dead Sea, on the east. Ownership determined land usage, i.e., each
family worked the land that it owned.”284 Thus, it is unclear whether
B’Tselem is making the claim that the land is owned by private individuals
within the identified villages or is village land owned collectively by its
residents. If it is the former, B’Tselem’s argument collapses into the
argument, already discussed, that Israeli settlements have been placed on
land privately owned by Palestinians. If, instead, B’Tselem’s claim is that it
is village land, the source of this claim needs to be examined.
Since the five villages identified do not have any registered title to this
expanse of land, B’Tselem tries to argue on the basis of prescriptive use.
But, while some claim is made that the villagers themselves had used the
land for grazing, the use demonstrated was by Jahalin Bedhouin, who in
recent years intermittently camped and grazed their livestock on land to the
east of Jerusalem going down to the Dead Sea. But B’Tselem strains to find
a connection between Jahalin Bedhouin and the Palestinian villagers whose
should not also include the West Bank’s Jewish residents, unless there are other grounds that make their
presence on the West Bank illegal.
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See Askan v. Military Commander, supra note 279.
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See Yuval Ginbar, On the Way to Annexation: Human Rights Violations Resulting from the
Establishment and Expansion of the Ma’aleh Admumim Settlement at 3 (B’Tselem July 1999),
http://www.btselem.org/Download/199907_On_The_way_Annexation_Eng.doc (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
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Id. at 4.

68

claim to the land B’Tselem champions: “They grazed on village land in
accordance with lease agreements (at times symbolic) with the landowners –
including landowners from the villages of Abu Dis and al’Izariyyeh.”285
In other words, only Palestinian Arab villages may be constructed and
expanded on land because Bedhouin have occasionally grazed their flocks
thereon pursuant to the implied consent of Palestinian villagers whose right
to the land (that is, the right to consent to someone else using it) is based
upon the same Bedhouin use. Aside from its circularity, B’Tselem’s
argument equates whatever rights Bedhouin may or may not have with the
rights of sedentary Arab villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Are the
rights identical? Why?286 Interestingly, Bedhouin do not necessarily
identify themselves as Palestinian Arabs, and, although they are surely not
Israeli Jews, many Bedhouin are Israeli citizens, serve (unlike most
Palestinian Arabs who are Israeli citizens) in the Israeli army, and
disproportionately have been killed by Palestinian attacks on Israeli border
patrols.
Moreover, when the expansive reach of B’Tselem’s claim on behalf of
the villages (all land substantially down to the Dead Sea to the east of
Jerusalem) is considered, presumably the question of which of the five
villages has the rights to this expansive stretch of land becomes pertinent.
Are the rights of each of these villages identical? Would not the claim of
some of the villages conflict with the claims of others? B’Tselem’s brief
neither asks nor tries to answer these questions. The result is that,
sometimes explicitly and otherwise implicitly, its claim that the land belongs
to these villages collapses into the contention – dealt with in the next
subsection -- that only Arabs, not Jews, have the right to own and use this
land.
(c) Land owned by a larger Arab polity of “people”
The meaning of the argument (by some) or the assumption (by others)
that Israeli Jewish settlements have been established on “Arab” land in a
broader sense is quite obscure. Let us put aside for the moment the whole
argument about whether Israel’s only status on the West Bank is that of an
“occupying power”, with any international legal implications of that
285

Id. at 22.
Interestingly, the problem of designating and dividing land on the basis of Bedhouin use is not unique to
the West Bank situation; Jordan has struggled with the same issue east of the Jordan River. See M.F.
Tarawneh, Public Land Between the State and the Tribes: A Dilemma of Rural Development: A Case from
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characterization.287 If the resultant conclusion from the
argument/assumption is that Jews cannot legally establish settlements west
of the Jordan River and east of the “green line”, the armistice lines that
characterized Israel prior to 1967, is the essence of this claim based upon the
negative notion that Jews have no rights or the positive notion that the land
legally belongs to “Palestinian” Arabs?288
As related previously, that Jews have only limited privileges in the
Near East is a recurrent historical theme. This perspective denies
substantially all aspects of the Jewish narrative, including a millennia-old
nexus with the land. More recently, within the 20th century, after promising
the land in the Palestinian mandate for a Jewish homeland289, the British
decided to partition off approximately 70 percent of Mandatory Palestine to
provide a kingdom for the Hashemites.290 Transjordan, once created, barred
Jews from owning land or even living within its borders, a prohibition it
extended to the West Bank when it captured it in 1948.291
If the basis of the argument is that, in a positive sense, the West Bank
“belongs” to Palestinian Arabs, what is the basis for this claim – legal title,
longevity of habitation, the concept of peoplehood, or other? Although these
issues have been adequately discussed and in some cases debated elsewhere,
at least brief mention of why the notion that the West Bank is only “Arab”
land cannot justify the claim that Israeli Jewish settlements are illegal is
warranted. Prior to the first Zionist aliyah in the late 19th century, most of
the privately owned land west of the Jordan was either “state-owned” land or
287
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land privately held by absentee Turkish landlords. With respect to the
privately owned land, most of the purchases were by the Jewish Agency and
allowed Jewish settlements to exist, and virtually all of this land was not
even land that was then farmed by Arabs in that area. As for state
ownership, any title claims descended from the Ottoman Empire (that is,
Turkish state ownership) to British trusteeship to Jordanian annexation that
was never recognized internationally. Moreover, it has been estimated that
over thirty square kilometers of land on the West Bank were owned by
Israeli Jews prior to any requisitions for settlements.292 In short, whatever
claims exist with respect to West Bank land on the part of Palestinian Arabs,
the claim is not based upon any concept of a recorded legal title.
Certainly, much of the popular belief in the claim that the West Bank
belongs to Palestinian Arabs rests upon a notion of longevity – the Arabs
were there first. But what does “first” mean? One possible meaning of
“firstness” is “most ancient.” As mentioned previously, Arabs recently have
tried to buttress the “firstness” of their claim by asserting that they are
descended from the ancient Canaanites293, but there is no anthropological or
other evidence that supports this claim.294 The solely political nature of the
claim is transparent.295 If, then, “first” means the ties to the land that are
most ancient, the three millennia history of the Jews in that area296 – a
history increasingly supported by mounting archaeological evidence297 –would seem to give Jews the superior claim.
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Popular support for the argument that the Palestinian Arabs were there
first, it would seem, depends far less upon an ancient notion that the
Palestinians were the first inhabitants of the land several millennia ago, than
the notion that in more recent times they were the majority, indeed almost
exclusive, inhabitants of the land prior to the advent of modern Zionism.
Edward Said298 and Noam Chomsky, among others, popularized this view,
according to which the Zionists were colonizers over an indigenous
Palestinian population. But even that argument raises more questions than it
supplies answers. What land is included in the claim of .majoritarianism or
exclusivity? For example, Jews apparently constituted a plurality of the
residents of Jerusalem, whose other inhabitants included Palestinian Arabs,
Greeks, Europeans, Turks and others, at least at the turn of 19th century.299
Prior to Arab riots and massacres in early Twentieth Century, Jews had
inhabited Hebron along with Arabs for centuries.300 While the exact
numbers are uncertain, it appears that many Arabs that assert a “Palestinian”
identity were attracted to the land west of the Jordan because of Jewish
settlement and economic development that provided jobs.301 The quality of
some of the research on this subject has been subjected to enormous
criticism – for example, on the theory that the 20th Century increase in the
Arab population in Palestine may have resulted from better health care rather
than the economic growth generated by Jewish settlement 302 -- but the two
tendered explanations are not mutually exclusive. The fact that the Arab
population in and around Jewish settlements increased several times the
increase recorded in other areas of Palestine, as well as other evidence, lends
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support to the economic growth thesis.303 In short, both Jews and Arabs
lived for centuries in a sparsely populated, desolate and largely neglected
land; Arabs surely constituted the majority of the population prior to the 20th
century, but Jews constituted a majority or plurality in Jerusalem and certain
other places. Yet, Jews were excluded from most of Palestine once the
British created Transjordan in order to provide the Hashemites a throne.304
Some of the notion that the West Bank belongs to Palestinian Arabs
exclusively rests on the notion of Palestinian “peoplehood.” Indeed, an
argument made in favor of the state of Israel has been applied to the
Palestinians: the state of Israel is justified on the ground that a people
(Jews), having a common culture and religion (Judaism, whatever its
variety), with a distinct language (Hebrew), deserve like other peoples a
geographical area distinct and governed by them. But the analogy breaks
down on many fronts. First and foremost, if the argument is used to counter
the right of Jews to settle as communities on the West Bank, one must
initially note that there are communities of Arabs living within Israel.305
Equally significantly, the Palestinian Arabs do not have a tradition, religion,
language or anything else that is materially distinct from the other countries
in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel and the possible exception of
Lebanon.306 Through much of the Twentieth Century, most Arabs, including
most Arabs in Palestine, saw the Arabs in Palestine less as a separate people
than as part of a greater polity of Arabs living within a greater Syria.307
There is even evidence that the whole notion of peoplehood was a construct
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to be used against the creation of a Jewish state rather than a firmly held
reality prior to the creation of the modern state of Israel.308
However, all of these arguments are beside the point: whether or not
Palestinians considered themselves a somewhat distinct people, they seem to
do so now and the question of whether there should be an independent state
of Palestine has been answered in the affirmative. The point here is not that
there should not be a Palestinian state, but that state need not exclusively be
inhabited by Palestinian Arabs. To the extent that such a claim depends
upon a notion that the land belongs to an Arab polity, it did not in the past
(note that the Ottomon Empire is not an Arab polity) and, most importantly,
it would not destroy any “Peoplehood” of Palestinian Arabs by having
Jewish communities in their midst.
Indeed, in the broadest sense that the West Bank “belongs” only to
Palestinian Arabs as “Arab” land is a notion that speaks not only to the issue
of Jewish settlements, but to the question of Jewish settlement within the
pre-1967 borders of Israel, that is, the legitimacy of Israel itself.309
3. The “transfer” issue: the charge that Israel, as an occupying
power, has transferred its citizens into the West Bank in violation of Article
49 of the 4th Geneva Convention310
As time passed, settlement opponents increasingly have relied less on
the the Hague Regulations, with its underlying dominant theme of protecting
an ousted sovereign, and more on the 4th Geneva Convention, with its
transparently humanitarian ideals and provisions. The specific charge has
308
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question of whether a second Palestinian state should be established (the first being Jordan itself, which
was carved out of and acquired the majority of the land covered by the Palestinian Mandate), Eugene
Rostow recognized this fundamental reality: “They [the “Proponents of ‘Palestinian self-determination’]
cannot bring themselves to believe that the object of the campaign for a third Palestinian state is not a
peaceful solution of the Palestine problem, but the destruction of Israel.” Rostow, Self Determination,
supra note 174, at 171.
310
See supra note 152.
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been that the establishment of the settlements violated the sixth paragraph of
Article 49,311 which states: “The occupying power shall not deport or
transfer parts of its own civilian population into territories it occupies.”312
Frequently paragraph 6 is recited as its “plain meaning” were transparent
and its application to the establishment of Israeli settlements beyond
dispute.313 However, as is the case with respect to the Hague Regulations,
both the meaning of this provision and its applicability to Israeli settlements
are subjects of substantial dispute. Many general texts on international
humanitarian law give paragraph 6 scant if no attention,314 and, if anything,
its origins and meaning are more obscure than the provisions of the Hague
Regulations discussed previously.
(a) The Rostow perspective, redux
An initial problem with the argument that Israeli settlements violate
paragraph 6 of Article 49 is that this argument, once again, may presuppose
the West Bank constitutes “occupied” rather than “disputed” territory in a
legal sense. Eugene Rostow consistently took the position that the predicate
for the application of Article 49, as a provision in Section III (“Occupied
Territories”) of Part III of the Geneva Convention, “Status and Treatment of
Protected Persons,” was the act of one signatory of the Convention
occupying “the territory of a High Contracting Party…”315 To Rostow, who
311

For the complete text of Article 49, see supra note 157.Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 307.
Id.
313
See, e.g., letter from Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, Middle East North Africa Division of
Human Rights Watch, to President Bush, entitled, Israel: Expanding Settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, December 26, 2005, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/27/isrlpa12346_txt.htm (last viewed Jan. 22, 2006); DIETER FLECK,
THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAND IN ARMED CONFLICTS 246 (1995) (“Article 49, para.6 prohibits
… the settlement of nationals of the occupying power in the occupied territory.”, with a footnote 33
concluding, “The settlement of civilians in the territories occupied by Israel therefore contravenes Article
49, para. 6.”).
314
VON GLAHN, supra note 203, at 72-74 (no mention in general discussion of Article 49); RENE PROVOST,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002) (no mention, but would seem to have
missed one context in which paragraph 6 might apply on pp.38-9); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN Law (2d. ed. Ashgate/Dartmouth 1998)(scant reference at 199). See infra note 385 as to
this reference. Even G.I.A.D. Draper, whose well known work, RED CROSS CONVENTIONS (supra note
161), while calling the sixth paragraph “very important”, devotes one clause of a sentence to it
(“Conversely, this Article prohibits the detaining of protected persons in danger areas, and furthermore,
which is very important, prevents the Occupant from moving parts of its own population into the occupied
territory” Id. at 41).
315
Rostow, supra note 108, at 719. Rostow’s correspondence is in response to the article by Adam
Roberts, supra note 200, in which Roberts termed this analysis – which he ascribed to Israel -- a “technical
error”: “To refer to the terms of the second paragraph of common Article 2 is of limited relevance, because
it is in fact the first paragraph that applies when a belligerent occupation begins during a war. [T]his
paragraph says nothings about ‘the territory of a High Contracting Party,” referring simply to ‘all cases of
312
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noted that Jordan’s own occupation of the West Bank was not recognized
internationally, “[t]he West Bank is not the territory of a signatory power,
but an unallocated part of the British Mandate.”316 Rostow’s reference, in
the 4th Geneva Convention, was to the second paragraph of Article 2, which
states that “[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance.”317
To the extent that Rostow’s conclusion was based upon his positive
view of the legitimacy of Israel’s claim to the West Bank – that is, his view
that the West Bank is “disputed” rather than simply “occupied” territory –
Rostow might have a point. Otherwise, one would arrive at the totally
paradoxical result that, for example, once Kuwait’s government reacquired
control over its territory after the first Gulf War, it could not construct
housing for Kuwaitees because both it and Iraq were signatories to the
Geneva Convention. However, to the extent that Rostow’s conclusion was
meant solely as an interpretation of the 4th Geneva Convention in light of
Jordan’s suspect sovereignty rights, a sensible reading of the application of
the Convention described in Article 2 is to the contrary. The vast weight of
authority318 is that Article 2’s second paragraph expands rather than limits
the application of the Convention described in its first paragraph: “the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.”319 In other words, the application of the Convention simply depends
upon whether both Jordan and Israel are signatories, not whether the West
Bank was legally the territory of Jordan. And Article 6 provides that certain
articles of the Convention, including Article 49, binds occupying powers
declared war or of any other armed conflict’ arising between two or more of the high contracting parties.”
Id. at 64. Quoting Chaim Weizmann, the first president of Israel, Rostow argued that Roberts presented
“the problem of terminating the Israeli occupation of the territories as if the only relevant legal question
were the arbitrary denial of Palestinianian national rights”, whereas, quoting Chaim Weizmann, the first
president of Israel, “the true issue is … ‘not the clash of right and wrong, but the clash of two rights.’”
Rostow, Correspondence, supra note 108, at 720.
316
Id.
317
Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 297.
318
For example, the ICJ, in its judgment on the Israeli security fence, see infra note 412, and accompanying
text, said the following: “The object of the second paragraph of Article 2 is not to restrict the scope of
application of the Convention, as defined by the first paragraph, by excluding therefrom territories not
falling under the sovereignty of one of the contracting parties. It is directed simply to making it clear that,
even if occupation effected during the conflict met no armed resistance, the Convention is still applicable.
This interpretation reflects the intention of the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect civilians
who find themselves, in whatever way, in the hands of the occupying Power.” 2004 ICJ 136, 175.
319
Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 297..
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“for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such power exercises
the functions of government in such territory…”320
(b) Defining the nature of state involvement
Aside from this basic prerequisite for the application of paragraph 6 of
Article 49, both the nature of state involvement that would trigger the
paragraph’s prohibition and, whatever the definition of that trigger, its
application to the Israeli settlements are moot questions. With respect to the
more abstract of these questions – what character and degree of state
involvement trigger paragraph 6 – one can envision a spectrum, with a
variety of legal opinions as to how most points within that spectrum relate to
paragraph 6. At one end of the spectrum would be citizens of the occupant
voluntarily moving to the occupied country, with the permission of the
occupant and under its protection but without any inducements of any
nature. At the other end of the spectrum would be an occupant’s forcible
transfer of its own population into occupied territory.
Closely related to, and arguably influencing, the question of the
degree and character of state involvement necessary to violate Article 49’s
sixth paragraph is the question of purpose, both that underlying the sixth
paragraph and that of the occupying power that effectuates the transfer. One
might conceive of the purpose of Article 49 as protecting the civilians who
are transferred, the population of the territory to which the civilians are
transferred, or both. Correlatively, the purpose of the occupying power so
transferring its own civilians might be to change the ethnic or racial
composition of its own population (that is, to cleanse its own territory of an
undesirable ethnicity), to change the ethnic or racial composition of the
population in the occupied territory, or, even, to replace the population in the
occupied territory with its own nationals.
Unfortunately, neither the language nor the history of paragraph 6 of
Article 49 conclusively resolves the issue of the extent and character of state
involvement necessary for a violation. Neither do they unambiguously
identify those persons intended to be protected by its prohibition. And the
only “authoritative” judicial interpretation interpreting Article 49’s sixth
paragraph, by the High Court of Justice, was given in the context of an
advisory opinion concerning Israel’s security fence,321 leaving open the
question of whether its interpretation will apply apolitically to disputes
involving other nations in similar contexts.
320
321

Id., at 298.
See infra, notes 412-18, and accompanying text.
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(c) The Limits of “plain meaning”
Article 49, in its entirety,322 deals with transfers of persons -- largely
civilians323 -- from and to occupied territories, except for their transfer to a
power not a party to the 4th Geneva Convention, which is the subject of
present Article 45 of the Convention.324 Key to an understanding of textual
arguments based solely upon paragraph 6’s language is Article 49’s first
paragraph, which reads: “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of
the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are
prohibited, regardless of their motive.”325 To settlement opponents,
“transfer” in the sixth paragraph -- especially because the adjective,
“forcible”, which precedes the term, “transfers”, in the first paragraph, is
lacking – connotes that any transfer of the occupying power’s civilian
population is prohibited.326
This literalist interpretive attempt only succeeds, however, if other
“literalisms” are disregarded. If the settlers have moved to the West Bank
willingly – and arguably forced the government to acquiesce in their
settlement327 -- it is questionable that one can say that Israel as an
“occupying power” has so transferred them. If it is then argued that the
Israeli government has often encouraged the settlers through tax subsidies
and other benefits and hence the effect is the same as if Israel had
“transferred” them,328 it should at least be acknowledged that interpretation
322

See supra note 157.
Article 49 relates to two groups of persons, “protected persons”, in the first five paragraphs, and an
occupying power’s own civilian population in the sixth paragraph. Article 4 defines “protected persons” as
follows: Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I. at 298. But it
then excludes certain parties, including any persons protected under the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War. Id.
324
Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 306.
325
See supra note 157.
326
See Lein, supra note 29, at 38.
327
Even B’Tselem concedes that the part of the settlement enterprise that resulted in the largest number of
settlers and settlements close to Palestinian population areas, on the central mountain range of the West
Bank, was forced by Gush Emunim, meaning, the Bloc of the Faithful: “The principal method adopted by
the movement was to settle a given site without government permission – and sometimes contrary to its
policy – in an effort to force the government later to recognize the settlement as an accomplished fact.” Id.
at 13.
328
Id. at 39. “State” involvement would include the Ministerial Committee for Settlement, composed of
ministers from relevant government ministries and members of the World Zionist Organization, which
decides on the establishment of a new settlement, and the Ministry of Construction and housing and the
Settlement Division of the WZO which are involved in the actual physical and economic structure of the
323
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has transcended the “plain meaning” of words in paragraph 6 to other modes
of interpretation. A literalist interpretation would also be self-contradictory
if one were to accept Rostow’s view that Article 49, like other provisions
dealing with occupation in the Geneva Convention, only applies to “acts by
one signatory ‘carried out on the territory of another,’”329 a predicate quite
problematic given Jordan’s very questionable rights to the West Bank.
Settlement opponents rightly emphasize that the Geneva Convention, unlike
the Hague Regulations, was designed primarily as humanitarian law to
protect people, not to protect dispossessed sovereign states, and therefore
argue that the applicability of the Geneva Convention’s occupation
provisions should not depend upon such a technicality.330 That is fair
enough, but the present point is that “plain meaning” of words or provisions
can be a two-way street. Superficially noting the “plain meaning” of a term
like, “transfer”, unmodified by “forceful”, without accepting the plain
meaning of “occupying power” or taking into account Rostow’s argument
about the Convention’s applicability hardly suffices to derive meaning.
A textual approach that may enlighten is to inquire why the term,
“forcible”, may have been used in the first but not sixth paragraph of Article
49. The answer of settlement opponents, of course, is that force is a
prerequisite of a violation of the first paragraph, but not necessary for a
violation of the sixth.331 But other answers are equally as plausible. Not
infrequently, in legislation of all sorts, when similar language is used in
several different paragraphs of the same provision, modifying language is
dropped because the modifying language is understood.332 Another
explanation is that while the first paragraph is phrased in the passive voice,
the sixth paragraph is phrased in the active. Force may be inherent and
therefore understood if one speaks about government action, that is, the act
settlement. See Lein, supra note 29, at 20-22. And state encouragement would include certain benefits and
financial incentives, which are generally available to development towns in Israel as well, but exceed on a
per capita basis the subsidies actually received by residents of settlement towns within the pre-1967
borders of Israel, primarily because of the role played by the Settlement Division of the World Zionist
Organization. Id. at 73-84.
329
Rostow, Correspondence, supra note 108, at 719.
330
Roberts, supra note 200.
331
See, e.g., David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian
Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 91 (2005) (“As paragraph 1 of Article 49 refers expressly to forcible transfers,
it seems fair to conclude that the term ‘transfer’ in paragraph 6 means both forcible and nonforcible
transfers.”).
332
This is essentially the point that Ruth Lapidoth makes specifically in relation to Article 49. See Ruth
Lapidoth, The Status of the Territories: The Advisory Opinion and the Jewish Settlements, 38 ISR. L. REV.
292 (2005) at 294-95: “According to a well known principle of interpretation, a term which appears several
times in a treaty, should usually be given the same meaning in each provision. This applies a plus forte
raison to a term that appears several times in one and the same article. A look at the other paragraphs of
Article 49 shows, that the terms deportation and transfer refer to non-voluntary movement of people.”
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of an “occupying power” deporting or transferring parts of its own
population, whereas “transfers” without any identified transferor may occur
at the instance of actors (including, conceivably, the transferees themselves)
in addition to the occupying power and therefore not necessarily imply
coercion exercised by one party upon another. And to understand the
phraseology used in the first paragraph – “individual or mass forcible
transfers” --, as well as one plausible origin of the sixth paragraph, it seems
necessary to transcend a dictionary definition of words to take account of
context, background and purpose.
(d) Context, Background and Purpose
Although an earlier effort to draft and have states adopt an
international convention for the protection of civilians preceded World War
II,333 the 4th Geneva Convention, the product of the Geneva Conference held
in the summer of 1949, was drafted in the aftermath of, and took into
account the experiences of, World War II,334 especially the Nazi atrocities
that occurred both before and during the war. Throughout, “[t]he
discussions were dominated … by a common horror of the evils caused by
the recent World War and a determination to lessen the sufferings of war
victims.”335 The various nations’ delegates at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic
Conference considered a draft of the convention that was the product of a
preliminary conference held in Stockholm the prior year, 1948.336 The
Stockholm draft was an amended version of the draft presented to the
Stockholm Conference, which in turn was based upon, but replaced, an even
earlier draft convention considered by a Conference of Government
Experts337 held in Geneva in the Spring of 1947. Article 49, in the final
333

See 15th International Red Cross Conference, Tokyo, 1934, Draft International Convention on the
Condition and Protection of Civilians of Enemy Nationality who are on Territory Belonging to or Occupied
by a Belligerent, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 445
(2004).
334
In the words of George Best, “This was a long-standing Red Cross project to which the experiences of
1939-45 gave urgency and direction.” Best, supra note 163, at 115. See Id., at 80-179 for a description of
the stages of considering ideas and drafts that became the 4th Geneva Convention, including the political
stances taken by various government as they, in some cases belatedly, realized the dimensions of the
convention they were drafting.
335
JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PRISONERS IN TIME OF WAR (1958) (hereinafter, “Pictet’s Commentary”) at 8.
336
See Final Record, supra note 152, Volume I, at 113-40.
337
See International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government
Experts for the Study of the Conventions for the Protection of War Victims (Geneva, April 14-26, 1947)
(hereinafter, “ICRC Report of Government Experts”). The Conference of Experts was itself preceded by a
Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies held in the summer of 1946, which, although
dominated by the most recent horrors of the 2d World War, initially considered the question of whether the
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draft, was the renumbered and partially redrafted successor to Article 45 of
the Stockholm draft,338 which in turn amended the draft of Article 45339 that
had been presented for discussion at the Stockholm conference. That draft

protection of civilians should be integrated into the convention protecting prisoners of war or required a
separate convention. See id.
338
Article 45 in the Stockholm draft reads as follows:
Deportations or transfers against their will of protected persons out of occupied territory are
prohibited, whether such deportations or transfers are individual or collective, and regardless of their
motive.
The occupying Power shall not undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area, unless the
security of the population or imperative military considerations demand. Such evacuations may not involve
displacements outside the bounds of the occupied territory, except in cases of physical necessity.
The occupying power shall not carry out such transfers and evacuations unless it has ensured
proper accommodation to receive the protected persons. Such removals shall be effected in satisfactory
conditions of hygiene, healthfulness, security and nutrition. Members of the same family shall not be
separated.
The Protecting power shall be informed of any proposed transfers and evacuations. It may
supervise the preparations and the conditions in which such operations are carried out.
The occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civil population into the territory
it occupies. Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 120-21.
As this was the draft of what became, once renumbered, Article 49, hereinafter reinafter Article 45 refers to
that article, unless the text otherwise indicates. For a usage otherwise, see the reference to the Final Article
45 (not the final Article 49) at infra note 363, and accompanying text.
339
Deportations or transfers of protected persons out of occupied territory, whether individual or collective,
and whatever their motive, are prohibited.
The occupying Power shall carry out no evacuation, total or partial, of a given area, unless the
security of the population or imperative military considerations require. Such evacuations may only take
place within the occupied territory, except in cases of material impossibility.
The occupying Power shall undertake such transfers and evacuations only after ensuring to the
protected persons proper accommodation to receive them. Such removals shall be effected in satisfactory
conditions of hygiene, salubrity, security and nutrition. Members of the same family shall not be separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any proposed transfers and evacuations. It may
supervise the preparations and the conditions in which they are carried out.
XVIIth International Red Cross Conference (Stockholm, August 1948), International Committee of the Red
Cross, Draft Revised or New Conventions for the Protection of War Victims at 173 (Geneva, May 1948)
(hereinafter, “XVIIth ICRC Conference”).
Each article of the draft presented to the Stockholm conference was accompanied by remarks that
had been prepared either by the committee that had revised the draft considered at the 1947 experts
conference or by the staff of the ICRC. The Legal Commission of the ICRC at that point consisted of :
Jean S. Pictet, Director and head of the legal division, and M. MAX HUBER, Honorary President of the
ICRC and M. BOSSIER, presumably a member of the ICRC staff., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, REPORT ON GENERAL ACTIVITIES, July 1, 1947 – December 31, 1948, at 12 (Geneva 1949). The
remarks following the text of Article 45 stated:
This Article corresponds to Article 27 of the Draft of the Government Experts. It draws a very clear
distinction between deportation of protected persons outside the borders of occupied territory (which is
strictly forbidden), and the evacuation of particular areas, which is permitted in two cases, named by way
of l imitations: (1) if the security of the populations requires; (2) if imperative military considerations
demand. It should be noted that the Protecting Power may exercise the right of supervision which is
granted to it, without exception, even when, for example, populations are removed outside the boundaries
of the occupied territory and transferred to the national territory of the Power in occupation. The Protecting
Power may exercise its right of supervision in respect both of the transfers themselves and of the conditions
in which they are carried out. XVIIth ICRC Conference, supra this note, at 173.
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of Article 45 succeeded what had been Article 27340 considered at the 1947
Conference of experts. Prior to the Stockholm conference, a legal
committee substituted the term, “transfers”, in Article 45’s first paragraph
for “removals”, which had been the term used in Article 27’s first
paragraph.341 But Article 27 lacked any analogue to Article 49’s sixth
paragraph, which a legal subcommittee at the Stockholm Conference
inserted. The new paragraph became the fifth paragraph in the Stockholm
draft of Article 45 considered at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference.
When the Convention was presented to the conference of delegates in
1949, the text of Article 45’s first paragraph read: “Deportations or transfers
against their will of protected persons out of occupied territory are
prohibited, whether such deportations or transfers are individual or
collective, and regardless of their motive.”342 Delegates from various
nations, most notably the Soviet Union,343 thought the language in the first
paragraph, “against their will”, too weak, on the theory that persons could be
coerced to consent to expulsions.344 Whether or not the text read as in its
original guise, “against their will”, or as redrafted to read, “individual or
mass forcible transfers”, the sentence remained in the passive tense, rather
than being phrased in the active voice, such as, “The occupying power may
340

Art 27 provided:
Individual or collective deportations or transfer, carried out under physical or moral constraint, to
places outside occupied territories, and for whatever motives, are prohibited.
This prohibition applies to all persons in the said territories. It shall not constitute an obstacle to
the general evacuation of an area by the occupying Power, if military operations make it necessary. Such
evacuation shall not involve the transfer of the population beyond the occupied territory, unless it cannot
possibly be effected within the limits thereof.
Collective transfers within an occupied territory shall only be enforced to meet the security
requirements of the occupying Power.
The occupying Power shall carry out such transfers and removals with all due regard to the rules
of hygiene, salubrity, security and nutrition, not only during the transfer, but also in the area in which the
evacuees will be accommodated.
The conditions under which transfers and removals are carried out shall be verified by the
Protecting power, or by the competent international body.
In no case shall the above removals and transfers constitute a disguised form of internment or
assigned residence.
ICRC Report of Government Experts, supra note 337, at 288. Note that Article 27 was drafted as a much
more specific text, taken into account the horrors of the 2d World War, in place of Article 19(b) of the
Tokyo draft, which read:
Deportations outside the territory of the occupied State are forbidden, unless they are evacuations intended,
on account of the extension of Military operatons, to ensure the security of the inhabitants. Id.. at 288.
341
Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIB, at p. 193.
342
Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 1, at 120-21.
343
See remarks of P. Morosov of the Soviet Union: “The Soviet Delegation further proposed deletion of
the words “against their will”, because in occupied territory no one had the right to express an opinion.
There was a risk of abuses arising out of the words ‘against their will’”. Final Record, supra note 152, Vol.
IIA, at p. 664.
344
See remarks of Colonel du Pasquier, the Reporter, in Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at p. 759.
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not deport or forcibly transfer…” The most probable reason is that the Nazi
atrocities to which the first paragraph primarily referred were often carried
out not by the Nazis themselves, but the nationals or partisans of the
occupied country, for example, Poles or Lithuanians, who rounded up Jews,
either for killing in mass pits or for transfer to concentration camps. Hence,
the phraseology of the first paragraph prohibited the kind of events that
occurred in Poland, Lithuania and other occupied countries, regardless of
whether an occupying power, such as the Nazis, or its surrogates committed
the atrocities.
The text of Article 49’s present sixth paragraph (the Stockholm draft’s
fifth paragraph) on which the alleged illegality of Israeli settlements is
based, remained the same from the Stockholm draft through the adoption of
the 4th Geneva Convention. To view its necessity in order to cover more
fully the heinous practices that occurred before and during World War II and
hence its plausible meaning, reference must be made to the definition of
“protected persons”, the parties sought to be protected by the initial
paragraphs of Article 49, in contrast to the occupying power’s own
“civilians” referred to in the sixth paragraph. Article 4 provides that
“[p]ersons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of
which they are not nationals.”345 In other words, although the Geneva
Convention was primarily 346designed to protect individuals rather than
sovereigns, it did exhibit some deference to the concept of sovereignty:
most of its provisions did not apply to a belligerent power’s own nationals or
civilians,347 and therefore left uncovered two Nazi practices, engaged in to a
lesser extent by other Axis powers: deporting Germany’s own Jews and
other undesirables to slave and extermination camps in Poland and other
occupied countries; and transplanting Germans to portions of Poland and
other occupied countries to displace those populations with Germans. The
language of the sixth paragraph covered these omissions, as the restrictive
345

Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 298. It should be noted that Article 4 then excludes from the
category of protected persons “Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention”, “Nationals of a
neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State”, and “Nationals of a co-belligerent
State.” Id.
346
The exception to this statement are the provisions of Part II of the Convention, but they are not relevant
to the present issues.
347
It should be noted that two other sets of civilians were excluded from the class of “protected persons”:
nationals of a state not bound by the convention; nationals of a neutral state who are in the territory of a
belligerent state if the state of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic relations with the belligerent
state; and nationals of a co-belligerent state. See Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 298.
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definition of “protected persons” protected by Article 49’s first paragraph
did not include the occupying power’s own “civilians.”
Besides the question of whether the “against their will” language348 in
the first paragraph was strong enough, many of the conference delegates and
the drafting committee members’ comments about original Article 45 related
to the question of responsibility for protected persons if, for their own
protection, they had to be temporarily transferred from the occupied territory
to the territory of another power.349 With the exception of these evacuations
for the benefit of the population evacuated,350 substantially all references by
delegates that concerned “transfers” connoted an involuntary movement of
people, whether or not the term, “transfers”, was modified by “forcible” and
regardless of the paragraph of Article 49 or of another provision of the
Geneva Convention in which one found the term.351 In the third committee
at the Geneva Conference, charged with the final drafting of the 4th Geneva
Convention, Adolpho Maresca of Italy “said that in the last war the flower of
Italian youth had been sent to Germany in cattle trucks.”352 Significantly, he
added, “Such forced transfers must at all events be prohibited in the future.
The term ‘deportation’ in the last paragraph of the Article had better not be
used, as ‘deportation’ was something quite different.”353 Maresca, here, was
clearly making reference to the text of present paragraph 6, and making the
same distinction between “deportations”, which some participants saw as
legitimate during war time,354 and “transfers”, which they condemned as

348

This language was inserted by a legal subcommittee at the Stockholm Conference into the text of Article
45 prepared for that conference’s approval and therefore became part of Article 45’s text in the Stockholm
draft presented to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference the following year. Its proponent was Albert J.
Clattenburg of the U.S. See Resume des debats, infra note 379, at 62.
349
See, e.g., the comment of Anna Kara of the Hungarian People’s Republic at Final Record, supra note
152, Vol. 1 at 347.
350
See infra notes 359-62, and accompanying text.
351
The one possible exception is this report from the drafting committee as to why it changed the wording
of the first paragraph of original Article 45:
“Although there was general unanimity in condemning such deportations as took place during the recent
war, the phrase at the beginning of Article 45 caused some trouble in view of the difficulty in reconciling
exactly the ideas expressed with the various terms in French, English and Russian. In the end the
Committee have decided on a wording which prohibits individual or mass forcible removals as well as
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to any other country, but which permits voluntary
transfers.” Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. 2-A, at 827. This paragraph could be even be interpreted,
however, not as indicating a difference between the conduct condemned by the first and sixth paragraphs of
the redrafted Article 49, but as substantiating the conclusion that the line of division between prohibited
and permitted conduct corresponded to the difference between forceful versus voluntary transfers.
352
Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 664.
353
Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA at 664.
354
See, e.g., remarks of Remarks of H.E. Mr. Maurice Mineur of Belgium, Final Record, supra note 152,
Vol. IIA, at 809.
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inherently forced and condemned. Representatives of the Soviet Union355
and the Netherlands356 similarly saw transfers as forced rather than
voluntary, without any comment that its use in the last paragraph of then
Article 45 differed.
Colonel du Pasquier of Switzerland, the Reporter for the Committee
considering the civilian convention, introduced the final draft of Article 45
to the 3d committee with these words: “the text proposed by the Drafting
Committee set forth a principle on which all the members of that Committee
had had no difficulty in agreeing, namely, the need to prohibit, once and for
all, the abominable transfers of population which had taken place during the
last war.”357 Addressing a Belgian fear that a majority vote, at one point, to
include “deportation” on the same footing as “transfers” in a draft of Article
41 (Article 45 in the final draft, which applies to transfers to a non-signatory
power) would “seriously prejudice the sovereign rights of the States
concerned”, Colonel du Pasquier replied, “the provisions of the Convention
might be evaded, ‘transfers’ taking place under the guise of
‘deportations.’”358 The Reporter’s comment reinforced the usage, adopted
throughout the discussions, that “transfers” were even more culpable than
“deportations”; hence, use of both terms in the sixth paragraph can hardly be
used to refer to “transfer” as a voluntary act and “deport” as a forced act.
Nowhere in this whole discussion was there any reference to the sixth’s
paragraph use of the word, “transfer”, as involving or including voluntary
movement. Nor, in these sparse references, can one find any indication that
the conference delegates understood the prohibition of an occupying power
transferring its own civilians in the 6th paragraph was anything more than
protection of those civilians who were being “transferred.”
In fact, the one usage of the term, “transfer”, in Article 45 that could
be construed as importing lack of compulsion reinforces the conclusion that
“transfer” in the 6th paragraph implied lack of volition on the part of the
population transferred. Because of the blanket prohibition of transfers and
deportations in Article 45’s first paragraph, it might have been considered
355
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unlawful to transfer protected persons out of harm’s way during warfare for
their own benefit. Hence, while the 2d paragraph of the Stockholm draft of
Article 45 did bar an occupying power from “undertak[ing] total or partial
evacuation of a given area,” this prohibition was succeeded by the clause,
“unless the security of the population or imperative military considerations
demand.”359 Without any change of meaning, the final draft of the 2d
paragraph was rephrased to read: “The Occupying power may undertake
total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand.”360 With minor modifications not
here relevant, the third and fourth paragraphs then dealt with the necessity of
insuring that, in the context where civilians had to be evacuated for their
own benefit, proper accommodations would be provided, their health
safeguarded, family members would not be separated, and the party in
control of the territory to which the civilians were being evacuated would be
so informed. In reference to these provisions, the Final Report of the
Committee drafting the text for consideration by the plenary meeting of the
delegates, referred to the function of the second paragraph in relation to the
first paragraph:
Although there was general unanimity in condemning such
deportations as took place during the recent war, the phrase at the
beginning of Article 45 caused some trouble in view of the difficulty
in reconciling exactly the ideas expressed with the various terms in
French, English and Russian. In the end the Committee have decided
on a wording which prohibits individual or mass forcible removals as
well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to
any other country, but which permits voluntary transfers.
The second paragraph deals with the problem of evacuations
made necessary in the interest of the security of the civilian
population, or for imperative military considerations. …This special
case constitutes an exception to the first paragraph….361
In other words, those transfers which were “voluntary” were those that were
permitted, that is, evacuations for the benefit of the civilians in the second
paragraph. In that context, the term, “transfer”, was used as a synonym for
“evacuations.” In contrast, the transfers in Article 45’s sixth paragraph are
of course prohibited, and there is no suggestion anywhere that these
359
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prohibited transfers were viewed as anything but involuntary. In this latter
context, “transfer” and “deport” were used synonymously.362
Within the 4th Geneva Convention, the two other primary uses of the
term “transfer” relate to protected persons, who are “transferred to a Power
not a party to the Convention”363 – which is prohibited -- and to “internees”,
whose transfer must “be effected humanely.”364 Both contexts clearly
indicate that “transfer”, again unmodified by “forcible” or a synonym,
connotes an act effected by the Detaining Power upon the protected persons
or internees, as the case may be, irrespective of their consent. Finally, the 4th
Geneva Convention, with which we are concerned, was considered at the
same diplomatic conference that considered and adopted three other
conventions; in the 3d Geneva Convention, relating to Prisoners of War,
“transfer” is used consistently, without any adjectives, to connote an act of
the Detaining Power upon them, rather than a voluntary act on the prisoners’
part.365
Without more, then, a textual reading that takes into account the term,
“occupying power”, as well as the term, “transfer”, reinforced by the term,
“deport,” the use of similar terminology elsewhere in the 4th Geneva
Convention, the use of similar terminology in the 3d Geneva Convention,
the comments of delegates to the Convention, as well as the overriding
context that surrounded the drafting of the Geneva Convention, would seem
to support an interpretation that voluntary movement of one’s civilians, done
of their own free will, is not prohibited by the sixth paragraph of Article 49.
To Julius Stone, writing in reference to this paragraph, “the word ‘transfer’
in itself implies that the movement is not voluntary on the part of the persons
concerned, but a magisterial act of the state concerned.”366 Terming a
contrary interpretation of the 6th paragraph as “an irony bordering on the
absurd”, he commented: “Ignoring the overall purpose of Article 49, which
would inter alia protect the population of the State of Israel from being
removed against their will into the occupied territory, it is now sought to be
interpreted so as to impose on the Israel government a duty to prevent any
Jewish individual from voluntarily taking up residence in that area.”367
Eugene Rostow concurred that “the provision was drafted to deal with
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‘individual or mass forcible transfers of population,’ like those in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary before and after the Second World
War,”368 In contrast, Rostow characterized Jewish settlers in the West Bank
as “most emphatically volunteers,”369 and concluded that Jews had every
right to settle on the West Bank, “equivalent in every way to the right of the
existing population to live there.”370
(e) Pictet’s Commentary and its Sources
There is “more”, however, and that additional input casts some doubt
on the meaning and purpose of the 6th paragraph. Under the general
editorship of Jean S. Pictet, Director Delegate of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, the sponsoring organization for the Geneva
Conference and the organization under whose auspices the Convention was
drafted, members or former members of the ICRC wrote a commentary on
the Convention,371 published in its original French version approximately
seven years after the conference. Like “official comments” of a statute
subsequently written by non-legislators who participated in drafting the
legislation, there is serious question of what weight to attach to commentary
of an international treaty published well after the conference at which the
drafts have been discussed, the final draft adopted, and the Convention
signed by the delegates from different nations and ratified by various
governments.372 Nonetheless, Pictet’s commentary has been given
authoritative weight,373 and therefore must be considered.
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Referring to the theme of Article 49 as a whole, Pictet’s commentary
states: “it will suffice to mention that millions of human beings were torn
from their homes, separated from their families and deported from their
country, usually under inhumane conditions.”374 But the authors were less
certain of the role of the 6th paragraph, and commented: “It is intended to
prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers,
which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for
political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those
territories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the native
population and endangered their separate existence as a race.”375 Moreover,
in addition to the above, the authors posited that “[i]t would therefore
appear to have been more logical – and this was pointed out at the
Diplomatic Conference[fn.3] – to have made the clause in question into a
separate provision distinct from Article 49, so that the concepts of
“deportations” and “transfers” in that Article could have kept throughout the
meaning given them in paragraph 1, i.e., the compulsory movement of
protected persons from occupied territory.”376
In other words, Pictet’s commentary suggests two things that might
give pause with respect to the prior conclusion that the 6th paragraph was
intended to protect the civilians of the occupying power’s own country (e.g.,
Germany) from their forcible transfer to the occupied territory (e.g.,
Auschwitz or other concentration camp in Poland). The first is that the
purpose of the sixth paragraph was the protection of two sets of parties: the
occupied power’s own civilians transported against their will into occupied
territory; and the native people of the occupied territory. The second is the
suggestion that the terms, “transfer” and “deport”, were not used with the
same connotation of involuntariness or compulsion that these terms
connoted in Article 49’s first paragraph.
To the extent that the purpose was to protect the racial purity or
economic situation of the native population, could it not be argued that the
sixth paragraph of Article 49 should be interpreted most liberally and
broadly against any actions of an occupying power that sponsor or promote
the movement of an occupant’s population into the occupied territory?377
Indeed, Palestinians and settlement opponents argue quiet vigorously that
the settlement enterprise had as its intent to change the demographic
composition of the West Bank. And does not the suggestion of a different
374
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meaning or usage of “transfer” and “deport” in the sixth than in the first
paragraph support the notion that Israel’s actions, -- allegedly a combination
of subsidies, tax and otherwise, infrastructure improvements for the use of
such settlements and confiscation of Arab lands378-- have violated the sixth
paragraph’s prohibition? But, while the historical record does provide
support for the first notion (that the beneficiaries of the 6th paragraph’s
prohibition included the native population of the occupied territory), it does
not confirm the latter (that “transfer” as used in the 6th paragraph, unlike its
usage in the first paragraph, did not connote compulsion).
There is support for the idea that the prohibition against the occupying
power transferring its own civilian population into occupied territory had, at
least as one of its purposes if not its primary purpose, the protection of the
native population. Pictet’s Commentary cites as support several pages in a
type-written report that tersely summarized discussions in a sub-committee
of the Legal Commission at the Stockholm Conference (interestingly, this is
the only cite to this source in the entire commentary on the 4th Geneva
Convention).379 The reference seems to have been directed primarily to the
378
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remarks of Dr. Georg Cohn of Denmark, who initially introduced the
provision with explicit reference to “protecting the inhabitants of an
occupied State against an invasion of people.”380 Cohn’s initial provision
would have prohibited an occupying power from deporting or transferring a
“part of its own inhabitants or the inhabitatnts of another territory which it
occupies” into the occupied territory.381 Claude Pilloud, then the Chief of the
Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross, reacted,
seemingly with some skepticism, with ambiguous references about some
aspect of Cohn’s proposal directed “more at the duties of the occupying
power, which is not entirely within the competence of the International Red
Cross”, but then concluded: “We should therefore try to protect a country’s
nationals.” It is unclear from the abbreviated summary whether Pilloud’s

La Commission, sur proposition de MM. Holmgren (Suède, CR.) et Abut (Turquie, CR.), decide de
différer sa décision sur cet article et d’attendre que la proposition de M. Cohn ait été distribuée.
M. Clattenburg (YSA, Gvt.) demande qu’au premier alinéa de l’article 45 on ajoute “contre leur gré”
après “les déportations ou transferts”. Cette proposition est adoptée. L’article 45 avec ou sans addition de
la proposition de M. Cohn sera mis aux voix lors de la prochaine séance. Id. at 61-2.
Discussion of Article 45 at next meeting:
M. Cohn (Danemark, Gvt.) propose l’addition suivante à l’article 45:
“La Puissance occupante ne pourra pas procéder é la déportation ou au transfert d’une
partie de sa propre population ou de la population d’un autre territoire qu’elle occupe
dans le territoire occupé par elle.”
Après une discussion à laquelle ont pris part M. Clattenburg (USA, Gvt.) qui estime que cet alinéa a un
sens beaucoup trop étendu, M. Wershof (Canada, Gvt.) et M. Pilloud (CICR), la sous-commission adopte
cet alinéa modifié comme suit:
“La Puissance occupante ne pourra procéder á la
déportation ou au transfert d’une partie de sa propre
population civile dans le territoire occupé par elle”.
M. Wershof (Canada, Gvt.) signale qu’il s’est abstenu de voter, non qu’il réprouve les sentiments
exprimés dans cet alinéa, mais il estime que cette conférence n’est pas habilitée pour examiner dans cet
alinéa des questions de ce genre et trouve que la Convention n’a pas pour but de montrer à des Nations
comment elles doivent faire la guerre. Id. at 77-8.
380
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reference to “a country’s nationals” referred to the transferred population of
the occupying power or the inhabitants of the occupied territory.382
The proposal to add the provision was first shelved to allow interested
parties to consider it. Cohn reintroduced his text at the next subcommittee
meeting, without reference to the intended beneficiaries of the prohibition.383
Other participants at the subcommittee committee, led by Albert J.
Clattenburg, Jr. of the United States, thought the provision was too broad.
After discussion, the language, “or the inhabitants of another territory which
it occupies”, was deleted, and the word, “civil”, was added prior to
“inhabitants” in the French text.
Shortly after the 1949 Geneva Conference, Hersh Lauterpacht,
published the 7th edition of Oppenheim’s International Law384, in which he
opined that the paragraph’s “prohibition [was] intended to cover cases of the
occupant bringing in its nationals for the purpose of displacing the
population of the occupied territory.”385 Lauterpacht, the very distinguished
English law professor and member of the International Court of Justice, had
been a legal expert to the International Committee of the Red Cross at a
committee of experts in December of 1948, but that meeting apparently
382
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concerned certain “grave breaches” provisions common to all four of the
Geneva Conventions and occurred subsequently to the Stockholm
Conference at which the language of the fifth paragraph was introduced and
fixed.386 In the preface to his edition of Oppenheim’s text, Lauterpacht
thanks Pilloud, of the ICRC, “for information concerning the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.”387 Pilloud, who, as mentioned above, was chief of the
Legal Division of the ICRC and a participant at the legal subcommittee
meeting at the Stockholm conference, is also listed as one of the authors of
Pictet’s Commentary, although not the principal one. It is a reasonable
assumption that Lauterpacht divined the meaning of the paragraph from
Pilloud.
Pictet’s Commentary itself notes that “[a]fter passing through these
various stages, the draft texts were taken as the only working documents for
the Diplomatic Conference …”388 – i.e., it appears that the delegates did not
have the summaries of the committee discussions before them, and those
delegates who spoke with respect to then Article 45 did not include the
members of the legal subcommittee that added its fifth (later, Article 49’s
sixth) paragraph. In any event, while it may be unclear whom the Geneva
delegates understood to be the intended beneficiaries of the prohibition in
the paragraph, all explicit references by delegates to “transfers” – whether of
protected persons, internees, the occupying power’s civilian population, or
others – seemed to focus either upon the need to protect the transferred
population or, in the context of transfers for the benefit of transferees (e.g.,
for their own safety) upon the necessity of notification to, and having regard
for the other needs of, the “protecting power” to whose caretaking they
would be transferred.
Certainly, the theme of racial or ethnic purity expressed in Pictet’s
Commentary cannot be found in either the remarks of the legal
subcommittee that inserted the provision into then Article 45 or elsewhere in
the 4th Geneva Convention. Quite the contrary. Article 13, the first
provision of Part II (General Protection of Populations against Certain
Consequences of War), which applies even if the parties affected are not
“protected parties” under the Geneva Convention, states that the provisions
of Part II “cover the whole of the population of the countries in conflict,
without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality,
religion or political opinion…”389 Part III (Status and Treatment of
386
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Protected Persons) provides that “ all protected persons shall be treated with
the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are,
without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or
political opinion.”390 And, of course, modern trends in international
humanitarian law, including negative views of immigration restrictions
based upon color or ethnicity and positive views of granting political
asylum,391 show no respect for a notion of preserving the racial composition
or ethnic integrity of the country of immigration, although they do evince
support for self-determination.
In less racial terms, 392whatever the intent of those who promoted
settlement – the negative one sometimes imputed to Israel by its opponents - to displace the Palestinian population with Israeli Jews -- or a positive one
-- facilitating the rights of Jews to live on the West Bank without prejudice
to the rights of Palestinians393 – it is difficult to argue that Jewish settlements
have altered materially the ethnic balance of the West Bank.394 Excluding
disputed neighborhoods in Jerusalem and settlements contiguous to the pre1967 armistice lines, Jews at most constitute no more than 8 percent of the
West Bank’s population, less than 4 percent of a Palestinian state that would
include Gaza, and an even smaller percentage of the population if at least
some Palestinian refugees return to live in either the West Bank or Gaza.395
390
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Moreover, while the 1967 War, like the 1948 War, produced some refugees,
there is no evidence that there was any nexus between any Arab refugees in
1967 and any plan to construct and populate Jewish settlements. This
situation differs substantially, then, from efforts by the Soviet Union to alter
the ethnic makeup of the Baltic States, by initially deporting hundreds of
thousands of people and then encouraging Russian immigration into them,396
or by China to alter the ethnic makeup of Tibet, by forcibly scattering its
native population and moving Chinese into Tibetan territory in their stead.397
With respect to the Pictet Commentary’s support for “transfer”
possibly having a meaning different from elsewhere in Article 49’s text, its
footnote 3 refers solely to that page in the Final Record of the Geneva
conference containing the remarks of delegates Morosov of the Soviet
Union, Slamet of the Netherlands, Maresca from Italy (discussed
previously), none of whom suggested that the 6th paragraph be removed to a
different separate article and all of whom referred to “transfers” in the
negative sense as involving force and compulsion.398 At the close of the 16th
committee meeting considering the civilians’ convention, Mr. Georges
Cahen-Salvador of France, chair of the committee, was reported to have
summed up the discussion concerning the whole of Article 49 in the
following way: “The Chairman, before declaring the discussion on article
45 closed, noted that the Committee was unanimous in condemnation of the
abominable practice of deportations. The sole purpose of every speaker had
been to strengthen the interdictory provisions of the Article. He suggested
that deportations should, in the same way as the taking of hostages, be
solemnly prohibited in the Preamble.”399 The delegates, meeting as a
396

See THOMAS A. ARMS, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE COLD WAR 43 (Facts on File 1994). While the
deportations began under Stalin in 1945, prior to the 4th Geneva Convention, the movement of Russians in
to the Baltic States continued even under Khruschev and Brezhnev “so that by 1980 of 1.5 million citizens
in Estonia, only 900,000 were ethnic Estonians.” Id. For a description of the forced deportations of
hundreds of thousands of natives of the Baltic States and the Russification of Estonia, Latvia and, to a
lesser extent, Lithuania, see also WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR., BALTIC INDEPENDENCE AND RUSSIAN EMPIRE
56-7(1991); JOHN HIDEN & PATRICK SALMON, THE BALTIC NATIONS AND EUROPE 131(rev’d ed.,
Longman, 1994) (“By 1979 ethnic Latvians constituted only 38.3 percent of their own capital, Riga.”);
ROMUALD J. MISIUNAS & REIN TAAGEPERA, THE BALTIC STATES, YEARS OF DEPEDENCE 1940-1990
(1993) (about 1/10 of Latvian and Estonian farmers were deported, Id. at 102, and “The Latvians’ share of
their country’s population was probably around 83 percent in 1945, but dropped to about 60 percent by
1953, due to immigration and deportations.”, Id. at 112).
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See John S. Hall, Chinese Population Transfer in Tibet, 9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 173 (2001).
The reticence of the international community actively and vociferously to criticize China’s human rights
record in this regard is explored in Philip Baker, Human Rights, Europe and the Peoples Republic of China,
THE CHINA QUARTERLY 45-63(2002), also available at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=101319.
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See supra notes 348-56, and accompanying text.
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Final Record, supra note 152, Vol. IIA, at 664.
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committee before the draft was presented to the plenary session for approval,
then proceeded to discuss succeeding articles. No one argues that Israel
forcibly moved settlers into the West Bank, although, as part of the Gaza
disengagement, Israel did forcibly remove settlers from four settlements in
the Northern West Bank and has since begun to evacuate, with force, illegal
outposts having some permanent residents.
(f) Other Considerations – Avoiding Absurdity and Circularity,
and Taking Account of the Element of Time
Several other considerations – most notably, avoiding absurd
conclusions, avoiding circularity of meaning and taking account of the
element of time,– counsel against the conclusion that Israeli settlements
violate Article 49’s sixth paragraph, especially on the basis of preserving
any alleged racial or ethnic purity of Palestinians. While Julius Stone
considered Israeli settlements in compliance with both of the themes that, at
least in his reading of Pictet’s Commentary, inhered in Article 49’s sixth
paragraph – protecting the occupying power’s own civilians from transfer
against their will and protecting the nationals of the occupied territory from
a mass influx that historically had often accompanied forcible transfer of
nationals out of occupied territory -- he did have the following to say about a
conclusion that Israel had any obligation to keep Israeli volunteers from
settling on the West Bank:
…[W]e would have to say that the effect of Article 49(6) is to impose
an obligation on the state of Israel to ensure (by force if necessary)
that these areas, despite their millennial association with Jewish life,
shall be forever judenrein. Irony would thus be pushed to the
absurdity of claiming that Article 49(6), designed to prevent repetition
of Nazi-type genocidal policies of rendering Nazi metropolitan
territories judenrein, has now come to mean that …the West Bank…
must be made judenrein and must be so maintained, if necessary by
the use of force by the government of Israel against its own
inhabitants.
Common sense as well as correct historical and functional
context exclude so tyrannical a reading of Article 49(6)….400

400

STONE, supra note 118, at 180.
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Stone’s observation invites a hypothetical: suppose that a group of
Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel requested permission to establish
a community on the West Bank. Without loss of their citizenship, Israel
facilitated the community’s establishment on land that this group was able to
purchase from other Palestinian Arabs (not citizens of Israel) or on state
land. Would establishment of this settlement violate Article 49’s sixth
paragraph? If not, how can one distinguish the hypothetical from Jewish
settlements?
Those who most vigorously allege that Jewish settlements violate the
sixth paragraph generally tend not to differentiate between those settlements
established prior to or subsequent to actions on the part of the Israeli
government that, for a time, are said to have promoted settlement activity; to
these opponents, the military government’s permission to establish a
settlement itself would have been prohibited. An argument that only Jewish
settlement without any state involvement would satisfy Article 49, therefore,
leads to another absurdity, to wit, that only Jewish settlements unauthorized
by the military commander and therefore illegal under Israeli law401 are
lawful under Article 49. Only the occupants of these illegal outposts would
seemingly truly qualify as “volunteers” not related in any way to Israeli
government action!
Circularity of interpretation is also to be avoided. Concluding that
Israeli settlements violate the sixth paragraph of Article 49 also overlooks
the fact that Jewish communities formerly existed in some of the areas that
are today defined as Israeli settlements, for example, in Hebron and in the
Etzion Bloc.402 These Jewish communities were destroyed by Arab armies,
militias, and/or rioters, and, as in the case of Hebron, the community’s
population slaughtered. Does it make sense to interpret Article 49 to bar the
reconstitution of Jewish communities that were themselves destroyed
through aggression and slaughter? If so, the international law of occupation
funs the risk of freezing one occupier’s conduct in place, no matter how
unlawful. And under what theory can one then distinguish between
settlements and the reconstruction and repopulation of the Jewish quarter of
Jerusalem’s old city, which was also destroyed by the Jordanians in its 1948
occupation of the West Bank?403 An answer that these acts of Arab
401

See the Sason Report, supra note 2.
See Lein, supra note 29, at 11: “As early as September 1967, Kfar Ezyon became the first settlement to
be established in the West Bank. It was established because of the pressure of a group of settlers, some of
whom were relatives of the residents of the original community of Kfar Ezyon, which was abandoned and
destroyed during the 1948 war.”
403
To its “credit” on grounds of consistency, B’Tselem does not do so, characterizing the Jewish quarter in
the Old City as a “settlement.” Id. at 103. Most people would presumably recoil at this characterization in
402
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aggression against Jewish communities preceded the Geneva Convention,
whereas the establishment of Jewish settlements on the West Bank succeeds
it, would be a “technicality” hardly consistent with a view that Article 2’s
provision as to when the Convention applies to occupied territory is a
“technicality” not to be relied upon or the view that “occupying power” and
“transfers” should be interpreted most broadly to accord with the
Convention’s humanitarian purposes.
Suppose that, irrespective of any textual, contextual, historical or
purposive analysis and no matter how voluntarily Jews have moved to
civilian settlements on the West Bank, one still wishes to conclude that the
initial establishment of Israeli civilian settlements on the West Bank violated
Article 49’s sixth paragraph. Substantially, all legal systems take account of
the element of time, which bears on both the relevance of legal doctrine as
well as the equities of parties involved.404 International law is no exception.
For example, after substantial time has passed where one has been
dispossessed of property, should one have a right of repossession or a right
to compensation under international law? Generally, the international
practice has been, at best, to grant compensation rather than a right to
repossession based upon dated claims. And, even then, compensation has
been based upon what Benvinisti and Zamir have called “adequate
compensation” rather than “fair value.”405 No one disputes that the Hague
Regulations were designed to regulate short term occupations.406 While it
has been argued that the Geneva Convention, because its focus is the
protection of people rather than simply sovereign states, does not necessarily
presuppose that only short term occupations are meant to be regulated by its
provisions, no one contends that even its drafters or signatories contemplated
a lawful belligerent occupation lasting close to 40 years.407 As George Best
has written, “[t]he makers of the Civilian Conventions can never have
envisaged a military occupation as unprecedentedly prolonged as this, or
circumstances as intractable as those which tangle tgether the new State of
Israel, the neighbouring Arab States (most of them in some sense new too),
that the property in this area had been owned and populated by Jews for centuries (if not millennia), the
synagogues were destroyed during Jordanian occupation, and Judaism’s holiest site, the Western Wall, lies
at the edge of the area.
404
A domestic example might be the doctrine of adverse possession, where open use of another’s property
after a certain number of years results in title passing to the occupier from the original owner.
405
See Benvinisti & Zamir, supra note 34, at 328-31.
406
See Benvinisti, supra note 133, 7-3.
407
Roberts, supra note 200 (“the Fourth Geneva Convention was designed to protect the civilian population
under an essentially temporary occupation”), although the same author elsewhere states, “The proposition
that the basic rules codified in the law on occupations must continue to be observed for as long as the
occupation lasts is a useful compass bearing to guide one through this difficult subject.” Id. at 54.
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and the dispossessed Palestinian people bearing the aspect of a State-inwaiting.”408 In its original guise, in fact, the Geneva Convention included a
one-year provision after which only certain of its provisions would continue
to be binding on signatory states.409 Surely, there is a difference between a
lawful occupation that, say, lasts five410 to ten years (relatively, “long” in
terms of the Hague Regulations) than one that lasts forty years or more. At
some point it becomes absurd to argue that an occupying power cannot
permit its own citizens to settle in disputed land411 , which is not privately
owned, especially in areas once occupied by Jews, simply because they
belong to the dominant ethnic group of the occupying power. The contrary
conclusion could well be reached if, consistent with Security Council
Resolution 242 and 338, Arab states had negotiated and arrived at peace
treaties with Israel, or if the Palestinians had accepted a negotiated
settlement of all claims with Israel in 2000, that is, if the occupation had
persisted not because of Israel’s legitimate security concerns but because of
Israel’s refusal to settle all claims with the Palestinians. It can even be
argued that, at some point, uprooting the settlers itself becomes a wrong
comparable to those at which Article 49 is directed. In short, even if one
adopts an interpretation of the Geneva Convention that would dictate the
initial illegality of Israeli settlements, both time and culpability in failing to
resolve the conflict should be accorded some weight in adjudging their
present legality.
(g) Judicial interpretation
The only instance of the International Court of Justice applying and/or
interpreting paragraph 6 of Article 49 was its advisory opinion in 2004, in
408

See BEST, supra note 163, at 316.
Art. 6, ¶3, amended by the 1977 Geneva Protocol I. See Roberts, supra note 200, at 55. Although Israel
never ratified the Protocol, it has never relied upon Art. 6 for its position that the Geneva Convention does
not apply to its control over the West Bank, although it has insisted that its conform to the Convention’s
humanitarian provision. See id. (“Israeli authorities have never invoked it as a means of reducing their
obligations.”). In any event, the one-year provision specifically does not apply to Article 49. See Final
Record, supra note 152, Vol. I, at 298.
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Roberts defines a “prolonged occupation” as one “that lasts more than 5 years and extends into a period
when hostilities are sharply reduced –i.e., a period at least approximating peacetime.” Roberts, supra note
200, at 47. Roberts, who is critical of Israeli settlement building, wrote in 1990 at a period when Israel’s
control over the West Bank was approaching 25 years. That is a far cry from the 40 years that is now
imminent. Moreover, while the consideration of time might be analyzed differently if the failure to end the
hostilities and the resultant occupation primarily lay at Israel’s feet, but the weight of authority is to the
contrary. See supra notes 179-98, and accompanying text.
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In this regard, one of the weightiest grounds given by an opponent of Israeli settlements – that some
were established on territories the sovereignty over which by another nation was not disputed – does not
apply to the West Bank. See Roberts, supra note 200, at 64-65.
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response to a request from an emergency session of the United Nations
General Assembly, that Israel’s security fence violates international law.412
Israel appeared only to contest the Court’s jurisdiction. For the most part, the
fence follows the route of the green line, but is in many instances
constructed to its east, that is, in the West Bank. Writing for the ICJ, its
President, Shi Jiuyong of China, reiterated the commonly accepted position
that the 4th Geneva Convention does apply to Israel’s control over the West
Bank. In his opinion, he also opined that Israeli settlements violate Article
49’s sixth paragraph, which he interpreted as “prohibit[ing] not only
deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried out
during the Second World War, but also any measures taken by an occupying
Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own
population into the occupied territory.”413 As support, the opinion cited three
resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1979 and 1980,414 but the
Court did not otherwise buttress its interpretation with any reference to the
drafting history of paragraph 6, the understandings at the Geneva Diplomatic
Conference, the Nazi behaviors towards which the whole of Article 49 was
directed, or contrary views.
From the Court’s perspective, its opinion regarding paragraph 6 was
hardly dictum, however. In addition to protecting the lives of soldiers and
Israeli civilians living within the Green Line, protecting the lives of Israeli
settlers on the West Bank seems to have constituted one purpose that
explained the positioning of the fence, at least at the time of the Court’s
opinion.415 Implicit in the court’s opinion, therefore, was the notion that
such a purpose could not serve as justification for constructing a fence on
occupied territory. On the other hand, since the Court held that all parts of
the fence lying within the West Bank were unlawful – and not simply those
parts that were designed to protect settlers – its view of the scope of
paragraph 6 was actually irrelevant to its broad decision with respect to the
412

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J.
136 (July 9, 2004) (hereinafter, “ICJ Wall opinion”). The opinion was sought by tenth emergency special
session of the United Nations General Assembly. Israel appeared only to contest the court’s jurisdiction.
413
Id. at 183.
414
S.C. Res. 446, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979) ; S.C. Res. 452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/452 (July 20,
1979); S.C. Res 465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 11980). The last of these resolutions described "Israel's
policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in [the occupied] territories" as a
"flagrant violation" of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”
415
The court stated: “ it is apparent from an examination of the map mentioned in paragraph 80 above that
the wall's sinuous route has been traced in such a way as to include within that area the great majority of the
Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem).” ICJ Wall Opinion,
supra note 412, at 183. It should be noted, however, that the positioning of the security fence has shifted a
number of times since, sometimes at the instance of questioning by the Israeli Supreme Court. See infra
notes 421-23, and accompanying text.
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fence.416 The vote of the court was fourteen to one. While six justices who
joined the majority wrote separate opinions, none expressed a difference of
opinion with respect to Article 49’s sixth paragraph. The sole dissenter was
Justice Thomas Buergenthal, who thought that the court should have
declined to exercise jurisdiction in light of the fact that “the court did not
have before it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings.”417
Nonetheless, even he agreed that Article 49 “applies to the Israeli
settlements in the West Bank”, that “their existence violates … paragraph
6”, and that “[i]t follows that the segments of the wall being built by Israel to
protect the settlements are ipso facto in violation of international
humanitarian law.”418
In Elon Moreh, the 1979 Israeli Supreme Court decision that greatly
impacted that land on which subsequent Israeli settlements were established,
Justice Witkon, unlike his other colleagues deciding the case, was prepared
to say that the 4th Geneva Convention applied to Israel’s control over the
West Bank. However, he noted in his concurring opinion, “the question
whether voluntary settlement falls under the prohibition of “transferring
sections of the population” within the meaning of Article 49(6) of the
Geneva Convention is not an easy one and … no answer has yet been found
in international jurisprudence.”419 The view expressed by Justice Witkon
about the applicability of the 4th Geneva Convention to Israel’s control over
the West Bank presaged a subtle shift on the part of the Israeli Supreme
Court as a whole. In later cases, the Court did measure Israeli actions
against the standards of the Convention’s humanitarian provisions, in part
because the government of Israel -- despite its official stance regarding the
Convention’s non-applicability -- claimed that its actions conformed to the
Convention.420 And, despite disagreeing with the ICJ as to whether it was
416

See Ruth Lapidoth, The Status of the Territories: The Advisory Opinion and the Jewish Settlements, 38
ISR. L. REV. 292, 293 (2005) (“discussion of the legality of the settlements was not necessary, and thus is
only an obiter dictum”).
417
ICJ Wall opinion, supra note 414, declaration of Judge Buergenthal at 1.
418
Id. at 4.
419
Concurring opinion in the Elon Moreh case, SHAMGAR, supra 219, at 438. It is pertinent to note that
Judge Witkon thought the Geneva Convention did apply to Israel’s hold on the West Bank, unlike the view
expressed by Justice Landau that the Geneva Convention “belongs to conventional international law shich
does not legally bind an Israeli court…” Id. at 419.
420
Most recently, this “construct” was articulated in Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ
7957/04, (Sept. 15, 2005), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html: “The Judea and
Samaria areas are held by the State of Israel in belligerent occupation. The long arm of the state in the area
is the military commander. He is not the sovereign in the territory held in belligerent occupation (see The
Beit Sourik Case, supra note 420, at p. 832). His power is granted him by public international law
regarding belligerent occupation. The legal meaning of this view is twofold: first, Israeli law does not apply
in these areas. They have not been "annexed" to Israel. Second, the legal regime which applies in these
areas is determined by public international lawregarding belligerent occupation …In the center of this

101

legal for an occupying power to construct a security fence in occupied
territory in order to protect its own citizens from terrorism, even if those
citizens were settlers,421 the Court has required the government to change the
shape and scope of the fence to take greater account of the interests of
Palestinians affected by it.422 In these and other more recent opinions, the
public international law stand the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The
Hague, 18 October 1907…. These regulations are a reflection of customary international law. The law of
belligerent occupation is also laid out in IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War 1949….The State of Israel has declared that it practices the humanitarian parts of
this convention. In light of that declaration on the part of the government of Israel, we see no need to
reexamine the government's position. We are aware that the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice determined that The Fourth GenevaConvention applies in the Judea and Samaria area, and that its
application is not conditional upon the willingness of the State of Israel to uphold its provisions. As
mentioned, seeing as the government of Israel accepts that the humanitarian aspects of The Fourth Geneva
Convention apply in the area, we are not of the opinion that we must take a stand on that issue in the
petition before us. In addition to those two sources of international law, there is a third source of law which
applies to the State of Israel's belligerent occupation. That third source is the basic principles of Israeli
administrative law, which is law regarding the use of a public official's governing power. These principles
include, inter alia, rules of substantive and procedural fairness, the duty to act reasonably, and rules of
proportionality. " Id. at 8-9.
421
Maar’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, supra note 420. The Mara’abe case dealt with a petition by
residents of several Palestinian villages that were separated from the remainder of the West Bank by the
placement of Israel’s security fence to protect Alfei Menashe, an Israeli settlement in the West Bank, 4
kilometers beyond the “green line.” The Court’s opinion, by its President, Aharon Barak, was written in
the aftermath of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion about the security fence, see notes
412-18 and accompanying text, and was as much a response to the ICJ opinion as it was an adjudication of
the rights of the villages affected (although it did order the military “within a reasonable period, to
reconsider the various alternatives for the separation fence route at Alfei Menashe, while meaning security
alternatives which injure the fabric of life of the residents of the villages of the enclave to a lesser extent.”)
Id. at p. 63.
422
One of these cases, HCJ 2056/04 Bet Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel [2005] , 58(5)
P.D. 807 (hereinafter, the Bet Sourik Case), occurred prior to the ICJ opinion, while the Maar’abe case was
decided subsequently. Writing for the court in the Beit Sourik case, President Barak also laid out the test of
proportionality that, according to the Court, inheres in both international humanitarian law and Israeli
municipal law: “[a]ccording to the principle of proportionality, the decision of an administrative body is
legal only if the means used to realize the governmental objective is of proper proportion. The principle of
proportionality focuses, therefore, on the relationship between the objective whose achievement is being
attempted, and the means used to achieve it.” Barak then laid out the subtests, all of which must be
satisfied, if proportionality is to be satisfied: “The first subtest is that the objective must be related to the
means. … According to the second subtest, the means used by the administrative body must injure the
individual to the least extent possible. In the spectrum of means which can be used to achieve the
objective, the least injurious means must be used. This is the “least injurious means” test. The third test
requires that the damage caused to the individual by the means used by the administrative body in order to
achieve its objectives must be of proper proportion to the gain brought about by that means.”
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html. In Beit Sourik itself, the Court was convinced that
the first two sub-tests of the proportionality test were satisfied but not the third in a majority of the
instances to which the decision related and ordered the government and military to change thes placement
of the fence in the objectionable areas. Similarly, in Maar’abe, supra note 420, although the Court
disagreed with the ICJ – both as to the question of whether the safety of Israel’s own citizens could be
taken into account with respect to the placement of the fence (Id.at 13) and the question of whether more
generally international law forbade the construction of the fence in occupied territory -- the Court did find
particular segments of the fence to have failed the proportionality test, especially the third sub-test part of
it. Id. at 63. This trend has continued. In another recent case, the Court has also required the Israeli

102

Court has seemed less certain that its basis for adjudging Israeli actions on
the West Bank according to the 4th Geneva Convention depends solely upon
the government’s own claim of adherence to the Convention’s humanitarian
provisions.423 As David Kretzmer, a prominent critic of settlements, has
acknowledged, “[i]n the last few years the Court has handed down a number
of courageous decisions, supportive of human rights.”424 Yet, despite this
record of attentiveness to Palestinian interests and of decisions that have
actually restricted governmental and/or military actions vis´ a vis the
Palestinians,425 the Court has never held that Israeli settlements, per se,
violate international law.426
government to reconfigure the security fence on grounds of hardship to Palestinian residents or of
separation of Palestinians from their agricultural lands. See, e.g., Yuval Yoaz, High Court: State Must
Explain why it Won’t Move Separation Fence in Bil’in, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/678112.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2006). In another case, the
court has enjoined building the security fence around illegal outposts. See Yuval Yoaz, High Court
Forbids Building Fence Round Illegal Avnei Hefetz Outpost, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/664913.html (updated Jan. 2, 2006). In general, the Israeli Supreme
Court has been regarded as one of the most impartial judiciaries in the world and seen as highly protective
of the rights of Palestinians. See D. Beinisch, “The Role of the Supreme Court of Israel in Times of
Emergency”, Globes, November 21, 2002 and DERSHOWITZ, ISRAEL, supra note 39 at 183-7. Indeed, the
Israeli Supreme Court, particularly under its present President, Aharon Barak, has been criticized precisely
for its judgments allegedly adverse to Israeli settlers and security. See Caroline Glick, Column One:
Israel’s Judicial Tyranny, Nov. 18, 2005, THE JERUSALEM POST,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132053877195&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
423
For example, in the Mara’abe case, supra note 420, President Barak’s opinion for the Court termed the
basic normative foundation of both the ICJ opinion on the security fence and its own to be “a common
one.” Specifically, in regard to the 4th Geneva Convention, it articulated that commonalty of normative
foundation in the following subtle way:
“The ICJ held that in an occupied territory, the occupier state must act according to The
Hague Regulations and The Fourth Geneva Convention. That too was the assumption
of the Court in The Beit Sourik Case, although the question of the force of The Fourth
Geneva Convention was not decided, in light of the State's declaration that it shall act
in accordance with the humanitarian part of that convention. The ICJ determined that
in addition to the humanitarian law, the conventions on human rights apply in the
occupied territory. This question did not arise in The Beit Sourik Case. For the
purposes of our judgment in this case, we assume that these conventions indeed apply.”
Id. at 36
424
KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 14.
425
David Kretzmer, writing approximately five years ago, noted: “In the last few years the Court has …
handed down a number of courageous decisions, supportive of human rights. Foremost among these are
decisions forbidding the security services from using any form of physical force in interrogation of terrorist
suspects, denying the authorities the power to use the law on administrative deterntion to hold detainees as
‘bargaining chips,’ and deeming unlawful restrictions on Arabs purchasing houses in a communal
settlement established on state land by the Jewish Agency.” KRETZMER, supra note 204, at 14-15 (citations
omitted). A recent example is a case in which the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of
Justice, rebuked the municipality of Jerusalem for not having created enough classrooms for the Arabs of
East Jerusalem and requiring the Jerusalem municipality and Israel’s Department of Education to draft a
plan to do so within five months. See Ketsena Svetlova, HCJ rebukes Municipality, Education Ministry
over Education in e. Jerusalem, THE JERUSALEM POST,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132475619858&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
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In accord with the ICJ’s opinion and the Security Council resolutions
in 1979-80 to which the ICJ referred, the General Assembly has repeatedly
passed resolutions stating that Israeli settlements violate Article 49’s sixth
paragraph.427 The Security Council issued three such resolutions during
1979 and 1980.428 However, finding references to the application of Article
49’s sixth paragraph to the actions of any nation except Israel is like looking
for “needles in a haystack.” A number of indictments and decisions by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that have
considered acts of genocide and forced deportations, primarily those
committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims,429 and a decision on a motion
for acquittal by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda430 deal with,
or are based upon, a violation of Article 49, along with other provisions from
the four Geneva Conventions. However, all references with respect to the
Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention seem to pertain to its first and
(updated Nov. 30, 2005). See also Y. Yoaz, High Court Bans IDF’s ‘Early-Warning Practice, HAARETZ,
Oct. 10, 2005, www.haaretz.com/hasen/objectw/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo-632657.
Although acknowledging and applauding this activism, however, Kretzmer seems partially to agree with
the view that the Supreme Court has legitimated the actions of Israel on the West Bank “[b]y clothing acts
of military authorities in a cloak of legality …” KRETCHMER, supra note 204, at 2. On the other hand, he
concedes that court questioning and pressure have caused the military and government to back down from
decisions or acts under consideration: “when the overall picture is considered, the conclusion is far less
clear [that the Court’s legitimating function has dominated], since the Court’s shadow has played a
significant role in restraining the authorities.” Id. at 190.
426
David Kretzmer suggests that the doctrine of “justiciability” still plays a role, the court accepting the
justiciability of individual claims brought by Palestinians on the basis of their property or other rights but
deeming the general policy of settlements not justiciable. For a case that support’s Kretzmer’s suggestion,
see Bargil v. Government of Israel, supra note 224. In other words, the Court’s silence on this issue does
not necessarily mean that it concurs with the government that the settlements do not violate international
law. And in the Mara-be case, supra note 420, the Court was able to avoid an opinion as to whether the
settlements themselves violate international law because it determined that the responsibility of the Israeli
military administration under the Hague Regulations included not only the safety and security of the
Palestinians on the West Bank but Israeli civilians as well (that is, the duty of protection did not depend
upon the legality of the presence of the settlers there). See id.at 13-14.
427
See supra, note 12.
428
S.C. Res. 452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/452 (July 20, 1979); S.C. Res. 465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (March 1,
1980); S.C. Res. 478, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980),
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html. The date of these resolutions, which were adopted
during the Carter administration, is significant. While the United States State Department, during the
Carter and George H.W. Bush administrations, did consider the settlements illegal, the State Department
subsequently declined to reiterate that position. The Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations
have adopted the more frequent formulation that the settlements simply are an obstacle to peace.
429
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic, Dragan Jokic, 2005 WL 414846 (UN ICT)(Trial)(Yug));
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic 2004 WL 2781930 (UN ICT (App)(Yug)). For a description of the horrific
events on account of which these prosecutions were brought, see TONY JUDT, POSTWAR, A HISTORY OF
EUROPE SINCE 1945 665-83 (2005).
430
The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Arsene Shalom Ntahobali (Case No. ICTR-87-21-T),
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second paragraphs rather than to its sixth. Finally, occasionally one finds a
non-governmental reference to Article 49 applying to the conduct of a nation
other than Israel – for example, in 1994, a non-governmental organization
alleged that Article 49(6) was violated in the Chinese transfer of its
population into Tibet in order to alter the population mix in Tibet.431
Caution in facilely concluding that Israeli settlements violate Article
49(6) comes from respect for, rather than disregard of international
humanitarian law. Although elementary, it merits repetition that what
distinguishes a system of “law” from arbitrary systems of control is that
similar situations are handled alike. No legal system is one hundred percent
pure, of course, but the incompletely achieved goal remains that legal
principles are applied based upon the circumstances regardless of the
political position or identity of the parties. The very loose use of
international law, disproportionately applied to every instance of Israel
trying to protect itself undermines the notion that this is “law” entitled to
authoritative weight in the first place.432 Where are the legal proceedings
and/or repeated United Nations General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions condemning and applying Article 49’s sixth paragraph to the
forced displacement of Tibetans by Chinese, the movement of Russians into
the Baltic States or other post-1949 transfers in Africa, Asia and Central
Europe?
Where warranted, of course, Israel should not be immune to the
charge that it has violated the 4th Geneva Convention. But others have cited
the irony of applying the Geneva Convention, drafted and adopted in the
aftermath of World War II, with the Holocaust specifically in mind, uniquely
431
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to that state a significant percentage of whose population consists either of
Holocaust survivors, their offspring, or other relatives of those who perished
in the Holocaust.433 On the part of some, the implied equation of Israeli
actions with those of the Nazis forms part of a strategy to demonize and
deny legitimacy to Israel, not simply its settlements on the West Bank or
particular Israeli policies.434 As one legal commentator writing in 2003
noted, “In three recent emergency special sessions of the UN General
Assembly, Israeli settlement was cited as a violation of the 1949 Fourth
Geneva Convention. These international humanitarian instruments, forged
in the ashes of the Holocaust to prevent future genocidal brutality and
oppression, were never invoked in 50 years until the case of condominium
construction in Jerusalem during 1998.”435 Similarly, would it not be ironic
if the only applications of the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment were against the interests of African Americans when that
amendment, like the 13th amendment, was passed in the aftermath of and
directed towards the end of slavery and its consequences in America?
4. Some concluding remarks about the applicability and weight to be
assigned to the condition of legality under international law
In sum, the question of whether, as a general matter, Israeli
settlements violate either the various provisions of the Hague Regulations
and/or Article 49(6) of the Geneva Convention is reasonably moot. One
should be cautious about overstating the position of either settlement
proponents or opponents.
Many of those who allege a violation of international law
acknowledge, indeed try to point out, a distinction between settlements
established in the late 1960’s until at least 1977, when the Labor led
government basically followed the Allon plan, and those established in
433

See Curtis, supra note 110, at 486: “It is ironic that this charge [that Israel has violated the Geneva
Convention] should be made in reference to a convention the purpose of which was to prevent the
recurrence of Nazi-like occupation with its brutality, disregard of human rights, physical and mental
coercion, taking of hostages, and imposition of foreign law.”
434
See Bradley Burston, What Makes Islam so Easy to Hate?, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=676507&contrassID=2 (last updated Jan. 30,
2006) (“The Code is clear, and it is communicated to a billion Muslims the world over – these Jews, these
are the Nazis now.”); Francis A. Boyle, Israel’s Crimes against Palestinians: War Crimes, Crimes Against
Humanity, Genocide, MEDIA MONITORS NETWORK, Aug. 28, 2001, available at
http://www.mediamonitors.net/francis7.html. Boyle served as Legal Adviser to the PLO from 1991 to
1993.
435
See J. Helmreich, Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of the Settlement Issue, 2 JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF,
No.16 (Jan. 19, 2003).

106

subsequent years under Likud led governments.436 Many if not most of the
settlements established under the Allon plan were placed in the Jordan
Valley, away from Palestinian population centers, and, wherever placed, had
a military defense justification. These settlements, then, at least initially
qualified under the “military necessity” standard of the Hague Regulations
and hardly affected the Palestinian civilian population.437 Under later Likud
led governments, many if not most settlements were demanded if not forced
upon the government by Gush Emunim and similar settlement groups. As to
the great bulk of these settlements, there is little doubt that almost all settlers
were enthusiastic volunteers, who, irrespective of any Israeli tax incentives
or other help, would nonetheless have established their settlements. As
B’Tselem itself has stated, “The principal method adopted by the [Gush
Emunim] movement was to settle a given site without government
permission – and sometimes contrary to its policy – in an effort to force the
government later to recognize the settlement as an accomplished fact.”438
Hence, the argument that Israel, as an “occupying power”, had “transferred”
them in violation of the Article 49(6) of the 4th Geneva Convention becomes
very weak. Similarly, since most Israeli settlements have been established on
state rather than private land, the charge that all settlements have been
established on “Arab” land should meet with substantial skepticism unless
material errors either in the substance or procedure of designating land as
“state” land is established.
On the other hand, one should also exercise caution about overstating
Israel’s position. When both the Hague Regulations and 4th Geneva
Convention are viewed together, there is a sense that Israeli arguments
justifying West Bank settlements under one body of law weaken its
arguments under the other body. The more one justifies settlements in the
West Bank under a doctrine of “military necessity” as a reason to depart
from the status quo ante prior to June, 1967 (in order to satisfy the Hague
Regulations), the more that justification seems incongruous with seemingly
permanent civilian settlements. Stated inversely, the more one emphasizes
that the settlers have moved to the West Bank of their own accord rather
than at the instance of the Israeli government or its military (in response to
the charge that an occupying power has transferred its civilians into
occupied territory in violation of Article 49(6) of the Geneva Convention),
the more difficult it is to support the justification of “military necessity”
436
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under the Hague Regulations for alterations in the West Bank allegedly
prejudicial to the native population, including the settlements. Similarly,
even if the settlers are present legally because of military necessity, that
would not give them the right to remain in a Palestinian state any more than
Israel’s soldiers present on the West Bank would have a right to remain.
While there may be answers to these difficulties that are given in the text of
this article – including the Blum/Rostow/Stone opinion that Israel’s status on
the West Bank cannot be defined solely as that of an occupying power, the
removal of seemingly “permanent” settlements from the Gaza Strip
(demonstrating that even the notion of permanence is ephemeral), the fact
that international law related to occupation was never formulated with
reference to control over a territory lasting this long without final peace
agreements, the absurdity of interpreting international law so as to bar Jews
from voluntarily living in an area, etc., etc. – the point is that, just like the
frequently reiterated statement that Israeli settlements clearly violate
international law, the question of legality is not a “slam dunk” on Israel’s
part either.
Nonetheless, international law should not be used solely as an
instrument of politics. To the extent that it is so used, its legitimacy as a
source of law materially suffers, as illustrated by the pointed critiques that
followed the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the fence.439 Given the paradoxes of
439
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applying the international law of occupation, especially Article 49(6) of the
4th Geneva Convention, which has uniquely and increasingly been the thrust
of the charge of illegality, to Jewish settlements on the West Bank – a reality
for millennia prior to the Twentieth Century and a right established in the
Balfour declaration and the Palestine Mandate-- it is questionable at best to
conclude that Jewish settlements in general violate international law.
Stating the condition initially posed in the negative – that Israeli settlements
are not demonstrated to be illegal -- the condition seems to have been
satisfied. This conclusion, of course, may not hold as to particular civilian
settlements that, without military necessity, have been established on
requisitioned land, civilian settlements established on private Palestinian
land subsequent to Elon Moreh, or settlements established on land
fraudulently purchased and/or fraudulently designated as state land. While
international law cannot be the ultimate arbiter of whether settlements
remain, it can influence the decision with respect to particular settlements.
The Oslo accords440signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization in September of 1993 specifically left the subject of Israeli
settlements, like the subjects of Jerusalem and refugees, to the political
process of negotiation.441 The 1995 interim agreement between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority similarly designated settlements and borders as
subjects to be negotiated in final status negotiations between the parties.442
It is the conditions based upon predominantly and transparently political,
(1991) (defending the intifada with a one-sided view of Israeli policies on the West Bank); UN
Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab
Territories, including Palestine, Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/20001/121, ¶¶35-44, Report on
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G01/118/72/PDF/G0111872.pdf?OpenElement(Falk was one
of the three authors of a report taking the position that Israel could not exercise the rights of an occupation
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social and security considerations – namely, that continuance of Jewish
settlements is both practical and consistent with the creation of a viable
Palestinian state – that will and should determine their fate in general.
B. That Israeli Jewish settlements not prevent the creation of an independent
Palestinian state necessary for a two-state solution
Except for partisans who tend to use legal arguments to score political
points, legitimate political issues dominate over legal issues when speaking
about Jewish settlements. It is to these political issues that we now turn.
The first, again heard repeatedly, is that Israeli settlements prevent the
establishment of a Palestinian state. The political argument would seem to
have two dimensions, one geographical and the other directed towards
peoplehood or citizenship.
The most frequently heard version of this political argument is
geographical. The strong form version of the geographical argument is that
Israeli settlements prevent a contiguous Palestinian state.443 A moderateform version of the geographical argument is that, whether or not, Gaza
aside, such a state would have contiguity, its borders would be
extraordinarily convoluted. A correlative claim connected to both versions
is that the settlements, in any event, occupy too much of the land that
Palestinians would need for their state.
It is difficult to understand the strong form version because, even if
Israel were to retain sovereignty over every existing Jewish settlement on the
West Bank, it would be Israel, not a state of Palestine, that would lack
contiguity. And, as previously discussed in this article, while the moderate
version has some validity in the abstract, much of its force is undermined
when we remind ourselves that we are speaking about an allocation of land
west of the Jordan River between two independent states. But, the irony of
both of these geographical concerns is that they do not apply to the argument
made in the article. Acceptance of the fact that Israeli Jewish settlements
can exist in an Arab state of Palestine would only serve to increase the
contiguity and/or geographical wholeness of the Palestinian state.444
Connected to both the “strong” and “moderate” geographical
argument is an assumption, seemingly held by the popular press and much of
443
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the public, that Israeli settlements constitute a substantial percentage of the
land mass of the West Bank. Ironically, Peace Now and B’Tselem, both of
which oppose the settlements, estimate the percentage of land mass
settlements presently occupy on the West Bank at 1.36 percent and 1.7
percent, respectively.445 To the extent that population clusters of Arabs and
Jews should and will influence the borders between Israel and a state of
Palestine, at least some of the settlements will be integrated into Israel,
probably in exchange for land in the Negev that would broaden the width of
Gaza. And, if so, the percentage of land on the West Bank that settlements
constitute would drop even further, arguably well below 1 percent. These
percentages rise appreciably, to somewhere between 3 and 6 percent of the
West Bank, if connecting roads and the like are considered.446 But, once
again, these percentages can only drop if the issue under consideration is not
whether the settlements will stay, but under whose jurisdiction they will
remain.
The heart of the matter concerns the presence of a population within
Palestine that identifies as Israeli Jews. In contrast to the nearly 20 percent
of Israel’s own population that is Palestinian Arab, however, the 50,000 to
100,000 Jewish settlers that will probably be most affected by continuance
of Jewish settlements in a Palestinian state would constitute less than three
percent of Palestine’s population, based upon a present population of
approximately 2.3 to 2.5 million Palestinian Arabs within the West Bank and
Gaza,447 and substantially less than 2 percent of such a state if one assumes
some influx of Palestinian refugees into such a state. Whereas, in the words
of Ephraim Karsh, “it is certainly true … that the influx of these
[Palestinian] refugees into the Jewish State would irrevocably transform its
demographic composition”448, the existence of Jewish communities within a
Palestine would not pose any demographic risk to Palestine’s remaining an
overwhelmingly Arab state.
As with Israel’s Arab population, the presence of Israeli Jews in a
state of Palestine would pose issues of citizenship (will they be citizens of
Palestine or only residents?), loyalty (will the settlers, regardless of whether
they gain Palestinian citizenship, remain citizens of the state of Israel?), and
445
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legal autonomy in particular spheres. These are serious issues, but it is
unclear why they pose more serious problems than those concerning the
Arab population in Israel.449 Israel’s Arabs – whether Muslim or Christian –
exercise legal autonomy in personal affairs.450 A recent Israeli survey on
patriotism in Israel and its bearing on national security found that “most of
the Israeli Arabs are not proud of their citizenship (56 percent) and are not
ready to fight to defend the state (73 percent).”451 Moreover, the survey
found differences “between the type and expression of patriotism among
Jewish citizens …and … Arab citizens.” “Among the latter”, it was
reported, “patriotic feeling is subdued” and “[w]hen patriotic sentiment is
given expression, twice as many Arabs define themselves as Palestinian
patriots than as Israeli patriots.”452 After the creation of an independent
Palestinian state, would not at least some of Israel’s Arab citizens wish to
become citizens of that state as well as citizens of Israel?453
Moreover, just as conceptions of sovereignty continue to evolve and
change454, it is clear that citizenship, a concept related to one’s degree of
449
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inclusiveness within a given sovereignty, bears different and evolving
meanings. Summarizing a wealth of social scientific learning, Paul Schiff
Berman demonstrates, “people can hold multiple, sometimes nonterritorial,
community affiliations.”455 Traditional and allied notions of citizenship,
sovereignty and the “nation-state” are fast eroding, with flexible and
contingent forms of these notions replacing the more absolutist, formalistic
notions associated with Europe post the Middle Ages. Significantly, under
the Oslo Accords, Palestinians in East Jerusalem were allowed to vote in the
Palestinian elections, although Israel claims all of Jerusalem as its capital
under its jurisdiction.456
Millions of Americans, to consider another example, hold dual
citizenship, retaining their American citizenship even as they live in Ireland,
Poland, Israel, Mexico or some other place and also exercise citizenship or
some attributes we associate with citizenship in these other places. Why
would dual citizenship necessarily be more problematic in the context of two
contiguous states? And what if the Jewish population, or large numbers of
it, chose not to become citizens of Palestine? Again, by way of analogy,
approximately 6.6 percent of legal residents in the United States are not
citizens.457 Provided that they are legally residing within the United States,
these residents enjoy many of the same rights as American citizens, the most
notable exception being the right to vote. Arguably, it is optimal to have all
persons permanently resident within a given territory enjoy all the rights and
experience all the obligations of others, but this utopian ideal rarely
characterizes the situation of any present country, especially multi-ethnic
nations that also attract immigrants.
Moreover, substantially all peace plans that have been proposed that
incorporate a two-state solution, with one of those states being an Israel that
can realistically be denominated and remain both a democratic and
predominantly Jewish state, also posit that any Palestinian state to be created
alongside Israel would be demilitarized.458 Without an army, some of the
455
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complications that Israel experiences with its Arab population459 disappear.
Issues of taxation, juridical status for purposes of legal proceedings, and
voting are no more intractable in the context of a peace agreement and
accompanying treaties than the comparable issues with respect to
Palestinians residing within the state of Israel as citizens or entering Israel
for employment on a daily basis.

C. That Continuance is practical: the issue of whether Jews and Arabs can
co-exist safely within a predominantly Arab Palestine
The argument that Jewish settlements are an obstacle to peace
frequently devolves to questions related to the willingness and safety of Jews
and Arabs to co-exist in a Palestinian state. Sometimes this view is
expressed in terms of “pragmatism”460, that is, although Jews should as a
matter of principle be allowed to establish communities on the West Bank,
pursuing the continuance option is not a pragmatic solution. The recent
victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections has, if anything,
heightened such concerns, although many pundits and academics have
attributed the Palestinian vote more to the Palestinian Authority’s
incompetence and inefficiency than to Hamas’ militant stance towards Israel
and Jews.461
Both Arabs and Jews have legitimate security and safety concerns.
Palestinians have been witness to the destructive, anarchic acts of some
Jewish settlers, who, originally armed for their self-protection, have stolen
additional munitions from the Israeli military and turned their wrath both
against the Israeli military and Palestinians. In several cases, they have
killed Palestinians and in other cases beaten them, torched residences and/or
stolen their olive crops.462
459
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Jewish settlers also have good reason to fear for their safety.463
Sectarian hatred is a common phenomenon in the Middle East.464 Even
Christian Palestinian Arabs have increasingly faced discrimination and
physical violence from Muslims.465 Jews face even greater hostility.
Sermons and speeches, broadcast on the official Palestinian Authority radio
station, continually desecrate Jews and Judaism, calling them the children of
pigs and monkeys, and implore Arab Muslims to kill all Jews and drive them
from Palestine (a term that includes all of even pre-1967 Israel).466 Indeed,
intentionally damaging them in order to receive compensation from the Israeli military). The recurrence of
incidents, however, indicates that the great bulk of damage has been caused by settlers. For reports of these
incidents, see, e.g., Ze’ev Schiff, Anarchy on the Hilltops, HAARETZ, Nov. 18, 2005, ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/650475.html; Arnon Regular & Eli Ashkenazi, Palestinians:
Settlers Cut Down 200 Olive Trees near Nablus, HAARETZ, Nov. 27, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/650475.html. (updated Nov. 27, 2005); David Forman, Settlers,
Hands off the Olive Trees, THE JERUSALEM POST,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1134309653390&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2F
ShowFull (updated Dec. 27, 2005); Gideon Alon, Shin Bet gives IDF, Police ‘Harvest Incident’ Suspects,
HAARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/668680.html (updated Jan. 11, 2006) (both describing an
allegation that Jewish youths cut down olive trees in the Hebron area, and giving the statistic that there
were 17 “harvest incidents” in 2005, including physical attacks on Palestinian harvesters, the theft of
harvested olives, and trespassing); Amos Harel, Hundreds of Settlers Riot in Hebron, Set Fire to
Palestinian Home, HAARETZ DAILY, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/670191.html (last updated
Jan. 15, 2006) (Israeli settlers, reacting violently to orders issued by the Israeli military to evacuate shops in
Hebron, rioted, including torching a home belonging to Palestinians in the city); Amos Harel, Settlers Riot
across W. Bank Ahead of Amona Evacuation, HAARETZ DAILY
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/676627.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2006)(describing beatings of
Arabs and torching of their cars, as well as violence by settlers against the Israeli Army in anticipation of
the forced evacuation by the Army of an illegal settlement on the West Bank).
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See Raphaeli Israeli, The New muslim Anti-Semitism: Exploring Novel Avenues of Hatred, JEWISH
POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW 17:3-4 (Fall 2005); Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Abbas Must Act, U.S. NEWS,
www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/051031/31edit.htm; Glenn Kessler, Palestinian Leader Is Urged
To Confront Militant Groups, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005 at A14.
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Witness the horrendous violence exhibited by Sunnis against Shiites, and visa versa, in Iraq. See Sabrina
Tavernise, Sectarian Hatred Pulls Apart Iraq’s Mixed Towns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, at 1.
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See generally WEINER, supra note 83. Weiner ascribes much of this to the emergence of Islam as a
political force, pointing out the draft constitution of the Palestinian Authority declares Islam to be the
official religion and includes Sharia Law. Specifically, Weiner details the social and economic
discrimination against Christians, the boycott and extortion of Christian businesses, violation of real
property rights, crimes against Christian Arab women, Palestinian Authority Incitement against Christians,
and the failure of the Palestinian security forces to protect Christians. One of his conclusions is that “[t]he
reversion to traditional Muslim religious attitudes necessarily includes the treatment of Christians as
second-class citizens or dhimmi.” Id. at 22. In other words, Christians, as non-Muslims, face the same
second class status that characterized minority communities in the Islamic Middle East for centuries,
especially its Jewish communities.
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See generally Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, Kill a Jew – Go to Heaven: The Perception of the Jew
in Palestinian Society, JEWISH POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW 17:3-4 (Fall 2005), reprinted at
http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-marcus-crook-f05.htm. The authors write:
“The Palestinian religious, academic, and political elites teach an ideology of virulent hatred of Jews. The
killing of Jews is presented both as a religious obligation and as necessary self-defense for all humankind.
Palestinian Authority elites have built a three-stage case against Jewish existence, much as a prosecutor
might build a case demanding a death sentence. As their expert witness, they bring Allah Himself, Who is
said to have sent a message through the Prophet Muhammad that killing Jews is a necessary step to bring
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during Ramadan, during the past several years, serial dramas based upon the
Czarist produced forgery, Protocols of the Elders of Zion, have been
broadcast on Arab television, including on stations under the control of the
Palestinian Authority and stations in Egypt (with whom Israel has a peace
treaty) and Syria.467 Very recently, the President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
the president of Iran, pronounced that “Israel must be wiped off the map.”468
Iran sponsors both Hezbollah, which fights Israel from Southern Lebanon,
and Islamic Jihad, which, operating both out of Gaza and the West Bank,
engages in terrorism against Israeli civilians, both within the 1948 borders
and on the West Bank; neither of these two groups accept the legitimacy of
Israel.469 And even after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, scores of terrorist
incidents have been attempted, and a few have succeeded.470 In the
immediate aftermath of the Palestinian elections won by Hamas, the Hamas
leadership seemingly remains committed to that organization’s retention of
its guns – even perhaps under the legitimacy of forming a Palestinian
“army” – and to the legitimacy of specifically targeting civilians.471
Yet important voices of moderation do exist, accepting the legitimacy
of Jews living within the midst of a greater Arab population.472 And
Resurrection. Stage 1 is characterized by collective labeling of Jews as the enemies of Allah, possessing an
inherently evil nature. Stage 2 teaches that because of their immutable traits, Jews represent an existential
danger to all humanity. Stage 3 presents the necessary solution predetermined by Allah: the annihilation of
Jews as legitimate self-defense and a service to God and man.”
See also Justus Reid Weiner & Michael Sussman, Will the Next Generation of Palestinians Make Peace
with Israel?, JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp537.htm
(“The idea of the shahid (martyr) has become so ingrained in Palestinian culture that it is a major theme in
formal education, family values, religious practices, television broadcasting, posters, pre-suicide eulogies,
trading cards, family celebnrations, movies, music, games, and summer camps.”).
467
For a description of these shows, see http://www.pmw.org.il/Protocols.htm (Itamar Marcus, ed., Jan. 25,
2001 – Nov. 26, 2002). See also Tamadan TV Special: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, MEMRI,
Special Dispatch Series – No. 309, Dec. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP30901.
468
See M. Indyck, Iran’s Bluster Isn’t a Bluff, L.A.TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-indyk1nov01,0,4655814,print.story?coll=lanews-comment-opinions. Indyk, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings
Institution, is a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of State for Near East affairs.
469
See id..
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For example, on October 26, 2005, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed five Israelis in the town of
Hadera. See Greg Myre and Dina Kraft, Palestinian Suicide Bomber Kills 5 in an Israeli Town, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at A3.
471
See Meshal, Hamas Ready to Merge Armed Factions to form PA Army, HAARETRZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/675793.html (updated Jan. 28, 2006); Steven Erlanger, Hamas
Leader Sees No Change Toward Israelis, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at 1. See also Jonathan Adiri, From
Mahmoud Abbas to Mahmoud Hamas, Israel has no Alternative but to Disengage from the Palestinians
and to Manage the Conflict from a more Secure Position, Feb. 19, 2006,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3218458,00.html.
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See, e.g., Walid Salem, Address the ‘Jewish Question’ Without Resorting to Propaganda, THE DAILY
STAR, Nov. 8, 2005, www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=19863#.
Salem is the director of the East Jerusalem office of Panorama, the Center for the Dissemination of
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undoubtedly, guarantees of safety, free travel, and the like would have to be
extended to Jewish communities before they would feel safe and agree to
stay in an Arab Palestine. The world has seemed to be rushing to create a
Palestinian state on the assumption that such a state would decrease the level
of Islamist terror that even the West, both the United States and Europe,
have recently experienced. Whether this assumption is wishful thinking or
not in terms of a decrease of Islamic terrorism against the West in general is
beyond the realm of this paper, but it increasingly appears to be wishful
thinking in terms of Palestinian acceptance of Israel.473
Indeed, the mere creation of a Palestinian state, without more, would
not be a panacea. There are and must also be preconditions to such a state,
not as a matter of theory or wishful thinking, but as a matter of reality.
These conditions include the dismantling of terrorist organizations,474 the
monopoly of force by a Palestinian police force, demilitarization,475 and
economic viability.476 It is not simply a matter of acceding to Israel’s
interest or that of Jews who may be living in a Palestinian state. As even
Adam Roberts, who is sympathetic to the Palestinian view of Israeli
settlements has observed, “on the Palestinian side, the belief that selfdetermination is an internationally recognized right still sometimes involves
a corollary reluctance … to accept that there might be any obligation on
Palestinians to demonstrate (to Arab states as much as to Israel) that a future
Democracy and Community Development. Sari Nusseibah, President of Al Quds University in East
Jerusalem, is another key voice of moderation. See,e.g., Alan Cowell, End to Boycott of Israeli
Universities Is Urged, N.Y.TIMES, May, 20, 2005, at A8; David Horovitz, A Glimmer of Hope, N.Y.TIMES,
Mar. 10,2004 at A27. Salem and Nusseibah differ from others, whose calls to integrate Jews into Arab
society seem part of a strategy to advocate one multi-ethnic state, with Arabs in the majority, rather than
two states.
473
See Zeev Schiff, The Hope that Turned False, HAARETZ, Dec. 9, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/655822.html (“In recent months, Israel has shown an openness that it
has not displayed in the past: the disengagement from Gaza and evacuation of the settlements, the opening
of the Rafah passage between Gaza and Egypt, and the agreement allowing European Union monitors at the
passage. … The response by the Palestinian gangs was to step up the Qassam rocket fire from norther
Gaza…And who’s among the shooters? Not only Islamic Jihad members, but also those belonging to Al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of Fatah, Abu Mazen’s organization.”).
474
See Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative Council Elections, Dec. 28, 2005,
http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/middle_east/quartet-28dec2005.htm (“those who want to be part of the
political process should not engage in armed group or militia activities, for there is a fundamental
contradiction between such activities and the buldin g of a democratic state.”).
475
See PM’s Kadima to call for Demilitarized Palestinian state, HAARETZ DAILY, Nov. 28, 2005,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/651003.html; Uzi Arad, No Free Rides, Tangible Israeli Gains
Required if Palestinian State is Established, Oct. 12, 2005,
http://www.yetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrint Preview/1,2506,L-31
476
This is undoubtedly why the World Bank and various donor countries are presently pumping almost a
billion dollars into Gaza after Israel’s disengagement from that territory. See Aid for Gaza Aimed to Jump
Start Economy, THE DAILY STAR, Oct. 12, 2005, www.dailystar.com. See also infra, notes 485-92 and
accompanying text.
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Palestinian state would be a stable and responsible member of international
society, accepting frontiers, regimes and rules of coexistence.”477 A recent
suggestion by Amnon Rubinstein, the founder of Shinui – one of Israel’s
most liberal parties and the present dean of one of Israel’s law schools – is
that in the absence of a control of the violence, a new mandate be established
for the West Bank under the trusteeship of either the European Union or
Jordan (with Egypt having the trusteeship for the mandate over Gaza), with
Palestinian sovereignty held in abeyance.478
The military, political and economic conditions interrelate. Apart
from the Arab-Jewish question, the lack of a monopoly of force in the
governing authority threatens the very existence of that governing authority
and the population it governs.479 A failure to rid the territory that becomes
the Palestinian state of various forces “contributes to the anarchy in
Palestinian society, to gangland rule”480, that is, it makes the creation of a
civil state nearly impossible.481 As the London Telegraph recently
editorialized, “Mahmoud Abbas’s chronic inability to contain Palestinian
violence…has serious implications both for democracy in the areas under
Palestinian authority and for relations with Israel. A man … unable to keep
his side of the bargain in the peace talks is failing those he governs…”482
Private investment necessary for economic revival will be difficult in the
context of a general state of lawlessness.483 Of course, a corollary of
477

Roberts, supra note 200, at 78-9.
See Amnon Rubinstein, Mandate for Palestine, THE JERUSALEM POST,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1134309653376&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(updated Dec. 27, 2005).
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http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=Jpost/JPArticle/Printer&cid=1091416708; Ibrahim
Barzak, Fatah gunmen clash with Palestinian police, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2006, at A10.
480
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See, e.g., Barry Rubin, Palestinian Politics, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Nov. 25, 2005,
www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=29289 (describing the “anarchy and continuing cult of
violence” that makes political progress impossible). Aaron Miller, an advisor to six presidents on the quest
for Middle East peace,concurs: “ Armed struggle as a tactic has been a disaster. … [T]he gun has also
wreaked havoc on the Palestinian society and image. Suicide terrorism has not only alienated Israel and
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/23/AR2006012301256.html (last viewed
Jan. 24, 2006).
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;jsessionid=ELQTRLBWAKJ4BQFIQMGCFF4AVCBQUI
V0?xml=/opinion/2005/12/30/dl3002.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/12/30/ixnewstop.html.
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centralization of force and police-keeping in a Palestinian central
government is that Jews also must be barred from militia-like activity and,
for that matter, bearing unauthorized arms. To some settlers, this might be
anathema484, but that would be a condition to their remaining within a
Palestinian state.
Another condition for the creation of a Palestinian state must be that it
would be economically viable. Otherwise, there can be little doubt that
rather than constituting an answer to the scourge of terrorism, that state
would become another and important base for it. And, for the foreseeable
future, there seems little doubt that to be economically viable, large numbers
of Palestinians – arguably in excess of 100,000485 – would have to come into
Israel to work every day, as they did prior to the first and second intifadas.486
The most recent World Bank report calculates unemployment in the West
Bank at 28 percent, with approximately 57 percent of workers receiving
Sharon Ails, Palestinians Face Own Travails, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8. 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/international/middleeast/08palestinians.html?pagewanted=2 (“The
combination of the security chaos in Gaza and in large parts of the West Bank … is likely to drive off
foreign investors…Yet it is only investment and job creation that can offer enough jobs for the growing
population of young men.”).
484
Zeev Schiff has described certain settlers as “right wing anarchists”, originally armed for their selfprotection, who “have been involved in an entire slew of illegal and violent activities against the
Palestinians in recent years, among them beatings and stealing their olive crops.” See Zeev Schiff,
HAARETZ, Nov. 18, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=647209.
485
See World Bank Report, Long-Term Policy Options for the Palestinian Economy, summarized in West
Bank and Gaza Update, Dec., 2002, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000160016_20030814165921.
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The Palestinian Economy and the Propsects for its Recovery, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee, Number 1, Dec. 2005, p. 6 available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Data/20751555/EMR.pdf ; Associated Press,
Israeli Aircraft fire on Gaza Rocket Labs, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/APIsrael-Airstrikes.html (“The entry of Palestinian laborers into Israel has been severely restricted during the
past five years in response to violence, dealing a crushing blow to the Palestinian economy); Associated
Press, UN report: Poverty rising in Palestinian areas, Despite Cease-Fire, HAARETZ DAILY,
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/655553.html (last update 12/8/95) (the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian affairs reported that “the unemployment rate is three times higher than what
it was before fighting broke out in late 2000”, citing “continued Israeli closures and other travel restrictions
as drags on the economy. During spikes in violence, Israel restricts Palestinian movement to stop militants
from launching attacks.”); Akiva Eldar, U.S. to Israel: Gaza convoys must start this week, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/656089.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2005) (“[A] new report prepared
by the World Bank … attributed most of the PA’s economic problems to various movement restrictions
imposed y Israel, including limitations on the number of Palestinians working in Israel.”). While Hamas
leaders – at least prior to forming their new government – have stated that they want an economy
independent of Israel (See Orly Halpern & AP, Hamas Plans Independent Economy, THE JERUSALEM POST,
Feb. 9, 2006,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=1&cid=1139395371192&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2F
ShowFull, accomplishing that goal presently seems remote and more reflective of their anti-Israel political
stance than objective economic reality.
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wages below the poverty line.487 An extraordinarily high unemployment
rate raises serious questions about whether a state at peace with its neighbors
can be created, especially one that lacks the oil resources of some of the
other Arab nations. One analyst at the World Bank, researching policy
options for the West Bank as well as Gaza, after citing the fact that
“Palestinians earn 91% more in Israel than in WBG [the West Bank and
Gaza]”, concluded that “it is paramount for WBG [the West Bank and Gaza]
to maintain access to Israel’s labor market, irrespective of the trade policy
between Israel and WBG.”488 Recent economic studies of the Arab Middle
East reveal very high unemployment rates throughout the Arab Middle
East,489 making it unlikely that Palestinian excess labor could be absorbed by
other Arab states, even assuming a willingness to do so.
Aside from employment within Israel, open or relatively open borders
are necessary for the export of goods from those industries that exist or are
created within such a state.490 As the World Bank reports, “All Palestinian
trade flows to or through Israel: for the small trade-dependent Palestinian
economy, therefore, the smooth operation of bilateral passages between
Gaza, the West Bank and Israel is essential.”491 It may be possible to
separate Israel and the Palestinians politically, but an economic separation
will take many, many years.492
487

Akiva Elder, UN report: Joblessness and Poverty on the Rise in Territories, HAARETZ,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/657006.html (last updated Dec. 13, 2005).
488
Maurice Schiff, Trade Policy and Labor Services, Final Status Options for the West Bank and Gaza,
World Bank Development Research Group, Trade, Policy Research Working Paper 2824, p.26 (April
2002), available at
http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/05/14/000094946_02050
10411325/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. While another World Bank Report has argued in favor of
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in favor of greater integration with global markets,” even this report acknowledges that “this scenario is
associated with significant unemployment. Long Term Policy Options for the Palestinian Economy at 5-6.
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unemployment rate for the Middle East and North Africa of 13.2% -- even higher than sub-Saharan Africa,
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A12.
491
World Bank Dec. ’05 Report, supra note 129 at 11.
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David Brooks, What Palestinians?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005 at A31.
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In what way do these economic data bear on the question of whether
it would be pragmatic to pursue the continuance option? The only
circumstances under which it would safe for Israel to accept huge numbers
of Palestinians every day for employment and exports from industries within
Palestine, without fear of terror, are the same circumstances under which it
should be safe for Jews to live in a Palestinian state. The exact nature of the
guarantees of safety and rights need not be spelled out here, but the presence
of Israel with its armed forces nearby ready and willing to protect
endangered Israeli Jews living close by can be a spur to a truly open and
therefore civil Palestinian society. And if this kind of society is not what the
Palestinians desire and, if permitted, design as their state, there is little
reason to allow such an independent state. As two observers of Palestinian
society have written, “A peace agreement can only successfully end a
conflict if it enjoys underlying, wide-ranging support from its respective
populations.”493
Moreover, the question of whether Jews should be allowed to stay in
their communities in land that is part of what they consider Eretz Y’srael, the
land of Israel, even if not medinat Y’srael, should be one that such
communities should be allowed to make. Under the right circumstances, just
as Israeli Jews live in New York, Los Angeles and Boston, these same Jews
might well decide, for religious and other reasons, to remain. It should be
their choice.
V. Conclusion
Two narratives indeed compete.494 According to one, the Palestinian
Arabs were “there” first, the Jews came and, as imperialists or colonists,
“took” the Arab land and displaced the native population.495 But blind
493

Weiner & Sussman, supra note 466.
For an example of one of these narratives, this one favorable to Israel, see, e.g., Charles Moore, How did
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acceptance of this narrative, intentionally in the case of some
commentators496, completely obliterates even the affirmative elements of the
Jewish narrative that relate the several millennia connection between the
land that Jews referred to as Eretz Y’srael (the Land of Israel) and the
Romans renamed Palaestina in an effort to sever that connection. According
to Ephraim Karsh, “[s]o successful has this misrepresentation of the
historical truth [the narrative that portrays “Israel as an artificial neocrusading entity created by Western imperialism”] been that what began as
propaganda has become conventional wisdom, with aggressors portrayed as
hapless victims and victims as aggressors.”497 Yet the Palestinian narrative
has now become dominant,498 and it is probably that narrative’s
unquestioned and uncritical acceptance, rather than particular arguments or
claims made and addressed above, that most accounts for the near universal
acceptance of the proposition that, in any final peace deal between Israel and
a Palestinian political authority (whether the Palestinian authority, or not) all
Jewish settlements would have to be abandoned. Indeed, if one adopts the
first narrative, then acceptance of the Jewish State of Israel is simply a
concession to a present geo-political reality rather than an acknowledgement
that Jews, too, have rights. Conscious suspension rather than acceptance of
the first narrative would allow for a more critical examination of the notion
that Israeli Jewish settlements must be completely absent from the territory
496
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to be included within a Palestinian state. The challenge is to move beyond
political narratives to deal with both the reality and desirability of Jewish
settlements on the West Bank. To what degree should the presence of
Jewish settlements affect the final boundaries of Israel vis a vis a nascent
Palestinian entity? Must the Palestinian state be free of Jews?
The presence and location of Jewish settlements surely should and
will influence the ultimate boundary between Israel and a Palestinian state.
If the raison d’êtra of Israel is that it is a Jewish albeit democratic state, its
Jewish majority should not be threatened by an Arab minority that has a
realistic chance of becoming a majority. Israel as a haven for Jews around
the world will have disappeared. The approximately 20 percent of Israel’s
present population that is Arab does not so threaten Israel’s Jewish
character. Similarly, if the raison d’etre of a future Palestinian state is to
provide a political sovereignty for Arabs who identify themselves as
Palestinians, whether or not they reside in that state, Palestine’s Arab
identity should not be threatened by a Jewish minority that would become a
majority. Two conclusions flow from this construct.
The first of these is that, indeed, some Jewish settlements like Maale
Adumim that are contiguous or substantially contiguous to the 1967 borders
of Israel will surely remain part of Israel in any final settlement499, with land
swaps most likely in the area of the Negev that would broaden the waist of
Gaza in return. This was basically Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s offer at the
2000 summit at Camp David with Chairman Yasir Arafat and in the
negotiations that followed. And, even some of the most pro-Palestinian
Israeli politicians, like former Foreign Minister Yossi Beilen, now one of the
heads of the Meretz party, acknowledge the need for border adjustments that
would integrate into Israel settlements that border on the old armistice lines
of Israel and house close to 80 percent of the approximately 250,000 settlors
on the West Bank.
The second conclusion is that the remainder of the settlements and the
Jewish settlers there, including those in the Hebron area, need not be the
obstacle to a peace settlement that is commonly portrayed. Even if close to
100,000 settlers remain (a rather high estimate, if major settlement blocs
contiguous to the green line are incorporated into Israel in exchange for
other Israeli land), that number would probably constitute no more than 2
499

While it seems clear that Jewish settlements in the Hebron area, if they are to remain, would become
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http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1131367050883&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.

123

percent of the population of such a state of Palestine and probably less. The
land area of those settlements would constitute considerably less than 2
percent of the land under Palestinian sovereignty.
Let us return to the African-American analogy tendered at the
beginning of this article. Most Americans, especially liberal Americans,
would never think that the solution to conflict within a predominantly whiteethnic neighborhood, whether Irish, Italian or other, if an African-American
family moved into it would be to remove the African-American family.
Rather, resources and substantial resources would be devoted to insuring that
the neighbors respect the new inhabitants. Instead of reiterations of the
assumption that the settlements are an obstacle to peace, thought and
resources should be devoted to a serious discussion of the context and
conditions under which Jews might continue to live on the West Bank.
While there is reason and justice for two states to co-exist west of the
Jordan, there is no reason or justice why one of these two states must be free
of Jews.
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